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Since Antoine Prost’s three volume Les anciens combattants et la societe frangaise, 
1914-1939 (1977), subsequent histories o f the period have largely accepted the benign role of 
French Great War veterans during the interwar period. This thesis re-examines the history of the 
veterans’ movement. Were the veterans integral to French democracy? Did they reject political 
extremism in favour o f a peaceful and Republican civic action? Can one judge their associations 
to have been an important obstacle to the development of a French fascism? What influence did 
the culture o f the Great War, widely held to have been important in Germany and Italy at the 
time, have on French veterans?
These questions are addressed in a detailed study of the Union nationale des combattants 
(UNC) from 1933 to 1939. Through the examination of the association’s political discourse and 
militant action, the thesis argues that the UNC challenged the democratic claim of elected 
representatives to lead France. The association’s plans for reform of the state would not have 
left parliamentary democracy intact. The UNC undertook militant political action that endorsed 
illegality and mirrored that of anti-Republican extra-parliamentary leagues. Ultimately, the 
association was one o f many actors that contributed to the destabilisation o f the French regime in 
the years before the defeat in May 1940.
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Introduction
Historians have argued that the 1930s witnessed the outbreak of an undeclared civil war in 
France.1 Groups that were often violently opposed to democracy attacked the French Third 
Republic. Anti-parliamentarianism was not a new phenomenon. In the 1880s, General 
Boulanger’s movement had threatened to engage the masses in an anti-parliamentary campaign 
for constitutional revision. The following decade, the flawed conviction for treason o f Captain 
Alfred Dreyfus divided the nation between the generally Republican Dreyfusards and the 
clericalist and right-wing anti-Dreyfusards. Nationalist intellectuals lent their weight to the 
cause against the regime. Maurice Barres’s theory of ‘rootedness’ and Charles Maurras’s 
depiction of the divorce between the pays legal (parliament) and the pays reel (the people) 
influenced the Republic’s enemies and the right for decades.2 Maurras’s monarchist Action 
fran9 aise (AF) movement presented the most strident challenge to the Republic at this time.
The outbreak o f war in 1914 rallied the left and right to the regime in the Union sacree. 
However, the successful outcome o f the war did not appease the Republic’s detractors for long. 
Left-wing agitation in the strikes o f 1919-1920 spread the fear of communist revolution. On the 
extreme right, militant groups such as Georges Valois’s Faisceau sprang up in response to the 
electoral victory o f the Cartel des gauches in 1924. A growing number of personalities and
'y
formations came to express dissatisfaction with the regime. Extra-parliamentary leagues 
attempted to engage the masses in their campaigns against the Republic, while the business and 
industrial elites took up the cause o f Ernest Mercier’s Redressement Fran9 ais.4 Increasing 
political confrontation came at a time o f economic difficulty for France. As the cost of living
1 Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years 1940-1944 (Oxford: OUP, 2001), p. 65; RobertO. Paxton, Vichy France: 
Old Guard and New Order (New York: Knopf & Random House, 1972), p. 243. For a summary o f the period see 
Samuel Kalman, The Extreme Right in Interwar France: The Faisceau and the Croix de Feu (Aldershot: Ashgate,
2008), p. 2.
2 Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 14.
3 Kalman, Extreme Right examines the Faisceau in the 1920s. On the Jeunesses Patriotes in the 1920s see volumes I 
and II o f Jean Philippet, Le Temps des Ligues: Pierre Taittinger et les Jeunesses Patriotes, 5 vols (Lille: Atelier 
National de Reproduction de Theses, 2000). Robert Soucy, French Fascism: The First Wave (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1986) looks briefly at the Legion and Action fran?aise and in depth at the Jeunesses 
Patriotes and the Faisceau.
4 Francis Monnet, Refaire la Republique: Andre Tardieu, une derive reactionnaire, 1876-1945 (Paris: Fayard, 
1993), pp. 201-202. On Ernest Mercier see Richard. F. Kuisel, Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat (Berkeley: 
University o f California Press, 1967).
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increased and the Franc lost value, the government’s use o f decree laws drew stinging criticism 
o f the apparently ailing parliamentary regime.
Though the Republic weathered these storms, the extent o f the challenge it faced during 
the 1930s was unprecedented. Parliamentary scandals, the onset of the global financial crisis in 
France and the instability o f government coalitions reinvigorated the Republic’s foes. Anti- 
parliamentarianism, previously the preserve o f extremist groups and relatively isolated thinkers, 
entered the mainstream press and society at large. The riots o f 6 February 1934, in which 
thousands o f members o f nationalist leagues and war veterans forced the government to resign, 
polarised French politics. Membership o f the leagues rocketed. They attracted hundreds of 
thousands o f French men and women into mass organisations that sought the overthrow of the 
Republican system. The exemplar o f this growth, Colonel F ran c is  de La Rocque’s paramilitary 
organisation the Croix de Feu, and its successor, the Parti social fran9 ais (PSF), became the 
largest political group in French history. While a violent seizure o f power did not take place, 
large sectors of society engaged with and supported the extreme right’s agenda. Alarmed at what 
they saw as the attempted ‘fascist’ coup o f February 1934, the extreme and parliamentary left 
joined forces in the Popular Front. Its victory in the elections of May 1936 compounded the 
division o f French politics.
The veterans o f the Great War could not escape the consequences of these political 
developments. Their numerical strength in French society was significant. In 1920 there were 
6.4 million war veterans in France. H alf o f  all men and, therefore, voters (in a country where 
women were not yet enfranchised) were veterans. Based on the shared experience of the war, 
these men laid claim to a common identity that made the veterans a potentially powerful political 
force.5 Associations such as the Union nationale des combattants (UNC) and the Union Federale 
(UF) claimed approximately 900,000 members each. The veteran became an important symbol. 
For veterans and non-veterans alike, the former poilu  more than anyone understood the interests 
of a country for whom he had shed his blood. His morality was irreproachable, forged in the 
egalitarian society of the trenches where men gave their lives for their comrades. At once a 
patriotic and moral force, the veteran would restore France after the catastrophe of the war 
because, after all, only he knew how. Standing in his way were the elected men o f the Republic.
5 Richard Bessel, ‘The ‘front generation’ and the politics o f Weimar Germany’, in Generations in Conflict: Youth 
Revolt and Generation Formation in Germany, 1770-1968, ed. by Mark Roseman (Cambridge and New York: CUP, 
1995), pp.121-122.
They had escaped the trenches and waited out the war in the relative comfort of the Chamber. 
Consequently, they could not understand the notion of self-sacrifice. Corrupted by the pursuit o f 
power, parliamentarians looked after only their personal interest. For twenty years, the veterans 
would stake their claim to the leadership o f France based on this opposition.
Heterogeneity characterised the veterans’ movement throughout its existence. From its 
inception, veterans were united in little more than the belief in their moral superiority over 
politicians and the defence o f pension rights. Associations and their civic action programmes 
came to reflect the political loyalties o f their founders and members. The two largest 
associations during the interwar period were the conservative UNC and the centre-left UF. 
Besides the two ‘heavyweight’ associations, many more existed. On the right wing o f the 
combatant movement, the UNC was joined by the Association generale des mutiles de la guerre 
(AGMG), the Federation des amicales regimentaires et d’anciens combattants (FARAC) and the 
Federation nationale (FN). On the centre right were the Union nationale des mutiles et reformes 
(UNMR), the Federation nationale des anciens prisonniers de guerre (FNAPG) and the Semaine 
du combattant (SDC), close to the UF in its pacifism but similar to the UNC on domestic issues. 
The UF and professional organisations occupied the centre, led by professeurs, instituteurs and 
other fonctionnaires who felt close to the Radical party and the secular republican tradition. The 
Federation nationale des blesses du poumon et chirurgicaux (FNBPC) and the Federation 
ouvriere et paysanne (FOP) were left wing. The communist-sponsored Association republicaine 
des anciens combattants (ARAC) represented the extreme left. The UF, UNC, AGMG, FN and 
UNMR were the only groups with the support and resources to have any hope of influencing 
politicians.6 The various associations were grouped in the Confederation nationale des anciens 
combattants et victimes de la guerre. Founded at a ‘congress o f congresses’ of associations in 
November 1927, Georges Rivollet (later minister for pensions) became its longest serving 
president. The potency o f the Confederation depended on the enthusiasm of the UNC and UF 
for the inter-associational body.7 ARAC, judged a political group, was denied membership.
During the twenties, the veterans assumed their self-appointed role as moral arbiters o f 
the Republic. Primarily concerned with securing fair pensions for their members, the 
associations did not shy away from other issues. In July 1926, for example, the Mellon-Berenger
6 Antoine Prost, Les anciens combattants et la societe frangaise, 1914-1939, 3 vols (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977), I, pp. 83-86.
7 Ibid., pp. 110-111 and p. 124.
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agreement on war debt failed to prioritise the issue of reparations over that of war debt 
repayments. If Germany defaulted, France would go on paying. On 11 July 1926, veterans from 
all groups protested on the streets o f Paris. They aimed to force a change in government by 
means of a public display o f discontent.8 It would not be the last time that the veterans took to 
the streets with a political goal in mind.
During the thirties, the veteran movement’s attention focused less on their material 
demands and more on political action. Their belief in a historical legitimacy based on the war 
experience, which trumped the democratic authority of Republican politicians, contained a 
subversive potential. The veterans claimed a privileged place in society. The associations 
believed this gave them the right to pronounce on matters o f moral, political and national 
importance while they demanded ‘just rewards’ for their members. Antiparliamentarianism was 
always a characteristic o f the movements yet it became more prominent at this time. Both the 
UNC and UF were irritated by perceived government incompetence and corruption. More than 
ever politicians and parties appeared to represent narrow and corrupt interest groups. After the 
unrest on the streets o f Paris in January and February 1934, the veterans resolved to intervene in 
national life as never before.
Historiography
Antoine Prost’s three volume Les anciens combattants et la societe frangaise, 1914-1939 (1977) 
dominates the historiography o f the French veterans’ movement. This detailed study 
demonstrates the importance o f the veterans in French society, from their national campaigns 
that sought to influence government policy on a multitude of issues, to the activity o f veterans in 
the daily associational life o f most rural French communes. Furthermore, Prost asserts that the 
ex-servicemen’s associations were integral to a French interwar democratic political culture. 
The middle classes used the anciens combattants associations to pursue their interests behind the 
cover of an apolitical front. This allowed them to defend their interests, avoid entry into the 
class struggle and act as mediator between the working class and the bourgeoisie, to whom they 
proposed conciliatory policies.9 The veterans’ associations entrenched the social classes most 
susceptible to fascism within democratic organisations. Republican in their aims, methods and
8 Ibid., p. 100.
9 Prost, III, pp. 219-223.
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‘spontaneous reactions’ they constituted ‘one of the major obstacles to the development of 
fascism in France’.10
Unlike in Germany and Italy where political violence was common, the French veterans’ 
morality forbade this action. The combatants, Prost argues, were anti-parliamentarian and 
wanted a strong regime but they refused to treat their fellow Frenchmen as enemies.11 Not only, 
therefore, did the fascist seed fall on the stony ground of an established democratic culture but 
there was also very little room for it to grow. While some ‘fascistic’ veteran leaders and UNC 
section presidents envisaged the creation o f a mass movement for state and social reform that 
would be ‘vichyssoise avant l’heure’, the Republicanism of provincial veterans meant they did 
not (and could not) launch a coup. However, the respect and esteem in which members held 
their leaders often led them to approve o f dangerous ideas.12
While Prost offers the most complete examination of the veterans’ movement, several 
partial studies provide further insight. Lynette Shaw has examined the veterans’ participation on 
the night o f 6 February 1934.13 Though Shaw shows the existence o f a radical element in the 
veterans’ movement, she is concerned more with writing the history o f the event rather than 
drawing any significant conclusions from it. Jean-Noel Jeanneney follows Prost’s argument that 
the veterans’ moralism, abhorrence of violence and bombastic yet empty rhetoric prevented the 
development o f a French fascism.14 Lyn Gorman’s analysis o f combatant foreign policy after 
Munich underlines the diversity within the movement.15 Gorman questions the conclusion that 
the veterans were united in their appeasement o f Germany and in doing so hints at a combatants’ 
movement that was not as unanimous in its politics as Prost asserts. Didier Leschi further 
emphasises the heterogeneity of the veterans’ movement. Leschi questions Prost’s conclusion on 
the wholesale Republicanism of the veterans. He argues that veterans patronised and joined the
10 Ibid., p. 217.
11 Ibid., p. 179.
12 Prost., I, pp. 164-165.
13 Lynette Shaw, ‘The anciens combattants and the events o f February 1934’, European Studies Review, 5 (1975), 
pp. 299-311. Shaw’s article was published in 1975, the same year as Serge Berstein, Le 6fevrier  (Paris: Gallimard, 
1975). Recent works on the veterans include Sophie Delaporte, Gueules cassees de la Grande Guerre (Paris:
Vienot, 2004) and Rebecca Scales, ‘Radio broadcasting, disabled veterans, and the politics o f national recovery in 
interwar France’, French Historical Studies, 31 (2008), pp. 643-678.
14 Jean-Noel Jeanneney, ‘Les anciens combattants: Fascistes ou democrates?’, Histoire, 1 (1978), pp. 86-88. See 
also Robert Soucy, ‘France: Veteran politics between the wars’, in The War Generation: Veterans o f  the First World 
War, ed. by Stephen R. Ward (Port Washington & London: Kennikat Press, 1975), pp. 59-103.
15 Lyn Gorman, ‘The anciens combattants and appeasement: From Munich to war’, War and Society, 10 (1992), 
pp.73-89.
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Croix de Feu. In doing so, they supported a group that neither respected legality nor democratic 
legitimacy.16 Building on the conclusions o f Gorman and Leschi, this thesis will argue that the 
veterans’ movement was a heterogeneous body to which one cannot ascribe a common politics.
There is a sizeable literature on extremism among ex-servicemen and groups that laid 
claim to the veteran mystique.17 The image o f the veteran, whether the living incarnation of 
order, moral authority and the nation, or a hero of the working class opposed to capitalist 
warmongers, provided a convenient mobilising myth for an array o f groups. Veterans were the 
founders and main clientele o f several extreme-right movements that desired an end to the 
Republic. The Faisceau, founded in 1924, sought to attract veterans to a project for their Etat 
combattant. The same year, veterans figured among the founders and leaders of Pierre 
Taittinger’s Jeunesses Patriotes (JP). The Croix de Feu was created in 1927 as an organisation 
for decorated veterans. In 1930, the AF established the Association Marius Plateau for veteran 
supporters. On the extreme left, the communist sponsored ARAC no more sought to shore up 
the bourgeois regime than did its opponents on the anti-Republican extreme right. These groups 
demonstrate that a sector o f the veterans’ movement was attracted to extreme and often violent 
politics.
However, the relatively minor proportion o f veterans within extremist associations means 
that they are largely considered unrepresentative o f the mouvement ancien combattant. Even the
16 Didier Leschi, ‘L’etrange cas La Rocque’, in Le mythe de I ’allergiefrangaise au fascisme, ed. by Michel Dobry 
(Paris: Albin M ichel, 2003), pp. 155-194.
17 For an analysis o f the extreme right that covers both decades of the interwar period see Robert Soucy, First Wave 
on the Jeunesses Patriotes and the Faisceau, while Soucy’s French Fascism: The Second Wave (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1995) examines the Solidarite Fran^aise, Croix de Feu/Parti social franfais and the 
Parti populaire francais. On the Croix de Feu/Parti social fran^ais see Gareth Adrian Howlett, ‘The Croix de Feu, 
Parti Social Fran^ais and Colonel de La Rocque’ (unpublished doctoral thesis, Nuffield College, Oxford, 1986); 
William D. Irvine, ‘Fascism in France: The strange case o f  the Croix de Feu’, Journal o f  Modern History, 63 (1991), 
pp. 271-295; Kalman, Extreme Right; Sean Kennedy, Reconciling France Against Democracy: The Croix de Feu 
and the Parti Social Frangais, 1929-1935 (Montreal & London: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2007); Cheryl 
Koos, ‘Fascism, fatherhood, and the family in interwar France: The case o f Antoine Redier and the Legion’, Journal 
of Family History, 24 (1999), pp. 317-329; Leschi, ‘L’etrange cas La Rocque’; Kevin Passmore, ‘Boy-scouting for 
grownups? Paramilitarism in the Croix de Feu and the PSF’, French Historical Studies, 19 (1995), pp. 527-557,
‘The Croix de Feu: Bonapartism, national-populism or fascism?’, French History, 9 (1995), pp. 93-123, ‘Planting 
the tricolour in the citadels o f communism: Women’s social action in the Croix de Feu and Parti Social Franfais’, 
Journal o f  Modern History, 71 (1999), pp. 814-852; John Rymell, ‘Militants and militancy in the Croix de Feu and 
Parti Social FranQais: Patterns o f political experience on the French far right (1933-1939)’, (unpublished doctoral 
thesis, University of East Anglia, 1990). On the Faisceau see Allen Douglas, ‘Violence and Fascism: The case of 
the Faisceau’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, 4 (1984), pp. 689-712; Kalman, Extreme Right. On smaller groups 
in the twenties and thirties that contained some veteran element see Robert O. Paxton, French Peasant Fascism: 
Henry Dorgeres’s Greens hirts and the Crisis o f  French Agriculture, 1929-39 (New York and Oxford: OUP, 1997); 
Philippet, Le Temps des Ligues.
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Croix de Feu eventually opened its ranks to non-veterans. Historians have downplayed 
extremism in the mass o f the veterans’ movement. The influence o f Prost’s work is evident here. 
Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker claim that, unlike in Germany and Italy, once the 
material demands o f the French veterans were satisfied they faded into the background. Robert 
Soucy admits that the UNC leadership flirted with fascism but that the general membership 
remained aloof to extremism. Albert Kechichian states that the UNC and UF were more 
representative o f the veterans’ movement than the Croix de Feu. While arguing that the UNC 
was important to the growth o f the Croix de Feu, Kevin Passmore supports Prost’s conclusion 
that most veterans were loath to follow the political designs of their leaders. Contrary to this 
view, Samuel Kalman questions Prost’s conclusion on the benignity o f veteran rhetoric but 
makes no assertion on the extent o f its influence on ordinary veterans.18
While Prost offers an excellent history o f the veterans’ movement as a whole, this thesis 
will investigate his conclusions through the detailed study o f one association. It will reappraise 
the role of the UNC during the 1930s. Founded in Paris on 11 November 1918, the association 
used the existing networks of its patrons -  the social authorities, Church and army - to spread 
throughout France. By the time o f its first general assembly on 23 February 1919, the 
association claimed to have 100,000 members in 72 departments. In July 1919, the UNC 
launched a national weekly newspaper, La Voix du combattant}9 O f the three million veterans 
who held membership of an association, the UNC accounted for approximately 850,000 during 
the 1930s.20
UNC action and policy were grounded in conservatism yet, as with the veterans’ 
movement in general, members held diverse political opinions. Certain veterans of the UNC 
were deputies. Though the association did not publish a list of these members, one may glean 
from its publications the various political allegiances of these men. On the right, the UNC 
counted eleven deputies who were part o f or near to the Federation republicaine (FR). These 
included Jean Ybamegaray and Georges Scapini, both of whom were close to La Rocque’s 
movements on the extreme right. Among its centrist deputies the UNC claimed four from the
18 Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau and Annette Becker, 14-18: Understanding the Great War (London: Profile, 2002), p. 
232; Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 47, footnote 123; Albert Kechichian, Les Croix de Feu a I’age des fascismes 
(Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2006), p. 33; Kevin Passmore, From Liberalism to Fascism: The Right in a French 
Province, 1928-1939 (Cambridge: CUP, 1997), p. 223; Soucy, Second Wave, pp. 29-30.
19 Prost, I, p. 59.
20 Ibid., p. 59.
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Alliance democratique (AD), two from the Parti democrate populaire (PDP), and one from the 
radical left {gauche radicale). Future radical prime minister Georges Bonnet was on the 
executive committee o f the UNC’s Dordogne section. Other UNC members in the radical party 
included Jean Montigny, secretary-general o f the radical group in the Chamber and Andre Marie, 
a member o f Edouard Daladier’s government in February 1934.21 Among the mass membership, 
most o f the UNC’s support came from traditionally conservative sectors yet the association 
counted socialists and communists among its members too. The executive committee {conseil 
d ’administration) estimated that up to a third o f the association’s membership was loyal to the 
left.22 UNC members held diverse political opinions. Indeed, the leadership recognised that 
though there was unanimity on material questions, once the question of civic action was raised 
members split into political factions.
The main concern o f this thesis is the UNC’s action between 1933 and 1939. It offers a 
new study of the associations’ politics and discourse in this period. During six years the UNC 
responded to the perceived crisis in France with increasingly political actions. On 15 October 
1933 the association convened a meeting o f 6000 members at the Salle Wagram in Paris. In 
response to economic hardship among veterans and alleged corruption in government, the 
meeting ratified the Wagram manifesto. It stated: “Si revolution necessaire ne se fait pas par 
des reformes adequates, la revolution les imposera brutalement...[il faut] restaurer l ’autorite... la 
liberer de 1’intolerable tyrannie des partis et des groupements, des appetits et des forces 
d’argent”.24 The text of the manifesto and subsequent commentaries displayed a disquieting 
change o f tone for a veterans’ association. The UNC did not temper its discourse as the thirties 
wore on.
Contemporary French politics did not leave room for moderation and the UNC could not 
escape the radicalisation o f French politics after the riot of 6 February 1934. Co-operation 
between the association and militant extra-parliamentary groups, known as leagues, multiplied. 
The association founded its own auxiliary called Action combattante. The UNC’s youth group,
21 See the articles ‘Le ministere Sarraut’, La Voix du combattant (hereafter La Vdc), 4 November 1933; ‘Nomination 
au gouvemement’, L 'UNC de Normandie, February 1934; H. Arbeletche, ‘Une lueur d’espoir’, Le Poilu basque, 
December 1935; ‘Deputes nous ayant ete signales comme Membres de l ’UNC’, La Vdc, 9 May 1936. A complete 
collection of the UNC’s national weekly newspaper is available at the organisation’s Parisian headquarters, 18 rue 
Vezelay, Paris. Where no author is cited in the notes, the article was anonymous.
22 Minutes of the UNC’s executive committee (hereafter UNC/EC), 28 July 1934; 29 February 1936.
23 UNC/EC, 23 October 1937.
24 ‘Le texte du manifeste’, La Vdc, 21 October 1933.
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the Jeunes de l’UNC (JUNC), advocated entry into the political arena. These sub-groups 
allowed the UNC to go further in its political action while it attempted to preserve its apolitical 
facade. The association developed a programme on state reform that was close to the right. Its 
ideas were not supportive o f the Republic’s parliamentary democracy. After the elections of 
May 1936, the UNC sought to become the centre o f an anti-Popular Front movement that 
included elements o f the extreme right. As industrial disputes paralysed the French economy 
and Hitler’s violations o f the Treaty o f Versailles multiplied, the veterans turned to authoritarian 
plans for French renewal. In 1938, the UNC, with the UF, called for a government of public 
safety (salut public). This government, which would operate without the machinery of 
parliamentary democracy, revealed the authoritarianism of veteran plans.
While accepting that the UNC’s Parisian based leadership was fascistic, Prost argues that 
the mass o f the movement was Republican. This dismissal of support among provincial 
members for the UNC’s political action raises several points. Can one merely attribute 
provincial support for the UNC’s more suspect ideas to the goodwill and esteem of the 
membership? Or were veterans receptive to authoritarianism? Indeed the Croix de Feu exerted 
an attraction upon some UNC members whom, Prost claims, were ‘seduced’.25 Allegedly 
moderate elements turned to alternative methods. UNC president of honour Humbert Isaac, who 
was briefly national president in 1925, was certainly less polemical than some of his colleagues 
yet nevertheless supported the UNC’s plan for an authoritarian government o f public safety in 
1938. His move from moderation to authoritarianism followed a path that many conservatives 
took when the established order appeared threatened. This thesis argues that UNC veterans 
turned to authoritarianism as the perceived French crisis worsened.
La Voix du combattant was not solely concerned with veterans’ material rights. Political 
articles frequently appeared. One cannot judge how audiences perceived veteran discourse. Did 
they simply enjoy the showmanship o f the speechmaker or the flamboyancy of the author, as 
Prost suggests? Or did they read more into such expressions? From our position in the present, 
we know that the veterans’ calls to action were not carried out. It is with the benefit of hindsight 
that one dismisses these calls as ‘incantatory’. As Michel Dobry argues, “After all, how can we 
tell the difference between ‘pseudo-revolutionary’ and ‘authentic revolutionary’, especially in 
the domain of language, except by referring to the fact that in the end the ‘revolution’ never
25 Prost, I, p. 173.
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26happened?”. Would a veteran at the time, living through a period o f crisis and upheaval, have 
appreciated the benign nature o f these calls? Would some have interpreted them as genuine calls 
to act? Veteran discourse may have appeared only as a rally cry to urge the unification o f the 
French but it was open to interpretation.
This thesis neither argues that the veterans in general, nor the UNC in particular, were 
fascist. I am in agreement with Dobry that the classification of a group can hinder its study if 
one attempts to define an ‘essence’ or ‘nature’.27 While avoiding the classificatory quagmire, 
which is discussed further in chapter three, the work nevertheless represents an attack on what 
Dobry has termed the ‘immunity thesis’, or the ‘orthodox school o f French historiography’ 
according to William Irvine and Soucy.28 The immunity thesis pertains to France’s alleged 
‘allergy’ to fascism. Developed in the 1950s and 1960s, under the influence o f the resistance- 
centric history o f the Vichy years and the totalitarian model that sought to compare fascist and 
communist regimes in order to discredit the latter, the immunity thesis has proved robust.29 
Defence o f the immunity thesis most often entails reference to a political culture founded upon 
the long implantation o f democracy in France. Immunity thesis historians argue that certain 
groups spread their values and ideas to a diverse set of social formations, especially the middle 
classes, and so oriented them towards democracy. One such group, the mouvement ancien 
combattant, was essential to the edification and maintenance of this democratic culture. Veteran 
anti-parliamentarianism therefore expressed a legitimate dissatisfaction with a regime that no 
longer functioned. The associations’ true convictions lay in their ideas on a democratic reform 
of the state.30
In recent years, a largely Anglophone group of historians (Dobry being a notable 
exception) has challenged the French orthodoxy on fascism.31 The anti-immunity thesis school
26 Michel Dobry, ‘February 1934 and the discovery o f  French society’s allergy to the ‘Fascist Revolution’, in France 
in the Era o f Fascism , ed. by Brian Jenkins (New York: Berghahn, 2005), p. 134. Dobry’s chapter is a translation of 
the article ‘Fevrier 1934 et la decouverte de l ’allergie de la societe fran^aise a la ‘Revolution fasciste’, Revue 
frangaise de sociologies XXX (1989), pp. 511-533.
27 Michel Dobry, ‘La these immunitaire face aux fascismes: Pour une critique de la logique classificatoire’, in Le 
mythe de I ’allergie frangaise au fascisme, p. 5.
28 Irvine, ‘Fascism in France’, p. 294; Soucy, Second Wave, p. 6.
29 Brian Jenkins, ‘Introduction: Contextualising the immunity thesis’, in France in the Era o f Fascism, p. 6.
30 Prost, III, p. 219.
31 See the collection o f essays in Le mythe d e l ’allergie frangaise au fascisme especially Dobry, ‘La these 
immunitaire’; Irvine, ‘Fascism in France’; Passmore, From Liberalism', ‘The Croix de Feu’; Robert Soucy, ‘French 
fascism and the Croix de Feu: A dissenting interpretation’, Journal o f Contemporary History 26 (1991), pp. 159-
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stresses that fascism was a significant force in France on the level o f ideas and political 
movements. Moreover, the argument for the existence of a common political culture is 
problematic. However widely a group may publicise its doctrine or ideology, the internalisation 
of such a culture on an individual level, that is to say for ‘ordinary’ citizens, is subjective. Each 
person has prejudices and preconceptions that would make them more or less receptive to one 
idea or another. One cannot credit a whole nation with the same fundamental political values.32 
In the case o f the veterans, Leschi questions the preponderance o f this culture in stating that the 
virulent antiparliamentarianism o f the veterans was greater than a marginal phenomenon within 
the wider movement.33 In short, the argument that three million veterans, let alone forty million 
Frenchmen, shared a common political culture is untenable. This thesis therefore contributes to 
the increasing amount o f research that considers the ‘historical hinterland’ o f the Vichy regime.34
This thesis argues that the UNC treated an important group of its compatriots as 
adversaries. Believing the Popular Front to be a Russian conspiracy and its communist 
supporters to be spies, the UNC’s call for unity excluded the French left. Recent developments 
in the historiography o f the First World War make a new approach possible. Audoin-Rouzeau, 
Becker and Alan Kramer have investigated the culture of the First World War at the front and the 
rear. Soldiers and civilians internalised pre-war and wartime scientific and racial thinking and 
synthesised patriotism and religion to construct the war as a conflict o f races, fought in defence 
of Western civilisation and for God Himself.35 Nations on both sides interpreted the war as a 
conflict between civilisation and barbarity.36 Visceral hatred of the enemy sustained the consent 
of soldiers to the conflict long after the illusions of a short war had disappeared. Similarly, 
public support was an organic and self-sustaining phenomenon.
188; Second Wave; ‘Fascism in France: Problematising the immunity thesis’, in France in the Era o f  Fascism, pp. 
65-104.
32Kevin Passmore, ‘The construction o f crisis in interwar France’, in France in the Era o f  Fascism, p. 164.
33 Leschi, ‘L’etrange cas La Rocque’, p. 167.
34 Jenkins, ‘Introduction’, p. 3.
35 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, chapters four and five, pp. 94-159; Annette Becker, La Guerre et la fo i 
(Paris: Armand Colin, 1994); Alan Kramer, Dynamic o f  Destmction: Culture and Mass Killing in the First World 
War (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 175-180; George L. Mosse, Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory o f  the World 
Wars (New York: OUP, 1990), p. 32; Leonard V. Smith, The Embattled Self: French Soldiers ’ Testimony o f  the 
Great War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 62-75. For a critique of the culture o f war thesis see 
R6my Cazals, ‘1914-1918: Chercher encore’, Le Mouvement Social, 199 (2002), pp. 107-113; Antonio Gibelli, ‘Le 
refus, la distance, le consentement’, Le Mouvement Social, 199 (2002), pp. 113-119; M. Isnenghi, ‘Un livre 
problematique et inquiet’, Le Mouvement Social, 199 (2002), pp. 103-107; Antoine Prost, ‘La guerre de 1914 n’est 
pas perdue’, Le Mouvement Social, 199 (2002), pp. 95-102; ‘Les limites de la brutalisation: Tuer sur le front 
occidental, 1914-1918’, Vingtieme Siecle, 81 (204), pp. 5-20.
36 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, p. 102.
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The culture o f war thesis claims that the French believed themselves to be a superior race, 
while Germany was the incarnation o f barbarity and evil.37 Becker goes as far as to say that the 
war was “ ...a  struggle between two intrinsically opposed races”.38 Kramer’s work throws some 
light upon the situation in France. He mentions French historian Joseph Bedier’s wartime 
pamphlet Les Crimes allemands d  ’apres les temoignages allemands, which made use of captured 
Germans’ diary entries to expose to the world the seemingly boundless German destruction of 
human and material matter.39 Significantly, Kramer writes that the French accusation of 
barbarity against the Germans actually preceded reports of atrocities. As early as 4 August 1914, 
Le Matin described the conflict as ‘a holy war of civilisation against barbarity’. The French 
media ascribed racial characteristics to the enemy, such as ‘square heads, sack-like bodies’ and a 
smell like a rabbit hutch, rancid fat and stale beer. Scholarly articles stated and restated these 
insults.40
This thesis does not investigate the brutalisation of French veterans per se. French 
soldiers are largely understood to have ended the war satisfied with the fruits of victory and 
supportive o f Republican democracy. Emphasising the relatively low incidence of political 
violence in France, this orthodox view claims that the culture of war was sublimated into a 
millenarian culture o f peace. Many in French society did embrace pacifism after 1918. It was 
dominant in the veterans’ movement and in this the UNC was no exception. There is evidence 
though that the culture o f war’s influence persisted. Passmore suggests that it was channelled 
into an anti-communism that both right and extreme right appropriated for themselves. During 
the 1920s, it remained a sub-current on the right that waxed as the perceived threat of 
communism grew at home and abroad.41 The culture of war was not strong enough to supplant 
pacifism in the veterans’ movement yet it remained an available discourse that some right-wing 
veterans used in exceptional circumstances. The thesis will investigate the war culture’s 
influence on the discourse o f the UNC, in which the association depicted a conflict of 
civilisations between France and the barbaric communist especially after May 1936.
37 Ibid., p. 143.
38 Annette Becker, 'From war to war: A few myths, 1914-1942', in France at War in the Twentieth Century: 
Propaganda, Myth and Metaphor, ed. by Valerie Holman & Debra Kelly (Oxford: Berghahn, 2000), p. 19.
39 Kramer, Dynamic o f  Destruction, p. 30.
40 Ibid., p. 183.
41 Kevin Passmore, The Right in the French Third Republic (forthcoming, 2010).
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The veterans o f the UNC did not declare their aversion to the Third Republic as a regime. 
However, they denied its component parts legitimacy. The concept of legitimacy is subjective 
and therefore difficult to define. It is hard to ascertain how or indeed if the UNC undermined the 
perceived legitimacy o f the Republic in the eyes of French citizens. To begin with, political 
organisations held diverse conceptions o f the Republic itself, which often entailed ideas on what 
the Republic should be. The UNC’s ideal Republic, for example, was a right-wing authoritarian 
regime with limited political pluralism and the representation of economic and social forces in 
state institutions. As the Third Republic at the time did not resemble this, the association openly 
questioned whether the regime was still the Republic. This took place more often when the left 
was in power and especially after May 1936.
One must question though to what extent the often violent criticism of the component 
parts o f the Third Republic constituted an attack on the regime itself. I argue that the veterans 
undermined the legitimacy o f the Republic by casting doubt on the competence and suitability to 
govern o f its personnel and institutions. Though they did not explicitly demand an end to the 
regime, they decried the practices and inefficiencies of the parliamentary system, the conduct 
and alleged self-interest o f parliamentarians and a lack of discipline and authority. Their attacks 
targeted successive administrations o f left and right, ministers and ministries and the electoral 
system. Their depiction o f the government as in opposition to a subjective ‘national’ interest 
eventually came to encompass the regime itself after May 1936. As a result, the veterans’ plans 
for state reform would not have left the institutions o f the Third Republic intact. In a democratic 
and parliamentary sense, the Republique des combattants would little resemble the old.
The outbreak of the Second World War and the establishment of the Vichy regime meant 
that the veterans no longer needed to establish their own government of national and moral 
union. It is unconvincing to suggest that their rejection of violence and eventual support for a 
legally established authoritarian regime in 1940 somehow attenuates their extremism. What one 
can say is that the politics o f the UNC became more authoritarian during the 1930s. Their plans 
for state reform were not democratic. Ostensibly concerned for the continuation of the Republic, 
the UNC defined effective government as a strong right-wing regime of military figures and 
veterans that would restore discipline and authority to France.
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Sources
Research for this thesis is based on the publications of combatant associations and police reports 
on veteran activities. Combatant newspapers reveal the national policy o f the parent organisation 
and its attempts to shape reader opinion. Although words and acts often differed, the combatant 
press nevertheless informed the membership and the public at large of the associations’ policies 
and so may have influenced perceptions in private and public spheres. However, one must bear 
in mind that French people were subject to multiple political, social and economic groups. The 
veterans’ publications alone did not solely influence a person’s political opinion.
Due to Prost’s differentiation between the more politically active national UNC 
leadership and the moderate provincial membership, I included national and local UNC 
newspapers in my research. In total, for his analysis of veteran discourse, Prost studied 216 
articles from across the monde ancien combattant, 117 from the 1920s and 99 from the 1930s. If 
one amalgamates Prost’s eight categories o f political affiliation into two groups, left and right, 
several interesting points are raised.42 Prost analysed 100 right wing articles compared to 116 
from the left, a rough 46-54 percentage split. For the year 1934, when veterans appeared most 
active, Prost consulted one-third more articles o f the left than o f the right -  22 left versus 14 
right. This under-representation o f right-wing articles is important as it was in 1934 that the 
right appeared to threaten most the Republic, especially before and after the riots o f February. 
This imbalance may have meant that the veterans’ movement appeared more pro-Republican 
than it was. More seriously, for the years 1936, 1937, 1938 and 1939, Prost did not consult any 
articles from the right and only 11 from the left. For 1937, only one article in total was 
consulted. One would expect such an omission to affect the overall image o f veteran politics 
during these years. Indeed Prost states that the UNC preached reconciliation after the election of 
the Popular Front. However, as we will see, the reality was more complicated than this. The 
UNC intensified its attacks on the government and communism, and this period is crucial to the 
understanding of the association’s role before the war.
This thesis is largely based on the publications of the UNC. Between the wars La Voix 
du combattant appeared weekly and printed 30,000 copies by 1937.43 I consulted 331 editions 
from January 1933 to May 1939. While the newspaper engaged with issues unique to the
42 Prost classifies each article according to the following categories: right, right-national UNC, right-regional UNC, 
extreme right and left-national UF, regional left, independent left and extreme left.
43 Archives de la Prefecture de Police, Paris (hereafter referred to as APP), BA 2313,4  September 1937.
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veterans’ world, such as the defence o f material benefits, articles that dealt with political 
developments in France and abroad appeared frequently. La Voix du combattant covered 
political issues more regularly than the U F’s bi-monthly publication the Cahiers de I ’UF. It also 
contained information on the activities o f local sections and a dedicated youth page.
Journalist and UNC vice-president Hubert Aubert directed the newspaper and contributed 
a weekly editorial piece. Paul Galland, a member o f the association’s policy-making committee 
(bureau) and a vice-president, assisted Aubert and regularly authored the lead article in each 
issue. Aubert and Galland were perfectly placed to formulate UNC doctrine on numerous issues. 
They thus exerted great influence on the association’s direction. Other regular contributors 
included UNC national vice-presidents Aime Goudaert and Alfred Charron. Articles by Jean 
Goy (president, December 1935-1940), Georges Lebecq (president, February 1934-December 
1935), Henry Rossignol (president, 1926-February 1934) and Humbert Isaac appeared less 
frequently.
The fact that a relatively small group o f men controlled the UNC’s national publication 
presents the researcher with a problem. Drawn from the association’s executive committee, the 
small group o f men who controlled the newspaper used it to disseminate ideas and propaganda. 
Fascistic in character, the dominance o f this select few calls into question the extent to which the 
national La Voix du combattant represented the mass membership. Though regional issues of 
this newspaper were also published, such as La Voix du combattant: Seine-et-Marne and La Voix 
du combattant: Tarn-et-Garonne, their titles are revealing; they were shorter versions o f the 
national press. To compensate for this Paris-centric bias, I included the publications of local 
UNC sections in my research. These were o f two sorts. On the one hand, as mentioned above, 
some merely reprinted articles from the national newspaper and included little originality. On 
the other hand, some contained original material produced by activists in that area. Local 
editions contained articles on politics, veterans’ rights and the activities o f the local and national 
UNC. In all, 22 regional UNC newspapers were included in the study. Some collections of 
these documents were incomplete and so a less thorough consultation resulted.
Occasionally the UNC published information and propaganda booklets, which outlined 
policy or contained the proceedings o f the annual national congress. The UNC produced, for 
example, La Route de Salut: Pensees, espoirs, volontes des Anciens Combattants et des jeunes. 
Pour remonter la pente de la Decadence vers la Renovation, written by Humbert Isaac in 1935
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and Les Anciens Combattants et la Confederation Generale du Travail, published by Action 
combattante. The UNC also kept minutes for meetings of its executive committee. The minutes 
do not provide a word for word account o f each meeting. While they can be detailed, in some 
places they are less so. Nevertheless, these minutes were not published and so often reveal ideas 
and incidents not reported in the association’s press. The minutes of 36 such meetings between 
18 June 1932 and 18 February 1939 were consulted.
Other than UNC publications, the UF’s Cahiers de VUF and the Fonds Henri Pichot 
provided another viewpoint on combatant life. Appearing less regularly than La Voix du 
combattant and less concerned with politics, editions of the Cahiers were useful in different 
measures. I examined 141 editions o f the Cahiers from January 1933 to May 1940. I also 
consulted several other UF publications and speeches. Using the archives o f Colonel F ran c is  de 
La Rocque at the Archives nationales and the Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po in Paris, I 
investigated the UNC’s relationship with the Croix de Feu.
Other than associational press, I studied police reports. These contain incidents, meetings 
and speeches that were perhaps not published. Although certainly useful, one must be cautious 
about the reliability o f police documents. There is a danger that their authors reported what they 
believed their superiors wanted to hear. Members o f the police often tendentiously summarised 
speeches and newspaper articles and so this diminishes the value of their reports. As long as one 
bears these limitations in mind, police reports can afford the researcher a glimpse into a more 
private sphere. Through the documentation o f rumours, actions and reactions, police reports 
have the potential to complement the official press. Police records held at the Parisian prefecture 
of police and in the F7 Series at the Archives nationales formed part o f my research. Recently 
repatriated from Russia, the Moscow archives held at Fontainebleau contain a variety of 
materials including police reports, press cuttings, and several dossiers on leading figures in the 
combatant world.
The following chapter re-examines the role of the UNC in the riots of 6 February 1934. 
Important to an understanding o f the Third Republic and its decline, the night opened a virtual 
French civil war that would not end until the Liberation a decade later.44 The chapter does not 
argue that the veterans attempted a coup but it does offer a more nuanced interpretation than
44 Jackson, Dark Years, p. 65.
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previous accounts. UNC veterans were unable (and in some cases unwilling) to remain separate 
from the violence. While only the UNC’s Parisian group took part, provincial sections approved 
of its action against the government. Chapter two examines the UNC’s plans for state reform. 
Close to the right and extreme right in its programme, one can say that their plans were not 
democratic. The UNC’s design for the Republic would see a constituent assembly (constituante) 
remodel the regime along the lines o f limited political pluralism, a corporatist organisation o f the 
economy and an authoritarian executive. Chapter three investigates political militancy within the 
UNC. Based on the success o f the Croix de Feu, the UNC launched its own auxiliary to spread 
these ideas and enter into the political fray. Action combattante found support among local 
sections and marked an escalation in UNC political tactics. The chapter also looks at the 
relationship between the UNC and the extreme right at a local and national level. While the 
UNC was not a fascist group, it is argued that co-operation with and membership of these groups 
among UNC veterans attests to an anti-democratic political militancy in the veteran world. 
Chapter four explores the way in which the UNC used youth to attack Republican politicians. 
Through the medium of their youth group, the JUNC, the association engaged in political action. 
It is argued that the JUNC went further in its doctrine than the UNC and did not shy away from 
demands for authoritarian government. Finally, chapter five analyses the influence o f the 
language and culture o f war in UNC political discourse. The UNC regularly referred to the 
culture o f war in its attacks on the left and the Popular Front government. It associated the 
Popular Front with the wartime foreign invader and depicted it as an illegitimate regime.
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Chapter One 
6 February 1934: The veterans’ riot
Scene IV
VILLATTE: “...moi, je  ne manifeste pas.... mais mon ffere Jean est convoque par les anciens 
combattants, et alors, la, vous savez, si les mutiles et grands blesses manifestent, le 
Gouvemement va chanceler.”
Scene V:
VILLATTE: “Certainement, les anciens combattants retabliront le calme, on n ’osera rien faire 
quand ils defileront”.45
In 1933, as the world economic crisis made itself felt in France, the failure o f successive Radical 
governments to find a viable solution served to sharpen hostility to the regime. When leading 
figures in the Radical party were apparently implicated in the schemes of the fraudster Alexandre 
Stavisky, the right-wing press and extra-parliamentary leagues sensed a story. They alleged that 
leading Radicals, including Georges Pressard, the brother-in-law of incumbent premier Camille 
Chautemps, had helped Stavisky escape justice. When his most recent swindle, the Bayonne 
Municipal Pawnshop, came to the attention o f the police, Stavisky fled. At Chamonix on 9 
January 1934, surrounded by police, he took his own life. The right and left exploited this 
‘convenient’ suicide. They alleged that the forces o f order had silenced Stavisky before he could 
make potentially damaging revelations. Throughout January 1934, Chautemps persistently 
refused to open a parliamentary enquiry into the scandal. Contempt for the men in the Chamber 
grew. The press roundly condemned parliamentary corruption. Citizens booed and whistled 
newsreel footage of politicians and daubed graffiti on the walls of the Chamber and Senate. 
Some cafe owners displayed signs stating that deputies would not be welcome in their 
establishment.46 The leagues took to the streets in protest.
45 P. Breittmayer, 6fevrier: Comedie en un actepour Eclaireurs (Courbevoie, 1935), p. 11 and p. 15.
46 Maurice Chavardes, Une campagne de presse: La droite frangaise et le 6fevrier 1934 (Paris: Flammarion , 1970), 
p. 23.
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A further financial scandal brought down the Chautemps administration on 28 January. 
The new government under Edouard Daladier set about reorganising the departments 
compromised in the Stavisky affair. Jean Chiappe, prefect of the Paris police, was the most 
contentious casualty o f this reshuffle. Conservatives held Chiappe, a native of Corsica, in high 
regard for his heavy-handed treatment o f communists, while the left condemned his leniency 
towards the nationalist leagues. Unsurprisingly, the left-wing press welcomed Daladier’s 
decision.47 The right denounced Chiappe’s transfer to a backwater job in Morocco as a 
concession to the socialists whose support Daladier was trying to win. L ’Action frangaise 
alleged that the government had conceded to socialist and Masonic blackmail. Le Temps 
declared a socialist victory and Le Figaro warned of a left-wing coup.48 Echo de Paris 
condemned the removal o f “ ...le meilleur chef que la police ait jamais eu”.49 Former French 
Prime Minister Andre Tardieu alleged in La Liberte that Daladier had offered the head o f the 
Corsican to the socialists. On 5 February, Parisian municipal councillors used a poster to invite 
the people o f Paris to protest. The council included several leaders o f the extreme right and 
veterans’ organisations hostile to the government and parliament including Georges Lebecq, 
newly-elected to the UNC presidency.50 Following a month of street protests against the 
government, the leagues called a demonstration for the night of 6 February.
The excerpts from P. Breittmayer’s play at the beginning o f the chapter present two 
different conceptions o f the veterans’ influence on the night of the Paris riot. At once attributed 
with the power to make the government ‘totter’ (chanceler) and then the means by which order 
would be restored, the impression is that their involvement was important. However, only a 
minority o f the three million strong veterans’ movement took part on the night. The UNC’s 
Groupe de la Region Parisienne (GRP) made up the biggest proportion of the anciens 
combattants contingent. The communist backed ARAC and several regimental associations 
were also involved. Additionally, the nationalist groups that rioted on the Place de la Concorde 
each had a veteran wing. Contrary to this relatively minor involvement, the extreme right 
propagated the myth that only veterans had rioted in order to vilify the government. As a result,
47 Ibid., p.59.
48 Pierre Pellissier, 6 Fevrier 1934: La Republique en flammes (Paris: Perrin, 2000), p. 84.
49 Marcel Le Clere, Le 6 Fevrier (Paris: Hachette, 1967), p. 115.
50 Chavardes, Une campagne, p. 42. On the Parisian municipal council see Yvan Combeau, Paris et les elections 
municipales sous la Troisieme Republique: La scene capitale dans la vie politique frangaise (Paris: L’Harmattan, 
1998).
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the image o f the riot as a veterans’ protest violently and bloodily put down entered the popular 
imagination after the event. The government was depicted as the heir to the barbarous adversary 
of the First World War. The press often equated the victims with the war dead. In April 1935, 
for example, the Galerie A. Barreiro in Paris held an exhibition of newspaper cartoonists under 
the title ‘Satire 1935’. One o f the exhibits entitled ‘6 Fevrier’ pictured Death holding a bloodied 
protester on the Place de la Concorde. The legend read: “Je t ’avais rate en 1914”.51
This chapter will re-examine the role o f the UNC on the night of the riots. Firstly, I will 
examine the UNC’s attitude to violence. Violent language in the association’s press presented 
politics as a wartime battle between the veterans and parliamentarians. Secondly, I will engage 
with existing interpretations o f the riot. I will argue that the UNC played a greater part in the 
violence than historians have claimed. Thirdly, I will consider the reaction o f provincial UNC 
sections. Contrary to the claim that these groups rejected the acts o f the national leadership, I 
will demonstrate that their condemnation was not unanimous. Finally, I will assess the influence 
of the war culture in the association’s public discourse on the events.
Militarised discourse
Before and after 6 February 1934, UNC discourse often cast the association’s struggle against 
politicians in the language o f military engagement. The UNC was not unique in this. After the 
riot, violent discourse and the use o f military tropes created a climate o f civil war. Threats of 
violence were not without consequence. Violent confrontations did not occur on a scale similar 
to Germany and Italy but even before the tense times of the thirties physical violence was a 
characteristic o f the Third Republic. In the mid-1920s the Faisceau violently confronted the 
left and its competitors on the extreme right. From 1929-1931, the communist party committed 
indiscriminate violence against its enemies. After 1934, the paramilitary Croix de Feu fought the 
Popular Front. Left and right cited their rivals’ aggression as proof of insurrectional aims and 
both claimed to be acting defensively. The period between 6 February 1934 and 30 November
51 Archives Nationales (hereafter referred to as AN) F7 13320, report, ‘Le Vernissage du Salon des Dessinateurs de 
Joumaux’, 7 April 1935.
52 On French political violence in the interwar period see Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau, ‘Le parti communiste et la 
violence, 1929-1931’, Revue historique, CCLXIX/2 (1983), pp. 365-383; Douglas, ‘Violence and Fascism’; 
Passmore, ‘Boy scouting for grown-ups?’; Daniella Tartakowsky, ‘Strategies de la rue. 1934-1936’, Le Mouvement 
social, 135 (1986), pp. 31-62; Andreas Wirsching, ‘Political violence in France and Italy after 1918’, Journal o f  
Modern European History, 1 (2003), pp. 60-79.
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1938 saw 75 people killed.53 Furthermore, for activists of political groups, violence became an 
accepted risk. Associations including the UNC urged their members to wear insignia in order to 
show solidarity with the group. Le Combattant du Sud-Est asked readers: “Seriez-vous un 
homme d ’assez peu de courage pour cacher vos sentiments? Etes-vous UNC ou ne l’etes-vous 
pas?”.54 With allegiance worn publicly on the lapel, this also meant that members risked 
violence from activists o f political rivals. Even when violence was expected at a meeting, 
members still attended.55
The UNC made regular references to the army in its discourse. It praised the noble life of 
discipline, morality and selfless patriotism o f the soldier, which contrasted sharply with domestic 
decadence in politics.56 Young Frenchmen were encouraged to live by this credo in daily life 
before and after their military service. The association claimed that two years’ military service 
would overcome the effects o f the ‘etat d ’esprit du moment’ and education that 20 year olds 
across France had received. It would leave them ‘physically, morally and spiritually stronger 
and better suited to life’.57 The Jeunes de l ’UNC (JUNC) urged the anciens to send the jeunes to
CO
their sections and: “Transposez dans la vie civile leurs vertus militaires”. The youth 
association claimed to have inherited the esprit combattant from their veteran fathers and 
sometimes referred to its groups as escouades. However, the UNC’s appreciation of army life 
did not end with the moral education o f the young. It informed their prescription for society and 
their interpretation o f French politics.
In reference to the army, the UNC expressed a preference for a military personality, such 
as Marshal Petain, to be head o f government. Henri Pichot, president of the largest veterans’ 
association, the UF, suggested that a government function as a general staff.59 The UNC 
described the nation as an army. Although the ‘great democratic fact’ o f the army was that it 
encouraged the intermingling o f all classes in a ‘great social fusion’, this view of society was 
based on a hierarchy in which everyone ‘knew their place’.60 Authority, discipline and hierarchy
53 Douglas, ‘Violence and Fascism’, p. 707.
54 ‘Un excellent moyen de recrutement’, Le Combattant du Sud-Est, October 1934.
55 Tartakowsky, ‘Strategies de la rue’, note 5, p. 32.
56 R, Dulys, ‘Le devoir militaire’, La Vdc, 20 April 1935.
57 A. Drauet, ‘L’armee et ses cadres’, La Vdc, 5 November 1935.
58 J. R. Moustiers, ‘Maintenant que vous etes forts, soyez actifs’, La Vdc, 25 September 1937.
59 H. Pichot, ‘Discours de Pichot’, La Vdc, 20-27 Mai 1939.
60 P, Galland, ‘Les bons ambassadeurs de la Republique’, La Vdc, 20 July 1935; ‘Etrennes 1938’, La Vdc, 1 January 
1938; H. Aubert, ‘Pour que ?a aille bien’, La Vdc, 2 February 1935.
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were ‘human rules’ fundamental to order in the army.61 Soldiers raised themselves above 
individuality for the good o f the ‘great united duty called Patriotism’.62 The association’s 
conception o f a society dependent on a single national interest was incompatible with a regime 
based on equality, parliamentary debate and the vote. Those people not considered to be 
working towards the single national interest were deemed enemies o f France.63 It is in this 
interpretation that one perceives the UNC’s authoritarianism.
Prior to 6 February 1934, the UNC did not encourage its members to engage in political 
violence. This did not change after the riot. However, given the context o f French politics at 
that time the association’s use o f violent military images appeared to endorse a means of political 
struggle other than the democratic process o f electoral competition. The association had long 
rejected electoral participation. Veterans preferred to lobby deputies through letter writing 
campaigns. However, the association’s discourse did not extol the might o f the pen over the 
sword. The UNC presented French society as divided by a conflict between the veteran-led 
‘honest’ elements and the anti-national and decadent political classes. It framed the veterans’ 
task as similar to the one they had faced in wartime. The use of military metaphors identified the 
association with the national interest. The UNC chose to situate its conflict with politicians on 
the battlefield rather than in the recognised institutions of democratic representation. In doing 
so, they questioned implicitly the value o f the parliamentary process.
Employing terms such as bataille, en avant!, marche, rangs and mission, UNC veterans 
compared their civic duty to the military devoir in the periods before and after the riot.64 In 
January 1933, for example, the UNC responded to government reductions in veteran benefits 
with: “C ’est done la bataille...” .65 Later that year, Aime Goudaert declared ‘a merciless war’ on 
the spirit o f the political party.66 The congress o f the Deux-Sevres group announced that ‘Jour J ’ 
and ‘Heure H ’ had sounded. It was time to confront French decadence, which was more
61 A. Drauet, ‘L’armee et ses cadres’, La Vdc, 5 November 1935.
62 Dulys, ‘Le devoir militaire’, La Vdc, 20 April 1935.
63 P. Galland, ‘Les bons ambassadeurs de la Republique’, La Vdc, 20 July 1935; ‘Etrennes 1938’, La Vdc, 1 January 
1938.
64 For example see the notice titled ‘Cheron contre la Generation du Feu’, La Vdc, 21 January 1933; Georges Heldet, 
‘L’infemel dilemme’, La Vdc, 28 January 1933; the poster titled ‘L’heure des Anciens Combattants’, L ’UNC de 
Paris, 22 February 1934.
65 Notice titled, ‘Cheron contre la Generation du Feu’, La Vdc, 21 January 1933;
66 A. Goudaert, ‘De quoi s ’agit-il?’, La Vdc, 23 December 1933.
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dangerous than mustard gas.67 After the bloodshed of February, several provincial sections 
described government violence against the protesters as an ambush (guet-apens).68 Hubert 
Aubert’s suggestion for UNC action was threatening and ambiguous in its call to adopt the 
methods of the front: “Employons done, aujourd’hui encore, les memes armes et, d’abord, le 
coude-a-coude fratemel et farouche” .69 In addition to this ambiguous use o f language, UNC 
veterans often stated that they would ‘sweep’ (balayer) the politicians from power and that they 
possessed the ‘brooms’ to do this. Aubert wondered: “Quand done sera donne le coup de balai 
qui mettra fin a la «republique des camarades». La France en meurt”.70 The veterans were le 
bloc des balayeurs, ready to clean the house. Furthermore, on 6 February 1934 the veterans had 
not carried arms but ‘moral brooms’.71 In military terms, the verb balayer implied armed action. 
It meant ‘to drive away the enemy’ or described the broad range of fire of a machine gun.72 
Even this term, therefore, contained an aggressive meaning that the UNC did not hesitate to 
express explicitly in other ways
The UNC imposed the landscape o f the war onto politics. This language became more 
common after the agreement o f the Wagram manifesto in October 1933. It divided France into 
two opposing trenches. Aubert described the trenches as standing opposite each other across the 
‘civic Marne’. Facing the trench o f the veterans was that of France’s enemies: the parties and 
politicians, shadowy interest groups and the forces o f finance.74 P. Delore, vice-president o f the 
Lyon section, hinted that the veterans would bring the fight to the enemies o f France: “...notre 
erreur fut de croire qu’une fois demobilises, nous n’avions plus rien a combattre... Nous avons 
d’autres tranchees a enlever, celles de l’interieur. La lutte continuait entre les forces du bien et 
les forces du mal...” .75 UNC president Rossignol referred to the violence of the war in his 
prescription for combatant action: “... il nous faudra avoir le courage, l ’heure H venue, de sortir
67 Extract from an appel by the Deux-Sevres group, printed in C. Vilain Les Combattants exigent.... Du manifeste 
de la salle Wagram au Congres de I 'UNC a Metz: Preface de Georges Lebecq (Rouen, 1934).
68 See the last line o f the poem ‘6 fevrier 1934’, by J. Douarre, Le Combattant d ’llle-et-Vilaine, April 1934; report 
from a meeting in Arras held on 15 April 1934, ‘Arras: La Conference de Jean Goy’, Le Creneau, May 1934; report 
from a meeting in Creil held on 18 April 1934, ‘Vie des Sections: Creil’, Le Trait d ’Union, June 1934.
69 H. Aubert, ‘Toujours dans le bourbier’, La Vdc, 22 December 1934.
70 H. Aubert, ‘A la recherche des responsables’, La Vdc, 6 January 1934.
71 P. Galland, ‘Ambassadeurs de la justice’, La Vdc, 10 March 1934.
72 G. De Cromieres, ‘Verite’, Le Combattant du Centre, March 1934.
73 H. Aubert, ‘Et d’abord...’, La Vdc, 7 October 1933.
74 ‘Apres la Manifestation de l ’UNC a la salle de Wagram a Paris’, extract from an article by Clement Vaitel 
published in Le Journal reprinted in Le Combattant du Centre, November 1933.
5 Dr. P. Delore, ‘Pensees d’automne’, La Vdc, 11 November 1933.
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de notre tranchee... On ne part pas sans avoir fait ample provision des munitions... Lorsque tout 
sera pret, nous partirons et nous vaincrons” . Rossignol claimed he had restrained the more 
militant members o f his movement: “...si j ’avais ecoute aussi le desir de nos camarades, prets 
depuis longtemps a agir, j ’aurais deja declenche les tirs... Quand nous serons partis chacun 
sachant ce qu’il a a faire, il conviendra de poursuivre l’attaque sans arret et avec une energie 
tenace” .76 After February 1934, as political confrontation in France sharpened, Henri 
Arbeletche, president o f the Basque group, was unequivocal: “A tous, un deMbir tres net nous est 
trace. II nous faut choisir. Sans distinction de partis, d’etiquettes ou de confessions, il nous faut 
etre du bord «France» ou du bord «Anti-France»... nous sommes au Verdun de rapres-guerre” .77 
Goudaert inscribed the battle o f February into French history alongside other incidences of 
French heroism: “Nous avions fait la Marne; nous avions fait Verdun; nous avons fait le 6  
fevrier” .78
The UNC also projected the imagery o f the trenches onto politics in order to highlight 
corruption, described as fetid mud. The task o f cleaning up the government was likened to that 
of unpleasant tasks in the trenches. In late February 1934, L ’UNC de Paris featured a cartoon 
that depicted two poilus with shovels in a trench. The description read: “On a enleve celle des
70tranchees, on enlev’ra p ’t ’etre celle qu’est ailleurs”. Later that year, Aubert compared the days 
of the trenches to those o f the interwar years: “Souvenez-vous de certaines joumees de printemps 
ou de l’automne pendant la guerre, dans certains secteurs. La aussi, normalement, la boue devait 
nous submerger, et, cependant, nous en sommes venus a bout et nous 1’avons vaincus....”.
Both reflecting and contributing to the violent atmosphere in French politics, UNC 
discourse did not make for moderation. UNC veterans occupied the French trench while 
politicians fought against the national interest from the enemy trench. In doing so, their 
discourse was detrimental to the Chamber’s claim to represent the national interest. The 
association did not call for violent action but its use of military metaphors portrayed violence as 
a possible and effective solution. This was not compatible with parliamentary democracy. The 
UNC counted deputies among its members and leadership, yet some defined themselves first in
76 H. Rossignol, ‘Parallele de depart’, La Vdc, 21 October 1933.
77 H. Arbeletche, ‘Drapeau tricolore ou torchon rouge’, Le Poilu Basque, May 1935.
78 A. Goudaert, ‘Ayons confiance...en nous’, La Vdc, 12 January 1935.
79 P. Galland, ‘Refiis d’obedience’, La Vdc, 31 March 1934; cartoon on page one o f L ’UNC de Paris, 22 February 
1934.
80 H. Aubert, ‘Toujours dans le bourbier’, La Vdc, 22 December 1934.
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their capacity as a veteran and not a member o f parliament. On his accession to the presidency 
of the UNC in 1935, Jean Goy announced: “...le Jean Goy UNC tuera le Jean Goy depute” .81 
The UNC rejected participation in the electoral process. When it spoke of taking the enemy 
trench this did not mean via an electoral campaign but perhaps through an extra-parliamentary 
route to power.
The History of 6 February 1934
Historians have spilled much ink over the intentions of the rioters on the night o f 6  February
821934. The debate is split along the lines o f the immunity thesis opposition. Some French 
historians argue that the failure o f the rioters to install a fascist regime attested to the 
democratically minded French people’s rejection o f fascism and their ‘immunity’ to the doctrine. 
For Rene Remond the events o f 6  February were little more than a protest that went wrong. Had 
the night not turned to tragedy, it would have been quickly forgotten.83 Serge Berstein claims 
that the lack o f co-ordination between the nationalist leagues and the absence of a plan to invade 
the Chamber prove that the riot was not an attempted coup. The heterogeneity o f the six fevrier 
groups underlines the disjointed nature o f the protest.84 Pierre Pellissier suggests that the rioters 
in no way threatened the Republic as the failed insurrection did not follow the ‘strict rules’ of 
past revolts, such as Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte’s coup of 2 December 1851. A successful coup 
requires the utmost secrecy in preparation, the selection of one supreme leader and the use of 
arms or the threat o f armed action. The action failed in February 1934 as agitation throughout 
January alerted the authorities to trouble, no group would submit to the leader o f another, and 
arms were not employed .85
81 UNC/EC, 7 December 1935.
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Brian Jenkins has specifically questioned the immunity thesis as applied to 6  February .86 
Firstly, immunity thesis historians mistakenly equate a fascist takeover with a violent coup. This 
was neither true in the case o f the Nazis in Germany nor the Italian fascists. Secondly, despite 
Berstein’s judgement on the alleged heterogeneous nature o f the groups, Jenkins writes that the 
organisations that took part on the night shared common ideas and an anti-democratic attitude.87 
Their memberships often overlapped and were largely drawn from the same social groups. 
Thirdly, there is evidence that despite the apparently disparate nature o f rioting groups, a 
collective mood took hold as the evening progressed. Witness statements do give some 
indication o f a common feeling among protesters. One witness told Le Matin:
Je me suis trouve au milieu d ’hommes qui ne se connaissaient pas, de generations tres 
differentes, d ’anciens combattants n ’appartenant a aucun groupement, ou bien, comme moi, 
ayant perdu contact avec leurs associations ou deja disloques de leurs corteges, mais en tout cas 
dans une atmosphere de sympathie... secoues par un meme sursaut de conscience publique, 
ebranles par la meme emotion et une volonte commune d’assainissement. 88
Finally, the teleological argument that uses the outcome of events to presume the 
intentions o f actors is dubious. In short, the failure of rioters to enter the Chamber does not 
prove that no such intentions existed. Moreover, the disappointment o f the extreme right on one 
night should not neutralise the threat that it posed during the decade. In France, extra- 
parliamentary movements like the Croix de Feu grew while parliament gradually gave way to a 
government reliant on decree powers.
Admittedly, there is a lack o f documentation to prove that an alliance between the various 
groups existed. No blueprint for the overthrow the Republic has been found. Immunity thesis 
historians cite this shortage o f evidence in their argument. However, in reference to the French 
penal code Marcel Le Clere argues that a plot did exist. Though it is largely futile to re-classify 
the riot as a plot largely based on a legal technicality, as Le Clere does, he makes several valid 
points. The leagues had co-operated throughout January. Activists of the AF and the Federation 
nationale des contribuables worked together on 9 January, as did members o f the JP and the 
Solidarite Fran9 aise (SF) on 11 January. On 23 January, the call to demonstrate saw the names
86 Jenkins, ‘The six fevrier’, pp. 336-340.
87 Ibid., p. 339.
88 Statement o f M. Jean Rottembourg, ‘L’histoire d’une emeute’, Le Matin, 25 February 1934. Le Matin published 
many letters from eye-witnesses in its enquiry into the riot entitled ‘L’histoire d’une emeute’.
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of the AF, the JP and the Contribuables on the same poster.89 Collusion on the night should not 
be discounted simply because it was not ‘total’ .90
On 6  February, the arranged meeting time for each group would see them converge on 
the Concorde between 8  and 9pm. For Pellissier, the dispersal o f meeting places and times either 
suggests that there was no plot or that the groups wanted to stretch the police .91 Le Clere 
concludes that this synchronisation shows a devised plan and an evident entente among the 
groups. Le Clere may have a point here. After all, the original UNC march was planned for 3pm 
on Sunday 4 February. On 6  February, the meeting time was much later, at 8.30pm and this 
coincided with the plans o f other groups. However, the later meeting time may simply be 
attributed to the fact that a maximum number o f members would be able to attend a weekday 
evening rather than a weekday afternoon during business hours. Yet within the UNC, 
preparations for some sort o f militant action had been underway in the weeks leading up to 
February. In late December 1933, the Parisian UNC circulated a notice to its 95 sections, asking 
them to provide: “...les noms et adresses de camarades eprouves pour composer le corps de 
commissaires de groupe, corps special destine a encadrer nos troupes, a les diriger, dans
Q9l’eventualite d ’une action quelconque declenchee par le siege central”.
There was collaboration between individuals. On 6  February, town councillors Charles 
des Isnards and Puymaigre joined the marches o f the JP and the Croix de Feu respectively. 
Prominent members o f several groups were in regular contact and had met before the riot. The 
Parisian municipal council included Lebecq and Jean Ferrandi, president of the UNC-coloniaux 
and the Association nationale des officiers combattants. JP leader Pierre Taittinger was also a 
member o f the council and a deputy in the Seine. His name appeared alongside Goy’s and 
twenty-eight other deputies at the bottom of an open letter of protest to interior minister Eugene 
Frot. This was turned into a poster and stuck up around Paris on the night o f 5 February. An 
unsigned poster calling on the people o f Paris to demonstrate appeared on 6  February. 
According to Pellissier, it is likely that Lebecq and Ferrandi were involved in the poster’s
r  '  93production, as were des Isnards, Puymaigre, Pinelli, Fontenay and Frederic-Dupont. At 7pm a 
group of nineteen councillors including Taittinger and Ferrandi left the Hotel de ville,
89 Le Clere, 6fevrier , p. 225.
90 Ibid., p. 226.
91 Pellissier, 6fevrier, p. 111.
92 Le Clere, 6fevrier , p. 95.
93 Pellissier, 6fevrier, p. 109. See also Philippet, Le Temps des Ligues, V, annex III-B-3, p. 276.
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accompanied by the leadership of the JP and Maxime Real del Sarte o f the AF. The group made 
for the Chamber o f deputies, joined by JP activist on the way. After several clashes with police, 
only des Isnards, Massard, Piel and Contenot managed to gain entry to the Chamber where their 
demand that the government resign was not satisfied .94
Prominent members o f the UNC had contact with leaders o f the JP prior to the riot and 
publicly associated their names with these men. Were they part o f a plan to establish a 
provisional government? Colonel de La Rocque thought so. Speaking to Daladier while both 
were prisoners o f the Germans in 1944, La Rocque claimed that Lebecq, Taittinger and AF 
leader Maurras among others were in the process o f planning a coup when Chiappe lost his post. 
Deciding to bring their action forward, the leagues and the UNC moved against the 
government.95 Perhaps La Rocque, with one eye on the post-war period, was looking to blame 
others for weakening the Republic. Daladier, also looking to his post-war political career, may 
have wanted to discredit La Rocque. However, Daladier noted that La Rocque refused to 
involve him self in the plan. If Daladier fabricated the meeting then he would have had more to 
gain by implicating the colonel. Perhaps, then. La Rocque’s story was true. In support o f this 
hypothesis is the fact that on the afternoon o f 6  February an unnamed municipal councillor 
offered Real del Sarte a place in the new government. This suggests that the plan was still in 
gestation and supports La Rocque’s claim that the plotters had brought their action forward after 
the fall o f Chiappe .96
Whether or not a plan existed does not mean that the riot did not undermine the 
Republic, which six years later gave way to an authoritarian regime. One may view the riot as 
part of a longer process o f radicalisation that destabilised the Republic, a process in which the 
veterans o f the UNC were one of many actors. The aim of this chapter is not to prove that the 
UNC attempted a coup, or that the association was the driving force behind the violence on the 
Place de la Concorde. The UNC’s actions on the night and the reaction to the events on a 
national and local level illustrate the ambiguous nature o f this veterans’ association. After the 
riot, the progressive politicisation of the UNC advanced and made a veteran attempt on power 
seem possible for the first time.
94 Pellissier, 6fevrier , p. 135.
95 Edouard Daladier, Prison Journal, 1940-1945 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p. 259.
96 Pellissier, 6fevrier, p. 135.
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The road to February 1934 
The UNC ‘duped’
Within the context o f the monde ancien combattant, the Stavisky scandal came after two years of 
simmering discontent over the monetary sacrifices asked of the veterans and demands for state 
reform. At the Wagram meeting in October 1933, the UNC adopted a series of demands and 
conditions that the association claimed would save France. According to Aubert, the time had 
come to restore order to France. He offered the collaboration of the UNC to any group with the 
same interest.97 The Stavisky affair, the ‘scandal of scandals’, only confirmed what the UNC 
had long believed: France risked death if the decay within government was allowed to continue. 
The time had come to ‘return order to the house’ and ‘sweep away the Republique des 
camarades. ’98
In spite o f the association’s moralising, Rossignol, president o f the UNC since 1926, was 
embroiled in Stavisky’s shadowy dealing. Reproached by members of the leadership for having 
had contact with men o f questionable moral standing, Rossignol also faced the threatened 
resignation o f certain sections if he remained in office .99 He resigned on 3 February. Humbert 
Isaac, president o f honour, twice refused the presidency. He suggested that as first vice- 
president Lebecq should take over. Lebecq, president o f the GRP, agreed to become interim 
national president until the national congress in May. Under Lebecq, the UNC developed its 
political action. A fervent propagandist, he spoke at many section general assemblies and 
meetings. 100
Prost names Lebecq as chief instigator o f the UNC’s 6  February march. Lebecq wanted 
‘his’ protest and got his way, contrary to the wishes o f the rest of the combatant world . 101 It is 
true that within the UNC Lebecq represented a right-wing activist tendency. As we will see in 
chapter three, he favoured a political activism that often entailed collaboration with the extreme 
right. In a movement as large as the UNC, though, a variety of political loyalties co-existed. 
Even in the executive committee unanimity was hard to come by. The vote that saw Lebecq
97 H. Aubert, ‘Et d’abord. . L a  Vdc, 7 October 1934.
98 H. Aubert, ‘A la recherche des responsables’, La Vdc, 6 January 1934; H. Aubert, ‘Toute la verite ?’, La Vdc, 20 
January 1934.
99 UNC/EC, 3 February 1934.
100 Centre des archives contemporaines, Fonds Moscou (hereafter referred to as FM), 19 9490459: dossier Georges 
Lebecq.
101 Prost, I, p. 160.
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elected to the presidency o f the association demonstrated the difference of opinion in the 
movement and how this could swing between relative opposites.
The UNC’s first choice of president was Isaac, a man less inclined to political activism 
and who rejected co-operation with the extreme right. Isaac was closest to what one may 
identify as a conservative Republican trend in the movement. In the first round o f voting, he 
won thirty-three votes, Lebecq won two and three other candidates shared four. In the second 
vote, after Isaac’s withdrawal Lebecq came out on top with sixteen out o f thirty-nine votes. This 
meant that for twenty-three members of the committee, Lebecq was not their first choice o f 
president. In the final round, Lebecq won twenty-six votes, eight went to other candidates and 
there were three abstentions. 102 One can see, therefore, that the UNC’s interim president did not 
have the unanimous backing o f the executive committee. Furthermore, one wonders how much 
Lebecq owed his victory to Isaac’s endorsement. As we will see, Lebecq’s appointment as 
president had consequences for the UNC’s subsequent action.
Originally, the UNC had planned to demonstrate on Sunday 4 February, to demand 
punishment o f the ‘Stavisky majority’ in the Chamber. 103 The planned itinerary of the march 
would see the veterans meet at the Clemenceau statue on the Champs Elysees and then move 
toward the Concorde. Unlike previous public displays, which usually saw the veterans march in 
the opposite direction to the Unknown Soldier, this demonstration would have a political 
terminus. 104 The UNC postponed these plans upon a government warning that troublemakers 
would hijack the demonstration. On 2 February, Frot, Ducos, minister for pensions, and Chiappe 
met with Lebecq to persuade him to call o ff the march. 105 Lebecq and Roux-Desbreaux, 
secretary general o f the GRP, alleged at the commission of enquiry into the riot that earlier that 
day Ducos attempted to bribe them into calling o ff the march with Legion of honour rosettes. 
Ducos denied the allegations. At the later meeting, Chiappe threatened to resign if  the march 
went ahead because he would not send the police against veterans. Lebecq yielded. He 
informed the national executive committee at a meeting on the morning of 3 February. Given
102 UNC/EC, 3 February 1934.
103 Notice, ‘Dimanche prochain, 4 fevrier 1934’, La Vdc, 3 February 1934.
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that Lebecq did not mention the incident with the rosettes in this meeting, it seems unlikely that 
it was true. Nine o f the twelve members o f the GRP’s executive committee disagreed with the 
decision to call off the protest. 106
Despite the postponement, 150 UNC activists gathered in front o f the statue o f 
Clemenceau on 4 February at the scheduled meeting time of 3pm. The crowd, after being 
informed o f the deal between Lebecq and Chiappe, criticised the leadership for this decision. 
Cries o f ‘Vive Chiappe!’, ‘A bas le Ministere de l ’lnterieur!’ and ‘Vive Hitler!’ were reportedly 
overheard by police. Joined by members o f several suburban sections, the group o f 300, under 
the orders o f Aubert, marched to the Arc de Triomphe, where security forces dispersed the 
troop. 107
After Chiappe’s removal, the UNC, angry and humiliated by the perceived dupery, 
condemned Frot’s ‘deception’, which had delivered the former prefect to the ‘vengeance o f the 
socialist party’. At a meeting of the GRP in Courbevoie, Lebecq revived the idea of a 
demonstration at the time of the inauguration o f the government. The veterans in attendance 
approved. UNC veterans at Chatenay-Malabry voted a similar motion. At 5pm the executive
committee o f the GRP fixed the date of the new demonstration for Tuesday evening. Lebecq
108neither consulted with the authorities nor the national UNC leadership.
The UNC’s call to demonstrate, Pourquoi nous manifesterons Mardi, asked all veterans,
not just those o f the UNC, to join the march . 109 Goy was confident that the police would not act
against the veterans as they were former comrades themselves. 110 He declared that UNC
members would be ready for the government’s response and would use force if provoked . 111 As
for the other groups present on the night, the decision to convene their activists appears to have
come after the UNC’s decision. Newspapers, tracts and posters carried statements and calls to
112protests from the AF, the JP, SF, ARAC and about fifteen Parisian municipal councillors.
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The aims of the UNC
Before the postponed march of 4 February, Lebecq set out the aims of the action in La Voix du 
combattant. UNC street demonstrations up to that point had concerned the defence o f the 
veterans’ material rights. The aim now was to protest against the parliamentary corruption at the 
heart o f the Stavisky affair and the politicians who had subsequently attempted to cover up their 
crime. A mass demonstration o f the UNC’s strength would cow the government into meeting the 
UNC’s demands on the punishment o f political corruption. At no point did the aims o f the 
march call for a coup or an attack against the Republic. The protest was not intended to be the 
final act in the UNC’s plan for national renovation. Rather it was a dummy run for ‘D-Day’ and 
‘H-Hour’ . 113 This suggests that the plan was to stage a dress rehearsal for a later more 
meaningful action. The UNC would fire a coup de semonce, but would not deliver the coup de
114grace.
However, immediately before the riot, UNC discourse depicted the government as 
contrary to the Republic. This tactic, therefore, precluded any mention of an attack on the 
Republic for the existing regime was not the Republic of the veterans. If the UNC no longer 
believed the regime was the Republic by their definition then the absence o f a statement against 
it is less important. Aubert gave the UNC’s wholehearted backing for the words o f Henri Beraud 
in Gringoire'.
La Republique, 9 a? Allons done! La Republique, cette puance macedoine de faisans, de 
mendiants, de croupiers, de prevaricateurs, de trafiquants d’influence, de ministres vereux? Le 
regime, ce chasse-croise des diners d ’affaires et de commissions d ’enquete? Le temple des lois, 
ce caravanserail aux antichambres encombrees de maitres chanteurs, de rastaquoueres, de filous, 
ou le regard de l’homme sans reproche cherche d ’instinct a chaque poignet la trace a menottes. 115
After the riot, the organisation continued to frame its action as Republican against a 
government that was not. 116 Though the UNC claimed that politicians, ‘the guests o f the 
Chamber’, should not be confused with the Republic, it nevertheless identified the constitutional 
regime with the political content o f the government: “Le Regime n ’etait pas, n ’est pas en cause... 
La Republique est le gouvemement qui reclame le plus de vertu. Elle n ’a rien a voir, elle ne
113 Notice, ‘Dimanche prochain, 4 fevrier 1934’, La Vdc, 3 February 1934.
114 P. Galland, ‘D ’etape en etape’, La Vdc, 14 April 1934.
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saurait se confondre avec ceux qui, au lieu de la servir, se servent” . 117 In a letter to the president 
of the Republic, it claimed that harmony between ministers and the wishes o f the nation no 
longer existed. The regime’s democratic character had disappeared . 118 For fifty years, the UNC 
claimed, an organised gang had lived off the Republic, financed by secret funds. The UNC did 
not support a government that had come to represent the worst excesses o f the ancien regime: the 
arbitrary use o f power, a biased judiciary, favouritism, gaspillage, the privilege o f castes, 
injustice, fraud and a new feudalism in the form o f electoral fiefdoms. 119
La Voix du combattant railed against all the deputies who claimed to be Republican but 
were not. 120 The Chamber governed against the country and had relied on armed force to remain 
in power. In a situation where the very life o f the nation itself was deemed to be under threat, the 
regime no longer represented the country and had to take second place to that o f the patrie.121 Le 
Combattant d  ’Ille-et- Vilaine, for example, reported that protesters had not faced the French 
government on the night o f 6  February 1934. Instead, they had walked into the ambush o f an 
‘anonymous faction’ and been pitilessly struck down. 122 The true Republic was not the 
‘Republic o f meteques, the bandit Frol and international finance’, but the Republic o f the 
combatants. 123 Though the UNC did express loyalty to the Republic this came after it had 
helped to force out an elected government so reversing the mandate voted for in 1932. This post­
riot ‘Republic’ was, for the time being at least, more acceptable than the ‘Republic’ that had 
gone before it. The Daladier government had not been a legitimate regime and direct action 
against it was therefore justified.
The UNC’s riot 
A protest within a protest?
Veteran participation in the riot was not representative of the movement in general. O f all the 
veterans’ associations, only the Parisian group o f the UNC and ARAC joined the demonstration. 
ARAC’s aims were different to those of the UNC. L ’Humanite claimed that the communist
117 H. Aubert, ‘Le Bilan d’un soir tragique’, La Vdc, 17 February 1934.
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sponsored veterans’ movement would protest against the regime while the UNC would march in 
solidarity with Chiappe . 124 ARAC demanded the arrest o f Chiappe and Rossignol in its call to 
protest. The Croix de Feu was no longer the exclusive preserve of veterans and the other leagues 
present on the night were not in the majority made up of former soldiers. Yet, the UNC veterans, 
marching in orderly ranks, medals worn proudly, preceded by flags and banners, perhaps made a 
greater impression on observers than their number suggested. 125 The presence of the UNC 
attracted people to the protest, including veterans o f other groups and those who attended in an 
individual capacity. One eyewitness came to the riot in response to a telephone call from his 
friend who told him that the government had fired on the veterans. 126
The UNC’s role in the riot requires careful consideration. Prost depicts the UNC column 
as staging a kind o f ‘protest within a protest’. The march remained separate to the riot on the 
Place de la Concorde, as well as the charges made towards the barricaded bridge, and the clashes 
that left police and protesters dead and injured. Upon reaching the Concorde, the column turned 
away from the Chamber and towards the Madeleine, a decision that proved the UNC’s 
involvement was: “ ...un episode original qui se suffit a lui-meme et se juxtapose aux scenes 
d’emeute comme s ’il leur etait entierement etrange” . 127 Berstein’s history o f the night concurs.
Despite the political aims of the leadership, the veteran demonstration did not become embroiled
1^ 0
in the riot on the Concorde. Berstein supports this point with the fact that no UNC members 
suffered gunshot wounds or were shot dead. Lebecq cited the same reason as ‘p roo f that UNC 
members did not riot. 129 However, to use a gunshot wound as the criterion for participation in 
the riot disqualifies the majority of people on the Concorde from being rioters. Conversely, 
innocent bystanders who were shot must logically be considered rioters.
One cannot say that the UNC’s march was completely separate to the rest of the riot. As 
the column advanced towards the Concorde, turned away from the Chamber and then returned 
towards the riot albeit significantly reduced in number, the cortege gained and lost numerous 
members, leaguers and simple bystanders. Contrary to the UNC’s claim that 30,000 members 
turned out, the police estimated that o f the 8000 marchers about 5000 were genuine UNC
124 Chavardes, Une campagne, p. 63.
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members, the remainder being from the Croix de Feu -  remnants o f the group’s march had 
crossed the Pont Alexandre III to join the UNC -  and onlookers. 130 Paul Chopine, at the time 
head o f the Croix de Feu’s shock troops (the dispos), witnessed the mixing of Croix de Feu and 
UNC members at the Cours de la Reine. According to Chopine, these men fought hard when the 
UNC column reached the rue Royale and the faubourg Saint-Honore. Although one cannot 
corroborate Chopine’s opinion, he wondered if  this co-operation had not been pre-planned to 
give the UNC formation a more combative edge . 131
The main body of the veteran demonstration set out towards the Concorde at 8.30pm yet 
some small groups of UNC and Croix de Feu members were reportedly moving towards the 
Concorde as early as 7.15pm.132 At 7.30pm, gardien Max Gurney was involved in a 
confrontation at the barricades with a group that contained members o f both groups. Blows were 
exchanged. 133 Victor Broissiat, inspecteur principal o f the 10th arrondissement, reported a 
confrontation with a column o f UNC veterans who had advanced to the north end of the Pont de 
la Concorde. The veterans refused to retreat until a fire hose dispersed them. This incident took 
place at ‘about 8 pm ’ . 134 The report o f Laurence, commander of police group 135, supports 
Broissiat’s statement. He claimed that the veterans arrived on the Concorde at about 8 pm, over 
thirty minutes prior to the arrival o f the main body o f the UNC. An hour later, the anciens 
combattants were completely mixed up with the other demonstrators and put pressure on the 
police cordon . 135
This observation uncovers a further flaw in the belief that the UNC was able to maintain 
itself as a discrete group. Photographs from the night show members dressed in suits and 
overcoats, the only distinguishing feature being the war medals pinned on their chests, medals 
that some lost on the night. At the height o f the riot, it would have been difficult to distinguish 
who was a genuine veteran and who was not. In response to accusations that rogue elements 
were mixed up with the veterans, Maurice-L. Martin, an eyewitness quoted in Le Matin, stated
130 APP, BA 1852/BI. Le mouvement Croix de Feu, undated.
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that there were many men dressed as everyone else (comme tout le monde), on the square at
1367.20pm. Members of the leagues wore the same clothes as UNC veterans. One could only 
distinguish between the two by the advanced age of the latter. 137 However, even older men were 
reported to have aided the younger rioters. Respectable old bourgeois men helped younger 
rioters to uproot benches and reinforce barricades . 138 To add to the confusion, several UNC flags 
were allegedly stolen and used by rioters on the Concorde to disguise their true allegiance. In 
some cases, this appears the likely explanation but one should not discount the possibility that 
UNC members took part in violence and lost their flags on the Concorde. Indeed Lebecq 
congratulated the flag bearers who had not hesitated to use their flagpoles as weapons. 139 An 
accurate identification of the provenance o f rioters is therefore problematic.
At approximately 8.30pm, Lebecq, joined by Parisian municipal councillors Le Provost 
de Launay, Charles Levee, Andre Boulard, Robert Monnier and Clement Roeland, led the UNC 
procession from its meeting place at the Cours de la Reine. 140 Upon the UNC’s entry to the 
Place de la Concorde some reports state that the police saluted the veterans. This lends weight to 
the argument that the UNC had a calming effect on the riot. Many policemen were veterans and 
that may have stayed their hand. The UNC itself claimed that upon arriving at the Concorde 
rogue elements attempted to incite UNC members to advance on the Chamber. As they reached 
the Concorde agents provocateurs cried for the veterans to go ‘A la Chambre!’ but the cortege 
turned away as its aims were not political. 141 At this stage, it appeared that the plan was not to 
invade the Chamber and install a government o f veterans.
It is difficult to deduce what the intentions of the UNC actually were. The Bulletin de 
VUNC's account o f the riot claimed that the plan was to march towards the Elysee for an 
audience with the president. Lebecq’s statements to the commission of enquiry told a different 
story. The column’s change of direction towards the Elysee, he testified, was a spontaneous 
move as passage to the Madeleine was blocked. Lebecq admitted that some members did
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demand an advance on the Chamber as the ‘contagion’ spread by the agents provocateurs took 
hold. Roeland recounted that when he heard calls to move towards the Chamber he joined in as 
this course o f action seemed a rational one . 142 One cannot know who was shouting yet the fact 
that it seemed rational to Roeland opens up the possibility that some veterans shared this view. 
A unanimous opinion cannot be ascribed to a group o f several thousand people.
Furthermore, the entire UNC column did not turn towards the rue Royale on the orders of 
Lebecq. A large number followed Lebecq but others, reportedly joined by AF leaguers, 
continued to advance and the violence resumed . 143 Capitaine Gilles, commandant o f the 9th 
arrondissement, reported that as soon as the UNC column arrived on the Concorde numerous 
demonstrators broke away, shouted insults and launched a hail o f projectiles at the police. 144 
Veterans mixed with young men advanced towards the Pont de la Concorde behind a tricolour 
flag. About 250 men of the Legionnaires decores au peril de leur vie turned towards the bridge 
when the UNC arrived at the Concorde. Philippet argues that these men were confused with the 
UNC during the riot. 145 Le Clere’s account differs slightly. Instead o f turning toward the rue 
Royale after a moment of hesitation, UNC veterans exerted pressure on the barrage at the bridge 
as they attempted to engage in discussion with the forces of order. They did not throw 
projectiles. 146
In the absence of a premeditated plan, one may only speculate at what point unfolding 
events dictated the direction of the column. Upon reaching the Concorde, Lebecq and the 
leadership hesitated. They decided to proceed towards the rue Royale (and away from the 
Chamber) to avoid death and injury against a police force that had fired on the crowd. Whether 
one can read this hesitation as the moment when the plan to advance on the Chamber was 
abandoned, due to a lack of weapons and the willingness of the police to use theirs, is conjecture. 
However, the editor o f L ’Intransigeant and UNC member Jacques Pericard hinted at a different 
plan: “Disons et repetons avec force que, parmi nous, aucun des manifestants n ’etait arme. Leur
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action s’est bomee a vouloir passer sur le pont avec la seule force de leurs poitrines” . 147 More 
extreme measures were not completely discounted. Le Journal published a report of the meeting 
between the Parisian municipal council and the President o f the Republic, at which the 
councillors requested that the President install a government of salut public. Goy warned the 
president that even though the UNC would not send its members against better-armed 
adversaries, they might make hostages o f those responsible for the bloodshed. 148
As the veterans entered the rue Royale a police manoeuvre on the street angered some 
veterans. Police superintendent Siron and fifty officers had received orders to occupy both sides 
of the street. Siron ordered his officers to do this just as the UNC column passed by. Le Clere 
alleges that Lebecq had always planned to go to the Elysee if  the bridge to the Chamber could 
not be crossed. Siron’s action, which caused some veterans to believe that the police were 
attempting to infiltrate their ranks, provided the justification to employ this secondary plan . 149 
The UNC procession attempted to reach the Madeleine but, its passage blocked by a barricade, 
the column split and was forced into the faubourg Saint-Honore. Witnesses disputed the 
existence o f this barricade. Lebecq claimed that the only way to take the column was to the left 
as the barricade prevented a move northward. To turn right would have led back to the Place de 
la Concorde. However, the advance o f the majority of the column towards the Madeleine 
supports the statements of witnesses who claimed that there was no such barricade . 150
The veterans advanced towards the president’s residence and almost reached their 
objective. Now split in two, Lebecq led a smaller column, which broke through police 
barricades, forced officers to retreat and set a car alight outside the British embassy. Only when 
the veterans found themselves less than fifty metres from the palace did the forces of order 
(mounted police and officers on foot) manage to halt their progress. 151 Paul-Frederic Charles 
Jousset, Parisian chef de secteur o f the JP joined the UNC column on the night. Wounded on the 
head and the shoulder blade as the column found its way blocked on the faubourg Saint-Honore, 
he claimed to have suffered his injuries 20 metres from the Elysee palace. At that time, he was 
in the tenth or twelfth row of the cortege. Philippet points out that to reach this point, the
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veterans must have broken through three barricades. 152 Maurice Chavardes concludes that the 
Republic was most at risk when the UNC nearly reached the presidential residence . 153 Brutalised 
by police, the peaceful protest transformed into a group o f indignant and vengeful veterans. A 
witness overheard some veterans planning to return with their rifles the next day . 154
The association claimed that it did not want violence but it nevertheless forcefully 
overcame police barricades. Several reports attest to veteran violence against the authorities. 
Police reacted to this aggression. On the faubourg Saint-Honore, a confrontation with the police 
saw Lebecq struck on the head with a rifle butt and Goy injured. A second and third barricade at 
rue Boissy-d’Anglas blocked the way. Both were broken by UNC camarades. Violence also 
took place among UNC members themselves. A UNC vice-president who refused to fight with 
the forces o f order was beaten by other veterans. He requested that the police protect him from 
his comrades. 155
At about 10pm, the contingent o f veterans that had advanced towards the Madeleine 
about-faced and headed back towards the scene o f the riot. The police now found it impossible 
to distinguish veterans from youths mixed up in the crowd. A report stated that 2000 veterans 
were heading to the Concorde, shouting ‘Au Poteau Daladier’ and inviting people to join 
them . 156 The violent action that forced the barricade at the rue Royale was not solely due to 
young men masquerading as veterans o f the UNC. Blind and disabled veterans preceded young 
rioters. 157 Alexandre d ’Aste, a witness on the night, remained with his friend, a UNC member, 
throughout the events. After the UNC column split, both men joined some Croix de Feu 
marchers and returned to the Concorde. 158 Bystander Lionel Basta de Cambemon found himself 
in the middle o f the veterans’ column as it returned to the Concorde, surrounded by ex- 
servicemen and young leaguers. Soon after, violence resumed. 159 Enraged by the treatment of 
their comrades on the faubourg Saint-Honore, the returning veterans, mixed with rioters, exerted
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pressure on the bridge over the Seine. Camille Marchand, directeur adjoint o f the municipal 
police, claimed that this was the most critical moment of the night. 160
At 10.20pm, 3000 UNC members purportedly paraded in front o f the Clemenceau statue 
and then proceeded in the direction o f the riot. At 11pm, a reportedly 5000 strong mixed group 
of UNC and Croix de Feu members descended the Champs Elysees to cries o f “A la Chambre, 
Daladier assassin !” . 161 At 11.15pm, a group o f veterans left the Concorde and made their way 
down the Champs-Elysees to the Unknown Soldier. However, upon passing the gates to the 
Elysee gardens they halted and only a cavalry charge dispersed them . 162 At 12.35am, police 
reported murmurings among the small groups of veterans and camelots du roi roaming the 
streets: the next day they would bring down the prime minister and the minister of the interior. 163
The evidence above suggests that no clear picture of the association’s actions and 
involvement in the riot can be drawn. While the leadership attempted to exercise control over 
the column and its members, agreeing on a specific meeting point and time, it could not control 
everyone. The UNC’s was not a ‘protest within a protest’. It did not exist within a bubble, 
through which leaguers entered to corrupt the veterans but out of which the veterans could not 
exit. Political groups infiltrated the ranks o f the cortege and incited some to militant action. 
Some UNC members sought out violent action among the political leagues present. Others 
broke police barricades and attacked officers out of anger. Similarly, the fact that no UNC 
members were shot does not prove their separateness to the riot. Some UNC veterans did put 
pressure on the police barricades on the Pont de la Concorde and were involved in the ensuing 
violence. The commission of enquiry into the riot found that truncheon blows, sabre cuts and 
pistol whippings had injured 53 members o f the UNC . 164
Reaction from local UNC sections
An examination of the reaction o f the UNC’s many provincial sections is important 
because the decision to protest was one made by the small group o f Parisian leaders. Were they 
out of touch with the concerns of the mass membership? Did grass-roots UNC members only 
support their leaders out of esteem and friendship, unwitting pawns in the grander designs of
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reactionary section presidents as Prost claims? For Prost, the fact that no provincial section 
called into question the legitimacy o f the regime demonstrates an implicit disavowal o f the 
GRP’s march and the violence that took place. Instead, the expressions of support from 
provincial sections praised the decision to turn away from the Chamber and commended the 
dignity with which UNC members conducted themselves. Provincial sections backed the ideas 
o fproprete and reforme demanded on the night.
However, evidence suggests that political militancy in the provincial sections has been 
underestimated. Several points must be made. The UNC reaffirmed its loyalty to the Republic 
in the pages o f La Voix du combattant. What did this mean? According to Dobry, one must take 
into account a group’s relation to others in French society and not in isolation . 165 Consequently, 
when the UNC claimed it had saved the Republic one must consider this declaration in relation 
to the association’s claim that the Daladier government was not the Republic. It did not mean 
that the association had embraced the democratic and parliamentary regime. Indeed, the UNC 
had not mentioned its loyalty to the regime before the riot. On the contrary, as shown above, the 
UNC had claimed that the Republic no longer existed. Moreover, in the climate o f recrimination 
that followed 6  February, to call for the toppling of the regime would have drawn attacks from 
the left and possible legal sanctions for the UNC. Even La Rocque revealed his ostensibly 
Republican colours, when the left called for the outlawing of his group. The UNC would not 
have wanted to find itself in the same position.
Not all messages of support affirmed loyalty to the Republic. Where statements 
congratulated the UNC on saving the Republic one must bear in mind what this implied. For 
example, the departmental congress of the UNC at Emee congratulated Lebecq and the GRP for 
the results they had achieved. These ‘results’ amounted to the fall o f an elected government and 
the arrival in power o f a conservative administration. The group did not express loyalty to the 
Republic. 166
The UNC did suffer a loss o f membership in the months following February. Lebecq 
claimed to have received letters o f support and congratulations ‘par des milliers’, but he also 
acknowledged that there had been losses too . 167 The Vaucluse group alone lost a third of its 
members. Its president promised to remain at the head of the section but only if political action
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was henceforth ruled out. 168 The Nord group lost an ‘influential member’ in Lille but gained the 
support o f ‘une notabilite’, M. Lauweruyns de Rosenadele, accompanied by a cheque for 300 
francs. 169 This group had witnessed isolated resignations but these were allegedly 
counterbalanced by the subscription o f 70 ‘intellectuals’ to the group. 170 Opposition came from 
the sections o f Villeneuve-sur-Lot, the Correze, Pompadour, the Ardennes, Touraine, the Haute- 
Garonne, the Dordogne, the Landes, the Oise and the Somme. 171 Endorsements o f the GRP’s 
actions came from the Nord, the Pas-de-Calais and Brittany, yet according to Prost these were 
not enough to ‘cover up the dissent (la voix discordante) ’ . 172 He explains the approval o f the 
sections from the Deux-Sevres, Anjou and the Ille-et-Vilaine in reference to their traditionally 
right-wing clientele. Yet the Nord group, in which “ .. .l’impression a ete excellente a TUNC le 6  
fevrier....” was recognised to have a significant socialist and communist membership in 1936, 
seemingly undeterred by the group’s previous approval of the riots. 173
The mixed reaction o f provincial sections demonstrates the plurality of opinion in the 
UNC. What were the reasons behind the opposition of some members? Some clue is provided 
by a group o f former UNC members. In April 1934, they produced a poster that outlined their 
motives for resigning from the association in the aftermath of the riot. Police reported that the 
posters appeared in the Haute-Mame, the Manche, the Mayenne, the Meuse, Nievre and the 
Haute-Saone. 174 These veterans linked their decision to resign not only to the association’s 
political action but also specifically to the UNC’s collaboration with the anti-Republican extreme 
right. They denounced the Croix de Feu as fascist and called on all true Republicans within the
1 7Sassociation to follow their example and resign. At the most this statement demonstrated that 
support for the parliamentary and democratic Republic was still strong in sections o f the UNC.
168 AN F7 13029, weekly report from the Vaucluse, 24 September 1934.
169 Meeting o f Comite de Direction, ‘Reunion du 11 mars 1934’, Le Trait d ’Union, April 1934.
170 E. Marchand, ‘Groupe departemental de TEure: Communication du President’, L ’UNC de Normande, March 
1934.
171 Prost, I, pp. 161-162.
172 Ibid., p. 162.
173 Meeting o f Comite de Direction, ‘UNC Zone du Nord, reunion du 18 fevrier 1934’, Le Trait d ’Union, April 
1934; UNC/EC, 29 February 1936.
174 AN F7 13024, weekly report from the Calvados, 16 April 1934. AN F7 13025, weekly reports from the Herault, 
6-16 April 1934; the Gard, 9 April 1934; the Drome, 9 April 1934. AN F7 13026, weekly report from the Indre-et- 
Loir, 9 April 1934. AN F7 13027, weekly reports from the Haute Mame, 3 April 1934; the Manche, 9 April 1934; 
the Mayenne, 9 April 1934; the Meuse, 16 April 1934 and Nievre, 3 April 1934. F7 13028, weekly report from the 
Haute-Saone, 9 April 1934.
175 F713028, copy o f the poster ‘La verite sur l ’Union nationale des combattants’, in the weekly report from the 
Haute-Saone, 9 April 1934.
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At the least it showed distaste among some UNC veterans for political intervention and the 
extreme right. The action of these veterans reveals the moderation o f sections o f the movement 
better than ambiguous public statements.
Provincial groups were not united in their opposition to the protest. In fact, the Rouen 
group demanded the resignation o f Andre Marie, a member of its comite de direction and 
secretary general o f the departmental group. The group did not demand his resignation for 
having taken part in the riot but for having been part of the government. Marie had been an 
under-secretary o f state in the cabinet on 6  February. 176 In the Somme, where Prost cites 
opposition, the Fort-Mahon group was the only one to raise a protest. In the Deux-Sevres, the 
Nueil-les-Aubiers group expressed regret that its members were too far from Paris to march with 
the GRP. One must bear in mind that this statement was made after the events o f the riot were 
known. 177 On 25 February the policy-making committee of the regional group of the Poilus de 
Touraine met and “...votait une motion de mefiance contre le groupe UNC de la region 
parisienne”. However, this brought protests from members and sections who subsequently 
formed a protest committee. The committee used press and posters to dispute the section 
president’s decision. On 19 March the committee voted a motion backing the UNC and declared 
it was not up to the policy-making committee o f the regional group to prejudge the attitude of the
178whole group.
The utility o f citing examples o f those sections who declared themselves ‘for’ and 
‘against’ the GRP’s action is questionable. The leadership o f UNC sections formulated public 
statements. They were a minority within the general membership of the group and so perhaps 
not representative o f ordinary members’ opinions. In the absence of the opinion o f every UNC 
section, which would facilitate a definitive tally, one is left with only a partial picture. The 
reality is more complicated. Moreover, one cannot say for sure that all resignations were made 
in protest at the new political line taken by the Parisian leadership. Overall, provincial sections 
were divided. It is important to maintain this balance rather than state that one attitude 
outweighed another.
One can examine provincial reaction from a different perspective: the formation and 
dissolution o f sections after the riot. To create a section, veterans often responded to a notice in
176 ‘L’histoire d’une emeute: Sa radiation etant demandee M. Andre Marie quitte l ’UNC’, Le Matin, 15 March 1934.
177 ‘Vie des sections: Nueil-les-Aubiers’, Le Combattant des Deux-Sevres, March 1934.
178 ‘Les Poilus de Touraine approuvent l ’UNC de Paris’, Le Poilu, March -April 1934.
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the local area. After 6  February 1934, those joining a new group would have been aware of the 
UNC’s role on the night. For example, the decision of 40 veterans in Guingamp to constitute a 
group after 6  February perhaps shows that many if  not all o f them supported (or at least did not 
disapprove of) UNC action in the protest. 179 This may provide a better measure o f support 
across members o f a whole section.
New provincial sections were founded soon after the riot, some as a response to and in
solidarity with the GRP’s protest. A new section was created in Villegenon in March 1934.180
In April 1934, veterans founded a UNC section in Tarbes and linked their decision to the UNC’s
role in the ‘organisation and realisation’ o f the protest on 6  February. 181 By July 1934, 30 new 
• • 182sections existed. New memberships allegedly counterbalanced the losses suffered. Desire 
Tritsch, vice-president o f the Oise group, reported that the GRP had welcomed 3000 new 
members in the fortnight since the riot. 183 The Pontivy group saw an increase o f 230 members 
from January 1934 to February 1935.184 The Montmartrois section o f the UNC received 154 
new members up to May 1934.185 The UNC section in the second district of Lyon welcomed 
1000 new members between the riot and the end o f the month. 186 Between February and June 
1934, the landais group gained 250 members and 7 new sections. 187
The JUNC cited UNC participation on the night as the reason for an increase in its 
membership. Their parent organisation had shown a willingness to fight the ‘gangrene’ exposed 
by the Stavisky affair. 188 The veterans’ march had impressed new members. Raymond Schmitt, 
president o f the jeunes in 1934, stated that if  the UNC had not launched into political action via 
on 6  February, the jeunes would not have followed the UNC veterans. Now that the UNC had a 
doctrine, he could offer his members more than social engagements and sporting gatherings. 189
179 AN F7 13024, weekly report from the Cotes-du-Nord, 7 May 1934.
180 ‘Chronique de Berry: Nouvelle Section’, L ’Ancien combattant du Berry, March 1934.
181 AN F7 13027, weekly report from the Hautes-Pyrenees, 9 April 1934.
182 Meeting report, ‘Conseil d’Administration: Seance du 30 juin’, La Vdc, 7 July 1934.
183 D. Tritsch, ‘Reponse a des Histoires’, Le Trait d ’Union, March 1934.
184 ‘Dans nos sections. Pontivy’, Le Cri du Poilu, March 1935.
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Provincial sections supported this view . 190 In particular, Franck d ’Hennezel, president o f the 
Saint-Quentin youth section, claimed that the 6  February marked a watershed in the development 
of the youth movement. It was now clear that the youth groups should expand their action 
beyond social and sporting activities. Inspired by the perceived co-operation of wartime and 
post-war generations in the Croix de Feu, d ’Hennezel claimed the time had come for the jeunes 
to join the anciens o f the UNC and work towards national, social and moral renovation. 191
Within the ex-servicemen community, ARAC and the Federation nationale des 
combattants republicans (FNCR) condemned the UNC’s action. In the Dordogne, UNC activist 
Boucher requested help from the national executive committee in fending off the attacks o f the
192FOP. Even the AGMG, usually close to the UNC, did not wholeheartedly back the action.
The Confederation expressed reservations. It had warned its members against rowdy
demonstrations prior to 6  February. The UF issued a statement distancing itself from street
battles led by groups ‘outside o f the mouvement and the esprit com battanf. The UF would later
claim that the rioters had launched an attack against the Republic in an attempt to ‘shake the 
1 0}legal order’. This disavowal o f the UNC’s involvement found reflection among provincial UF 
sections. In the Pas-de-Calais UF veterans put pressure on their comrades in the UNC to 
resign. 194 In the Landes, UF section president Dupouey declared that the the federation would 
never make rioters of its members. 195 A UF section at Taillan in the Gironde echoed the motion 
of the departmental FOP in its opposition to fascism and the ‘bellicose action’ o f the UNC . 196
Not all UF sections disassociated themselves from the UNC. The comite d ’entente o f 
Saint-Quentin declared its willingness to undertake necessary action to bring ‘cleanliness’ back 
to government. It is unclear what this statement meant yet the fact that both local UNC and UF 
presidents signed the statement on 7 February demonstrated at least that relations between the 
two groups were not hostile . 197 The U F’s Association des mutiles et anciens combattants de la 
grande guerre in Nancy regretted the federation’s statement distancing it from the UNC. Vice- 
president James Robert congratulated the UNC for having saved the Republic and instigated a
190 J. Audin, ‘Donnons l’exemple’, La Vdc, 30 July 1934.
191 F. D ’Hennezel, ‘L’heure des Jeunes’, La Vdc, 3 March 1934.
192 UNC/EC, 24 February 1934.
193 Rene Cassin, ‘Contre la violence et l’anarchie’, Cahiers d e l ’UF, 20 January 1938.
194 UNC/EC, 24 February 1934.
195 AN F7 13026, weekly report from the Landes, 14 May 1934.
196 AN F7 13025, weekly report from the Gironde, 29 March 1934.
197 AN F7 13308, report from St Quentin, 7 February 1934.
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revolution that would see the return o f justice and liberty to France. 198 Several veterans’ 
associations used language that hinted at various courses of action. In April 1934, for example, a 
motion o f the 17th departmental congress o f the Association ariegoise promised to resort to all 
means o f action if the government continued to victimise veterans financially . 199 The veterans’ 
associations o f Toulouse met in May 1934 and promised to “ ...lutter par tous les mo yens en leur 
pouvoir et avec perseverance pour que la generation du Feu.. .soit enfin entendue et comprise des 
Gouvemements et de 1’opinion publique” .200 Though the meaning of these statements is unclear, 
coming as they did in the heated post-riot atmosphere one cannot rule out the possibility that they 
hinted at an action similar to that o f 6  February.
Far from isolating the UNC, the association’s participation drew a wider audience to its 
Wagram manifesto. Direct action had brought some success. Indeed, while other veterans’ 
associations may have disagreed with the method o f street action, they had few qualms about the 
ideas behind it. The UNC suffered a loss o f members after the riot. Table 1 shows the number 
of sections created and dissolved according to the reports of UNC treasurer Alfred de Pontalba to 
the executive committee. Without knowing the motives of veterans, one can say that though the 
number o f dissolved sections increased greatly after the Wagram meeting and the February 1934 
riots, the UNC was consistently able to found new sections and attract new members.
Date Sections created Sections dissolved
6  May 1933 57 8
14 October 1933 55 8
9 December 1933 61 23
24 November 1934 52 34
12 January 1935 39 14
Table 1: UNC sections created and dissolved 6  May 1933-12 January 1935
198 ‘L’UNC approuvee par d’autres associations’, L ’Ancien combattant du Berry, March 1934.
199 AN F7 13024, weekly report from the Ariege, 9 April 1934.
200 AN F7 13025, motion voted May 1934.
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The aftermath of the riot 
The UNC’s interpretation
The press, in words and pictures, portrayed the night as a massacre o f innocent veterans. The 
right propagated a somewhat contradictory depiction of peaceful veterans advancing to battle. 
Satirical cartoons furthered the myth that the veterans had fallen victim to a government ambush, 
a pre-meditated massacre o f France’s bravest sons. One cartoon pictured a tribunal o f dead 
veterans passing sentence, skeletons carrying tombstones engraved with the names of ministers: 
Pressard, Sarraut, Cot, Chautemps, Frot and Daladier.201 Posters pictured dead veterans on the 
Concorde with the description: “Ils ont echappe aux balles allemandes, les balles du Cartel ne les 
ont pas epargnes” .202 L ’Ami du peuple , the organ of the SF, reported that the men o f the 6  
February advanced on the Place de la Concorde with the same enthusiasm as their elders had 
entered the woods o f Verdun .203 P. Croizier wrote in Le Combattant landais: “Dans mes 
souvenirs de Lorette et de Verdun, rien ne m ’a autant boulverse que d ’entendre ces matraques 
s’abattre comme des masses sur la tete de ces anciens combattants et de les voir en grand nombre 
s’ecrouler ensanglantes sur la chaussee” .204
Police reports show a variety o f opinions among the French public. Some felt that the 
Republic was not under threat. Others feared that another attempt to replace the regime would 
soon be made, this time via a bloody revolution. The veterans’ participation drew public 
attention to the movement as never before, especially regarding the UNC’s national congress in 
Metz and the UF’s meeting in Vichy. Press opinion differed on the consequences o f the night for 
the veterans’ movement. Victoire expressed a desire to see the veterans united behind a political 
programme and electoral participation. Le Figaro warned against this action, desired by a 
minority o f the monde ancien combattant.
The day after the riot, a number o f senators, deputies and councillors issued a statement 
that urged the President to form a government o f public safety (salut public) and punish 
corruption in the government. Goy and Lebecq figured among the authors o f this statement.206
201 AN F7 13320, report, ‘Le Vernissage du Salon des Dessinateurs de Joumaux’, 7 April 1935.
202 AN F7 13027, weekly report from the Manche, 26 March 1934.
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Georges Scapini, a deputy and a member o f the UNC, accused the government of ruling in 
opposition to Paris. Scapini, with the backing o f Goy, warned that if  Gaston Doumergue’s new 
government failed, the people would once again take to the streets. In this eventuality, they 
would not stop at the resignation o f the government.207 The UNC professed loyalty to the 
Republic but a measure o f ambiguity remained. A group in the Cotes-du-Nord warned its 
members to remain alert and ready to intervene directly in the affairs of the country if they were 
needed.208 Le Poilu advised the veterans not to rest on the laurels o f their victory .209 Le 
Combattant du Centre asked readers to choose between the honest Republic of the veterans and 
that of the meteques and international finance .210 Once again, though these statements did not 
call for an attack on the Republic, their meaning was ambiguous.
The UNC presented a contradictory picture o f its role in the riot. Firstly, the association
emphasised the fact that it turned away from the Chamber, did not have any political aims and
was not involved in the rioting. Goy publicly denied Frot’s charge that professional rioters had
entered the ranks o f the UNC column. He claimed that the police savagely charged the veterans 
211without warning. Secondly, the UNC claimed to have been on the Concorde with the aim of 
chasing politicians from government and rescuing the Republic. In fact, if  it had not been for the
919UNC’s participation, the Republic ‘would have had its day’. Goy boasted that it was the UNC 
that had forced Daladier to resign .213 The UNC de Normandie condemned those in government, 
such as Daladier, for effacing the role of the veterans in the rio t214 Lebecq claimed responsibility 
for the UNC in the events that had followed the riot, which included the downfall o f the 
government.215 At the GRP’s general assembly in April 1935, Roux-Desbreaux declared that it 
was thanks to the UNC that Doumergue now led the government.
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4The UNC feted 6  February as a historic date when the veterans rose up against 
parliamentary corruption .216 However, to claim sole responsibility for the investment in power 
of an administration at the expense o f an elected government, implicated the UNC as the main 
factor in the downfall o f the latter. Perhaps to avoid such an accusation, the UNC couched its 
claim in populist terms. It was not alone in its claim to the popular will. With the fall o f the 
government on 6  February, the street became an important territory in which the ‘people’, or 
rather the self-appointed representatives o f the people, could air their views.217 In parliament and 
press, discussion intensified on the location o f popular sovereignty. Did it lie with the elected 
men of the Chamber or the man in the street? 218
Galland boasted that the UNC’s Seine group’s manifesto perfectly translated the wishes 
of all French citizens.219 Lebecq wrote in Le Temps, “...nous avons exprime le sentiment general 
d’une opinion excedee et ecoeuree par le spectacle deconcertant que lui a donne, depuis des 
mois, un Parlement incapable de toute discipline et de tout travail utile . . . ” .220 Jean Ybamegaray, 
a deputy and honorary president o f the UNC’s Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port section, claimed that the 
protest was the ‘cry of anger and indignation o f a whole people’ .221 In late February 1934, Goy 
condemned those who had manoeuvred behind the scenes to try and install Daladier as a dictator,
disregardful o f popular French indignation. He urged the French to support Doumergue’s ‘true
222anti revolutionary front’. The UNC also depicted the action as a popular uprising by the people 
of Paris. Yet even in this case, it was a Parisian action on behalf of the nation: “ .. .une explosion 
a la Parisienne, de tout un peuple a bout d ’indignation et de contrainte”. Reporting on the 
preliminary results of the municipal elections in May 1935, Galland observed that nearly all the 
councillors who took part on 6  February had been returned to office. Paris had “...vote sous le 
signe du 6  fevrier...” and so given its approval to the veterans’ action.224
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The newspapers o f provincial UNC sections concurred with the interpretation of the riot 
as a popular protest. In the Cantal, the UNC described the riot as the ‘explosion o f a legitimate 
popular indignation involving the population o f Paris’ .225 Le Creneau emphasised the national 
character o f the demonstration: “La manifestation de l ’UNC, le 6  fevrier dernier, n ’a ete que la 
consecration de l’indignation et du degout qui soulevent le Pays entier” .226 At the congress of 
Andelys, held by the Seine-Inferieure and the Eure groups in June 1934, Victor, president o f the 
departmental commission on civic action, explained 6  February as the work of the people o f 
France against the self-interest o f parties and politicians 227
It was not the first time that the cx-poilus had represented the people o f France. Veterans 
claimed that trench life had created a classless society where all social differences took second 
place to the wider conflict. The front soldier represented the whole o f France, from the peasant 
to the industrialist. Veterans asserted the conviction that they were acting on behalf o f the 
French nation and people. The front had been a microcosm of both. According to Roux- 
Desbreaux, such a levelling o f social differences during the war meant that the veterans truly 
represented the people of France during the riot: “Nous sommes, comme autrefois, aux 
tranchees, tout le peuple Fran9 ais” .228 Lebecq wrote that the protest involved the whole 
population o f Paris, indiscriminate o f social class:
Je tremble de sainte colere qui secouait Paris tout entier, ce mardi soir, quand je  pense que, d’un 
cote il y avait le peuple parisien, fin, elegant, courageux, fa it d ’ouvriers, d ’employes de 
commerqants, de petit bourgeois, et puis nos camarades, anciens combattants de l’UNC, des 
Croix de Feu et d ’autres associations, tous en bronze par leur inebranlable fermete, tous en or pur 
par la noblesse de leurs sentiments et la dignite de leur attitude et, de l ’autre cote, vous Eugene
'yjQ
Frot, un dechet de poubelle!
UNC veterans did not unanimously support the association’s action yet their 
condemnation o f it was no less unanimous. The UNC attempted to legitimise its role through the 
claim to represent the people of France against anti-national politicians. One must bear in mind 
that the conflict between veterans and politicians contained a contradiction. The UNC could not
225 D. Audollent, ‘Reformes necessaires’, Le Combattant du Cantal, March 1935.
226 L. Vandewalle, ‘Le Sang a coule’, Le Creneau, February 1934.
227 Report from the Congress of the Seine-Inferieure and the Eure groups, M. J. Victor, ‘Troisieme commission: Les 
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228 Roux-Desbreaux, ‘Apres’, L ’UNC de Paris, 22 February 1934.
229 Ibid., (my italics).
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deny that some politicians had served in the war. Goy, for example, was a deputy. Daladier, 
head o f the ‘government o f assassins’, was a veteran. In order to resolve this conflict o f terms, 
the title ancien combattant was granted and withdrawn at will. The UNC could not erase the fact 
of war service but the quality o f ancien combattant depended almost as much on one’s post-war 
conduct. After the riot, Daladier and Frot underlined their status as veterans perhaps in an 
attempt to regain some legitimacy. However, Lebecq ‘withdrew’ Frot’s veteran status.230 
Condemning the veterans who had given the order to fire, Louis Vandewalle, president o f the 
Calais section, wrote: “Nous, Anciens Combattants, nous renions, nous chassons a jamais de 
notre grande famille, ceux qui ont fait massacrer leurs freres” .231 The Normandy group 
requested that those veterans who had not prevented the murder of their comrades be excluded 
from the association’s ranks .232
The UNC presented the government as an anti-national force. It did this through framing 
the riot as a premeditated massacre o f French heroes. Le Combattant d ’llle-et-Vilaine published 
an elegy on the riot. The poet, Jean Douarre o f the Courbevoie section, compared the march on 
the Concorde to a wartime advance into battle. Their torsos shining with medals hard-won in 
battle they marched, unarmed, only to be greeted by a salvo as they arrived at the Concorde. He 
claimed that the police attacked them without warning and so confirmed suspicions o f a 
government ambush (guet-apens). Goy supported the explanation that the attack had been an 
ambush to massacre veterans.234 In Creil, the local executive committee also made reference to 
the government ‘ambush’, as did the Normandy group.
Furthermore, crimes committed against French national symbols reinforced the argument 
that the Daladier government was ‘anti-French’. For the right and the veterans, the tricolour 
represented a quasi-religious symbol. Le Matin reported a confrontation between veterans and 
police in which the tricolour flags o f the UNC were forced down, broken and tom, and their 
bearers beaten .236 UNC official Croizier saw blows rain down on one flag-bearer. His flag 
thrown to the ground and his medals stamped upon, the veteran cried out as a police officer
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231 L. Wandewalle, ‘Le Sang a coule’, Le Creneau, February 1934.
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shouted, “Tiens salaud, voila ce que j ’en fais de tes decorations!” .237 In a symbolic affront to the 
war generation, a policeman was reported to have tom off Lebecq’s medals with a contemptuous
• 238 •“Sale feraille!”. According to UNC section vice-president Georges Bonne, mounted police 
reacted most brutally to flag-bearers and those wearing their war medals, both sacred symbols of 
the war.239
War culture influenced the UNC’s treatment of the victims o f the riot in several ways.240 
Firstly, the men who had taken part in the riot were referred to as ‘camarades’ whether they were 
members o f the UNC or not. Secondly, veterans of the GRP were awarded a diploma and a 
medal for their services on the night.241 Soldiers who fought in the war also received these 
symbols o f heroism. Finally, victims who died, whether they were participants or innocent 
bystanders, were elevated to a similar level as the men who had died in the war. Although the 
association lost no members, a UNC delegation attended the funerals of some o f the deceased, 
even when the victim in question was too young to have fought in the war. Lucien-Fran9 ois 
Gamiel, for example, was 15 when he died, yet approximately 5000 veterans of the Croix de Feu 
and UNC reportedly attended his funeral.242 Jean Mopin, 24, was a simple bystander on the 
night yet the leagues and the UNC were present at his funeral.243
The UNC and nationalist leagues used commemorative devices usually reserved for the 
war dead to link the fallen o f the Place de la Concorde to the fallen o f the Great War. Referring 
to the dead as ‘nos morts’, the UNC and other nationalist groups observed a minute’s silence in 
memory o f those ‘fallen heroes’ at several memorial services.244 Nationalist groups acted 
similarly. Degirard, president of the Neuilly-sur-Seine Croix de Feu, compared the victims to all 
those who had given their life for the defence and grandeur o f France.245 In May 1934, the 
Association Marius Plateau, the veterans’ wing o f AF, laid a wreath at the Place de la Concorde
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for the victims o f the riot. They were joined by delegations from the JP, the SF and the 
Phalanges Universitaires. As the latter passed the wreath, their leader read a roll call of those in 
the organisation who fell on 6  February to which the response ‘Mort au champ d’honneur’ was 
given.246 A group o f municipal councillors, including Lebecq, submitted the proposition for a 
commemorative stone in honour o f the victims, that would stand on the Place de la Concorde 
where the blood o f the martyrs had flowed that night, ‘piously conserving’, “...la memoire, 
toujours vivante, de ceux de ses enfants qui sont morts pour un ideal de justice, de morale public 
et de vertu” .247
In tandem, the veterans portrayed the actions of the police in a similar way to wartime 
atrocities. UNC veterans emphasised their own nature as defenceless pacifists, mutiles and 
aveugles, savagely knocked unconscious by police .248 A. Godon, president of the UNC’s section 
in Montmartre, reported that mounted policed slashed women, the blind and the elderly with 
their sabres while officers on foot beat veterans with their bloodied truncheons.249 A witness in 
Le Matin compared the government’s actions to the wartime massacre o f the dinantais in 1914,
25Q
which the German authorities had blamed on the provocation of ‘imaginary snipers’.
Photographs o f injured veterans illustrated reports from the night. Lebecq was pictured 
with blood pouring down his face. La Voix du combattant showed a veteran lying prone on the 
pavement, allegedly having suffered three truncheon blows to the head, a kick in the face, and 
four kicks to his body .251 The UNC issued a statement to the press, emphasising the brutality 
shown towards veterans with ‘wooden legs’ and ‘empty sleeves’. The press used attacks on 
women to further demonstrate the brutal behaviour of the police: “On emmene une femme 
blessee dans la bagarre, ou elle accompagnait son mari aveugle de guerre” .252 Mile Oge, beaten 
on the head with a truncheon, headed the list o f victims published in L ’Echo Montmartrois de 
I ’UNC.253 Aubert asked: “ ...matraquer et sabrer des mutiles, des femmes des combattants sans
246 AN F7 13306, report, ‘Manifestation organisee a l ’occasion de la Fete Nationale de Jeanne d’Arc (Paris), 13 May 
1934.
247 ‘Une dalle commemorative place de la Concorde’, L ’Echo de Paris, 10 February 1934.
248 H. Aubert, ‘Le Bilan d’un soir tragique’, La Vdc, 17 February 1934.
249 A. Godon, ‘Menteur, Lache, Assassin’, L ’Echo montmartrois, February 1934.
250 Letter from Alexandre d’Aste, ‘L’histoire d’une emeute’, Le Matin, 27 February 1934.
251 Photographs o f the riot can be found in La Vdc, 17 February 1934.
252 ‘Une soiree d’emeute a Paris: Les manifestations sanglantes’, Le Journal, 7 February 1934.
253 List o f section members injured in the riot, L ’Echo montmartrois, March 1934.
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armes, des porteurs de drapeau qui ne pouvaient se defendre, sont-ce la procedes habituels de 
police?”.254
The UNC’s interpretation o f the riot sought to undermine the institutions of the Republic 
in several ways. Firstly, it located popular sovereignty in the streets and not in the Chamber. 
The veterans claimed the right to represent the people of France and they denied this right to 
elected politicians. It used the quality o f being a veteran to further support its claim to 
legitimacy. Secondly, the UNC portrayed parliament and the government as anti-national in its 
affront to all that was French. The government had ordered police to ambush the heroes o f the 
Great War. Officers had degraded French national symbols and war decorations. Furthermore, 
reports concerning victims o f the riot centred on the most vulnerable and were similar to atrocity 
propaganda during the war. UNC veterans received decorations for their role in the service of 
France against the government.
Speaking at the Sorbonne in February 1934, Lebecq denied that the UNC’s action was 
political on 6 February. It had simply fulfilled its duty and served the country. He argued that 
during the war those who had committed crimes against French honour and the nation had been 
punished and: “Certains parmi nous ont meme fait partie de pelotons d ’execution”.255 Those 
who had neglected their national duty were executed. The UNC treated the Daladier government 
in the same way. Should politicians face the firing squad too? Ultimately, the UNC endorsed 
illegality when it considered the government’s action detrimental to a single national interest.
Conclusion
One can be clear on several points. Throughout the interwar period, the UNC did not advocate 
violent action against its adversaries or the regime. It was not a paramilitary organisation like 
some of the leagues. Consequently, the UNC neither called for a coup against the government 
nor was it the driving force behind the violence on the Place de la Concorde. Its members were 
not involved in the worst o f the rioting when the police opened fire. Yet the UNC’s violent 
discourse suggested a potentially violent course of action. This was not compatible with the 
practices of the Third Republic, that is, electoral participation and parliamentary democracy. Its 
use of military language advocated an extra-parliamentary route to power in which violence was
254 H. Aubert, ‘Le Bilan d’un soir tragique’, La Vdc, 17 February 1934.
255 Speech by Georges Lebecq, ‘La Commemoration de Verdun: La belle manifestation de la Sorbonne, 21 fevrier 
1934\L a  Vdc, 7 April 1934.
60
at least framed as a viable option. The UNC did not recognise the Daladier government as the 
sovereign power in France. In fact, the government was akin to an anti-national force. The true 
Republic lay with the people and the veterans in the streets o f Paris. Some members, therefore, 
were prepared to be violent when the situation called for a Republican action (as defined by the 
UNC) against a government that was not.
The UNC’s demonstration was not a protest within a protest. No single group remained 
separate to the others. As individuals, UNC veterans took part in violent acts against the police. 
However, in the confusion and fluidity o f the riot one cannot be sure what members of each 
group did. Reaction from provincial sections was mixed. A significant number of members left 
the movement. Compared to pre-riot figures, a great number o f sections were dissolved. New 
sections were founded and new memberships arrived, some in response to the February action. 
With the political right in power, the UNC anticipated change would come through legal means. 
This in no way diminishes the authoritarianism o f their plans. The riot should be considered as 
an event in the slide towards authoritarianism o f certain sections o f the mouvement ancien 
combattant.
I am in agreement with Dobry and Jenkins that one cannot discount the threat o f the 
extreme right based on their failure on 6 February 1934, if indeed they did fail. Even if their 
action was apparently uncoordinated the organisations nevertheless secured the eviction from 
power o f an elected left-wing government. They hoped Doumergue would implement 
constitutional reform along authoritarian lines. The February riot would leave some UNC 
sections with a taste for militant action. After all, the GRP had been successful in bringing about 
the downfall o f a left-wing government and the installation o f a more palatable conservative 
administration. In June 1937, the Antibes section o f the UNC suggested similar action to remove 
the Popular Front government.256 A year after the riot, in February 1935, Aubert lamented the 
fact that despite the passing o f 12 months the same men remained in power. The criminals and
257corruption had not been punished. Now the time had come to ‘put everyone in their place’.
256 FM, 19 940 500: 229, telegram from the UNC’s Antibes section to Jacques Doriot, 20 June 1937.
257 H. Aubert, ‘Pour que 9a aille bien’, La Vdc, 2 February 1935.
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Chapter Two 
The Combatants’ Republic
D’une fa^on generale, la ‘temperature’ de l ’etat d ’esprit serait bonne et favorable a l’activite 
gouvemementale actuelle s’il n ’y avait encore quelques apprehensions quant au maintien de 
l’ordre et de la tranquillite publiques. C ’est ainsi qu’on fait courir le bruit un peu partout, en ce 
moment, que “le 8 juillet, il y aura une revolution!”. Cette rumeur, qui a sa source dans les 
decisions que doivent prendre, a cette date, les anciens combattants, ne manque pas d ’inquieter 
beaucoup de personnes... L ’atmosphere de ‘bataille’ n ’estpas encore disparue. 58
Chief superintendent o f police in Lille, 2 June 1934
As the chief superintendent’s report suggests, after the events of February 1934, a veteran-led 
attempt on power appeared more likely than it had ever been up to that point. On 8 July the 
Confederation was due to meet. Many believed that the veterans would then decide the fate of 
France. After the riot, the veterans were no longer alone in judging unsatisfactory the present 
state of affairs. Sections o f French civil and political society came to accept that the Republic, 
now covered as much in blood as in the ‘mud’ o f corruption, was in need of change. Political
9 SOparties weighed into the reformist debate.
9 AOReformist thinking had a long heritage under the Third Republic. In the decades before 
the First World War, social elites expressed concern for the perceived competence and quality of 
parliamentarians entering the Palais-Bourbon. The solution, they claimed, lay in the organisation
258 AN F7 13038, monthly reports from the Nord, 1 and 2 June 1934.
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of democracy, the structural alteration o f Republican institutions and electoral reform in the form 
of proportional representation (PR). Some revisionists recommended a strengthening of the 
executive and a more frequent recruitment o f ministers from outside parliament in order to raise 
levels o f competence.261 Anti-parliamentarianism was common but groups differed in the 
strength o f their condemnation and the proposed solution. While reform programmes sometimes 
contained similar points, the difference between a genuine concern for the improvement of 
parliamentary mores and the desire for a more radical overhaul (or destruction) o f the Republic 
split conservatives.
The centre right criticised the lack o f quality among parliamentarians and recommended 
reform within the system to correct the decline. In 1896, certain progressistes, including 
Raymond Poincare, Louis Barthou and Paul Deschanel, while accepting to work within the 
democratic and Republican system, envisaged a change in the esprit of the regime through the 
modification o f parliamentary rules, conduct and suffrage in order to restore efficiency and 
authority. The right and extreme right condemned parliamentarianism tout court. Intellectuals 
such as Barres, who described the ‘rootedness’ o f all French in the land’s ‘blood and soil’, and 
Maurras, leader o f the most energetic exponents o f anti-Republicanism, the AF, denounced the 
divorce o f the pays legal or parliament from the pays reel or the people. However, as the 
parliamentary right entered the Republican fold soon after the turn of the century, extremists 
would have to wait for success in the crisis o f the interwar years.
After the elections o f November 1919, in which the right-wing Bloc national triumphed, 
numerous groups and publications sprung up. They drew inspiration from the desire for post­
war change and the reformist ‘spirit o f 1919’. Most were concerned with a modification o f the 
parliamentary regime. In the decade to come, the major political parties would include state 
reform policies in their manifestoes. But Republicans would continue to regard the notion of 
reforming the regime, and so straying from the Republican model, as suspect. Reform without 
constitutional revision was possible, yet few projects, if put into practice, would have left it
Ofx'Xcompletely untouched.
261 Ibid., pp. 158, 160-176, 206-214.
262 Monnet, Refaire la Republique, p. 186; Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 14.
263Monnet, Refaire la Republique, p. 317.
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The elections to the so-called sky blue {bleu horizon) chamber of 1919 saw 23 mutiles 
and 220 holders o f the Croix de Guerre elected.264 O f all the veterans’ associations, the UNC 
contributed most to this renewal o f the parliamentary elite. La Voix du combattant boasted of 46 
elected candidates o f which 36 became deputies for the first time.265 Important actors in the new 
veterans’ associations were often members o f several reformist groups at once. Ernest Pezet, 
president o f the UNC’s Parisian section immediately after the war and a member o f the 
association’s policy-making committee, contributed to the pages o f Quatrieme Republique. This 
weekly publication, founded in August 1919, drew on the esprit combattant and demanded a 
modification in the rules o f the Chamber while supporting Millerand’s revisionist projects. Its 
long list o f contributors included Joseph Barthelemy, Jacques Bardoux and Pierre Taittinger.266 
While Pezet’s Christian democratic values would distinguish him from the UNC’s programme in 
the 1930s, his case nevertheless demonstrates the early immersion o f UNC veterans in state 
reform projects. He was not alone. Pezet had been a member o f the national council o f the 
Jeune Republique group, to which Hubert Aubert also belonged before the war. Jeune 
Republique, revived by UNC member Marc Sangnier after the war, demanded reform that 
included the institution o f the referendum, the suppression of the Senate, a ‘social suffrage’ of all 
intellectual and manual workers (who would be represented in an assembly elected on a regional 
basis), PR and the feminine vote.267
By the mid-1920s, more drastic conceptions o f reform gained favour. Left-wing agitation 
in the strikes o f 1919-1920 and the electoral victory of the Cartel des gauches in 1924 spread the 
fear o f communist revolution. With the subsequent appearance o f extreme-right extra- 
parliamentary formations in response to this, a growing number o f groups came to express 
dissatisfaction with the regime. Doubly alarmed at the victory of the left and France’s nascent 
economic difficulties, the right perceived the crisis as institutional; the Republic itself was 
failing. This concern ran parallel to a crisis o f political programmes among the parties, who 
appeared unable to adapt to the problems o f the time. Compared to the youthful and dynamic 
doctrines o f fascism and communism, the French system seemed old and rusty to some as it
264 Le Beguec, ‘L’entree au Palais Bourbon’, p. 333.
265 Ibid., p. 355.
266 Monnet, Refaire la Republique, p. 27. In 1923, Pezet’s report on the civic role o f veterans’ associations to the 
UNC’s national Vichy conference drew attention from the wider combatant movement. His proposals advocated the 
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clunked from one crisis to another.268 Extra-parliamentary leagues attracted an ever-increasing 
membership and the growth o f Mercier’s Redressement Fran9 ais showed a concern for the future 
of French government among the business and industrial elites too.269 Set against a background 
of the rising cost o f living, the declining value of the Franc and growing political confrontation, 
the government’s recourse to decree laws did little to remedy the image o f parliamentary 
incompetence.
The fading o f the left after the 1928 elections effectively relegated the reformist 
campaign to a secondary concern, though intellectuals and certain political figures such as 
Alexandre Millerand would continue to espouse reformist doctrines. The onset o f the worldwide 
economic depression in France and the return o f a centre-left Radical government in 1932 
revived rightist dissatisfaction expressed in the mid-1920s. Allegations o f political corruption 
and the accompanying press hysteria amplified discontent to an unprecedented level.
In 1934, no longer the domain o f extremist groups, isolated thinkers or politically 
impotent veterans, reformist projects garnered close attention because o f a combination of 
factors. Across the Rhine, Hitler’s first year in power signalled that further challenges were to 
come to the Versailles treaty. Governmental stability was considered to be the key to 
confronting a resurgent Germany and the menace to French security that this entailed. In 
domestic politics, the persistence o f the economic crisis, parliamentary scandals and the events 
of 6 February appeared to show that something was indeed wrong with the regime. For the 
leagues, the murder o f their comrades in the riot compounded the perceived bankruptcy and 
illegality o f the regime. As the press took up the reformist campaign, the previously ignorant 
and those who had simply paid lip service to reform now became convinced proponents, at least 
in the heated post-riot atmosphere.270 The Chamber and the hitherto reluctant Senate both 
founded commissions to examine reform projects. It appeared that, especially to the veterans 
who had developed reform ideas over the past decade, the time had finally come for reform.
Within the wider veterans’ movement discussion of state reform gathered pace. The UF 
was traditionally reticent on matters o f state reform. It opposed the discussion of the issue at the 
Confederation’s congress o f March 1933. The association was no less anti-parliamentarian than 
the rest o f the combatants’ movement but it feared that the issue of state reform was too bound
268 Ibid., p. 199.
269 Ibid., pp. 201-202.
270 Ibid., p. 309.
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up in politics and that constitutional revision would threaten the Republican regime. At this 
time, the UF chose a different tactic. It favoured the collaboration of the veterans’ associations 
with the public powers.271
A year later, the U F’s position had changed dramatically. No longer would the 
association shun plans for state reform. The UF planned that the veterans would form the 
‘nucleus and the pivot’ o f a coalition o f French forces charged with reform. The February riot 
played a significant role in this volte-face. It is important to note that the UF did not support 
Gaston Doumergue’s government. Unlike the UNC, Pichot claimed that it was not on 6 
February 1934 that the people o f France had defended the regime, but on 12 February when the 
left mobilised its activists throughout the country.272 Close to the Radical party, the association 
could not accept the extra-parliamentary manner in which Doumergue and the gouvemement des 
vieux (according to the UF) had come to power. If this was now the means by which 
governments were formed there was indeed something wrong with the functioning o f the regime. 
In March 1934, Pichot saw but two alternatives for France: either reform would come from 
within the Republican system, or Doumergue’s ‘truce’ would fail and revolutionary reform, 
through violence or a national assembly, would see a dictatorship installed in France.
A meeting o f the Confederation in April 1934 announced that on 8 July, the movement 
would pass judgement on Doumergue’s government and its actions to that date. Some expressed 
fear for the fate o f the Republic should this verdict be unfavourable. This chapter considers the 
UNC’s plans for state reform and repositions the association in the reformist debate. It will be 
argued that the reform plans o f the UNC were not moderate. Contrary to the conclusions o f 
previous scholarship, when considered on its own merits the UNC’s programme was closer to 
the right than the Republican centre.274 However, within the UNC, a single view on state reform 
did not exist. The UNC’s plans may have had points in common with the right, but one must 
bear in mind that an association o f nearly 900,000 members could not have possessed a single 
mentality. Moderates, conservatives and authoritarians co-existed.
271 G. Roge, ‘La reforme de la constitution ou le voyage inutile’, Cahiers de I’UF, 15 July 1933. A complete 
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Firstly, this chapter looks at the reformist fervour of 1934. Various political groups 
adopted reform programmes in the post-riot tumult. Apparent consensus seemed to herald 
constitutional revision but as tempers cooled reformists would be disappointed. Secondly, the 
chapter examines the events leading to the July ultimatum. Exasperated with alleged 
parliamentary dishonesty and deadlock, the veterans of the Confederation united to demand that 
their concerns be heard and acted upon. Thirdly, the chapter analyses the methods of the UNC’s 
reform. The association favoured constitutional revision through a constituent assembly, a tenet 
of the right’s programme. Moreover, in claiming to represent the people o f France, the UNC 
appropriated the sole right to reform the regime. Finally, the chapter concludes with the reform 
campaign after 1938. As the Daladier government took France in an authoritarian direction, the 
UNC and UF’s call for a public safety government signalled their willingness to abandon, 
perhaps permanently, parliamentary democracy and political pluralism. If this period did indeed 
prefigure Vichy, then the UNC’s actions perhaps both illustrated and contributed to a more 
general derive autoritaire.
The fever of 1934: Reforming the Republic
After 6 February 1934, the veterans, previously the vanguards o f the reform agenda, now faced a 
field of competitors. During spring and summer o f 1934, the theme o f ‘reforme de l’Etat’ 
became a panacea for France’s political and economic crisis. The parties could no longer ignore 
the apparent failings o f the system. Each one tried to present its reform programme as unique yet 
different groups had similar points to their programme. Common to most were the desires to 
grant the prime minister the right to dissolution without the prior agreement o f the Senate, 
enforce limitations on parliament’s financial initiative and reorganise the premier’s office. The 
majority o f groups advocated the involvement o f economic forces in the state. Parties across the 
political divide proposed the introduction o f proportional representation, albeit for different 
reasons. The centre-right Alliance democratique (AD) and the right-wing Federation 
republicaine (FR) hoped that electoral reform would break the cartelliste majority in the 
Chamber. Paul Reynaud, head o f former French premier Andre Tardieu’s parliamentary group, 
urged a vote on a new electoral law in May. General elections would follow in June and
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constitutional revision in July.275 On the left, the socialist and communist parties saw PR as a 
means to increase their representation in parliament.276
Right-wing plans for state reform generally targeted the left. After the removal o f the 
Daladier government, the AD and the FR endeavoured to push home their advantage and break 
the cartelliste chamber.277 The FR’s support for proportional representation and the women’s 
and family vote stemmed too from a belief that these reforms would increase the conservative 
share in the Chamber.278 Tardieu’s high-profile campaign, devised to the detriment of the left, 
identified deficiencies in the function and spirit o f the regime that originated in the subordination 
of the executive to the legislature, the influence o f interest groups on politicians and the outdated 
political practices and ideologies in place.279 Denouncing the left-wing menace at the heart of 
parliament, Tardieu claimed that socialism threatened the existence o f the French state and 
undermined the nation through the spread o f division and atheism. Each element o f his 
programme aimed to erode socialist power. Tardieu took up a long-established argument o f the 
right when he claimed that left-wing deputies needed spending powers more than their right- 
wing counterparts, in order to satisfy the demands o f the interest groups that controlled them. 
The enfranchisement o f women, believed to be conservative, would strengthen the right’s share 
of the vote. Granting the government the right to dissolve the Chamber without the prior consent 
of the Senate would bypass this left-wing stronghold.280
The UNC’s programme shared these points and given the association’s anti-socialism one 
may speculate that these concerns informed its campaign. In October 1937, La Voix du 
combattant featured an interview in which Georges Barthelemy, deputy mayor o f Puteaux, which 
stated that PR was the best way to ‘barrer la route’ to communism, extremist parties and prevent 
revolution.281 With the cartelliste tactics o f the left in mind, the UNC’s programme d ’action 
civique stated:
On ne verra plus avec le Representation] P[roportionnelle] le spectacle d’impuissance 
que depuis les elections de 1932 la parti radical-socialiste, le plus nombreux de la Chambre,
275 Monnet, Refaire la Republique, p. 339.
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donne au pays: essayant en vain de transposer a la Chambre le Cartel conclu, pour les elections, 
avec les socialistes SFIO, il n ’a abouti pratiquement qu’a des impasses; et la paralysie qui a, de 
ce fait, frappe les Gouvemements quand ils voulaient realiser un indispensable redressement 
financier, a evidemment contribue au discredit des methodes parlementaires.282
Reform programmes were ostensibly similar but the illusion of consensus hid conflict. 
Differences lay in the method o f reform and who would be called on to carry it out. Historically, 
both left and right had focused on the return o f ‘competence’ to government. However, 
depending on the political colours o f the incumbent regime, all groups laid claim to competence 
in government or alleged a lack thereof.283 Even extra-parliamentary groups showed the 
influence o f the competence debate. The Croix de Feu desired to see its own men (veterans and 
youth) in power. Whether precipitating a national crisis in which La Rocque would be called 
into government, or via electoral politics as the PSF attempted after 1936, the movement itself 
would rule. These men were the competent.284
The centre and the right both claimed that their plans would return talented, honest, 
sincere and competent men to power. The method of each camp differed. The centre-right AD 
and the centrist Radical party sought to effect change within the confines o f the existing regime. 
This method o f reform differed from the UNC’s. Reform would progressively improve the 
efficiency and competence o f the system without straying from the Republican ideal. To grant 
the prime minister the right to dissolve the Chamber was too great a threat to parliamentary 
sovereignty. PR would give the public a fair means by which to express itself and 
simultaneously improve the quality of men entering parliamentary posts. For supporters o f this 
idea, there would be no trip to Versailles to design a new constitution.
Nevertheless, the reformist fervour o f spring 1934 caused policy shifts, if  only temporary, 
in the parties of the centre. The AD’s manifesto of May 1934 adopted Tardieu’s ideas on 
dissolution, the financial initiative and followed the FR in supporting PR and the family vote. 
This conversion to the reformist cause did not survive the cooling of passions as 1934 
progressed. The Radical party harboured revisionists in its right wing including some who were
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prepared to call a constituent assembly to reform the Republic.286 On the surface, the 
programme of the jeunes radicaux was similar to that of the UNC. On 5 May 1934, L ’Oeuvre 
published the programme o f the jeunes radicaux, namely Jacques Kayser, Andre Sauger and 
several collaborators. This youthful team hoped to install an ‘ordered economy’. They 
prescribed several changes. To restore executive power, the prime minister’s office would be 
reorganised, the number o f ministers reduced and the right o f dissolution granted to the 
government. PR and the removal o f financial initiative from deputies would ensure that elected 
representatives were no longer the puppets o f interest groups. An economic assembly based on 
organised corporations would allow the Republic to make best use o f the professions in the 
running o f the economy.287 However, in contrast to the UNC, the jeunes radicaux already 
enjoyed access to power. As part o f a parliamentary party called to take part in left- and right- 
wing administrations, the Radical party reaped the rewards of the Republican arrangement. With 
a stake in the party system, the jeunes radicaux did not recommend a reduction in the number of 
deputies or the curtailment o f political parties. Their concern lay in remaining within a 
parliamentary regime, not its distortion.
The competency debate influenced the anciens combattants. For the veterans’ 
movement, service in the war rendered one competent. According to the UNC, ‘bad’ or 
incompetent politics was the practice o f politicians while the ‘civil action’ o f the veterans’ 
movement was ‘good’ or competent: “Nos groupements de l’UNC sont constitues en dehors de 
toute preoccupation politique, economique ou sociale. Ni 1’esprit de parti, ni 1’esprit de classe ne 
nous aveuglent. Nous n ’avons d ’autre passion que celle du bien public. Nous nous sommes 
battus pour la France...”. The degree o f competency designated to particular politics rested on
289whether the veterans were involved in it or not.
The leaders of neither the UNC nor the UF expressed the desire to lead France whether in 
a democratic framework or not. To do this would require political action whether through 
elections or a coup. The veterans rejected (at least publicly) electoral involvement. The UNC’s 
plans were not fascist but this did not prevent some o f the association’s members expressing 
admiration for fascist regimes. In May 1936, Rene Villard o f the Cotes du Nord group praised
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Mussolini’s ‘paix romaine’ in comparison to the ‘paix espagnole’ of Spanish revolutionaries. 
Indeed, he prescribed fascism as the antidote to communism.290
As we have seen in chapter one, admiration for and experience o f the military informed 
the UNC’s conception of society. The association claimed to embrace the egalitarianism o f the 
trench community but aspects o f military life, namely duty and hierarchy, remained appealing. 
Paul Galland wrote: “Une armee ne peut vaincre que si, du haut en bas de la hierarchie, du 
generalissime au soldat de deuxieme classe, chacun fait son «boulot», a sa place, et du mieux
291qu’il peut”. He saw no contradiction in remaining a free man who consented to his 
‘servitudes’ and put his duty before his rights.292 Aubert also concluded that the nation would 
function more efficiently if everyone was ‘put in their place’.293 The government should function 
as an army’s general staff. In 1939, following the UNC and UF’s campaign for a public safety 
government, Pichot proposed this solution to the UNC’s national congress:
La democratic plus qu’aucun autre regime a besoin d’autorite car la democratic est un regime 
dangereux....Nous avons vu se succeder nombre de ministeres composes de 25 a 30 ministres. II 
n’est pas besoin de tant de gens pour gouvemer. Un gouvemement c’est d ’abord un chef...il 
commande et il controle. Pourquoi un ministere ne serait-il pas compose a l ’image des etats- 
majors d ’armee tels qu’ils fonctionnaient pendant la guerre?294
Given their emphasis on military service as the ultimate qualification of competence, it is likely 
that a prominent figure from within the army, perhaps Marshal Petain (whose name was raised 
occasionally in the veterans’ plans), would have assumed the role of national leader. Deemed to 
be above partisan politics and therefore incorruptible, some believed that the Marshal would be a 
leader with France’s interests at heart. Jean Goy supported this choice as Petain’s alleged
• 90Sdistance from party politics heightened his prestige. The UNC was not alone in its admiration 
for Petain. In 1935, the results o f a poll in Le Petit Journal declared Petain the most popular 
choice of dictator in France.296 In March 1938, Pichot suggested to President Lebrun that Petain 
be called to lead France. The same month, Goy wrote that in the event of Petain’s refusal,
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“...vous ne nous ferez pas croire qu’il n ’y a pas, a la tete de notre armee, de notre marine, des 
chefs capables de prendre leurs responsabilites”.297
The team around the new head of government would contain veterans and it was these 
men who would restore order to France. The Cahiers de VUF  planned that: “Le chef du 
gouvemement de salut public... appelle a lui les hommes de son choix qui, ayant donne leur 
mesure dans 1’oeuvre combattante, lui paraissent susceptibles de devenir des hommes de 
gouvemement”.298 Pichot insisted that if  parliament refused the plan for the government of 
public safety then it should be dissolved, at which point the veterans would ‘throw themselves 
into the fight’.299 Described as competent, sincere and honest, these qualities appeared to qualify 
the veterans for the task at hand. Aubert wrote that salvation lay in the veterans alone.300
The association had long espoused such a plan. In January 1934, president of the UNC’s 
Ardennes group Schmitt warned that the electorate was sick and tired of the profiteers and 
buffoons in power. Political debauchery may well cause a crisis o f regime and in this event the 
veterans would be ready to ‘sweep’ the house.301 Hoffmann, secretary general of the UNC’s 
Action combattante in the Pyrenees-Orientales, was unambiguous in his endorsement o f the 
veterans’ historical claim to power:
«Peut-on sans crainte confier les destinees politiques du pays aux anciens combattants, a ceux 
qui, pendant plus de quatre ans, ont endure les souffrances physiques et morales pour lutter 
contre l’envahisseur, conserver a notre pays l ’integrite de son territoire et la liberte a laquelle 
nous sommes si profondement attaches?» Quant a nous, nous repondons categoriquement par 
1’affirmative, car le combattant qui a su se battre et mener le Pays a la victoire saura aussi, sans
302nul doute, diriger la vie politique de la France Republicaine.
Around this national saviour, the competent men of the veterans’ Republic would almost 
certainly have been drawn from outside the parliamentary milieu from men assumed to have 
proved their ‘national’ credentials. The UNC never stated that it would take power whether 
through force or via elections. It is unclear, therefore, what the association meant when it said it
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would ‘sweep’ the politicians from power or ‘cleanse’ France o f the party spirit. Perhaps the 
UNC meant it would attempt to change gradually the morality of parliament via a public 
campaign. This was probably the choice o f moderates in the movement. Or, conversely, maybe 
the association (and its extremist tendency) did desire to enter government and evict 
democratically elected representatives. Whatever the association’s intentions, one can say that 
given the tense atmosphere in France at the time, its statements were ambiguous.
Not only did the UNC believe that its veterans were qualified to lead France but also that 
the mass o f the movement represented a support base for the new government. Prost writes that 
the UNC and the UF supported the Daladier government in 1938. The plan for the government 
of public safety was designed to allow his administration to work. The associations hoped to 
fulfil the role of a supportive moral force upon which the government could rely. In some ways 
this role would be analogous to that of the single party in authoritarian regimes.303 When their 
plans for the disbandment o f political parties are taken into account with this envisaged role, 
concern for political pluralism in the associations seems slight. Indeed, Goy made it clear that 
the public safety government, although ‘national’ in character, would not include representatives 
of every party.304
Additionally, both the UNC and the UF saw a role for themselves in the state apparatus. 
In October 1938, Aubert, under the pseudonym F ran c is  Malval, described a new role for the 
veterans in the event o f war. With the army and the police otherwise occupied, the veterans 
would keep a watchful eye on the three million foreigners resident in France. In particular, he 
singled out factory workers for intensive surveillance, as they would earn a good deal more than 
front soldiers.305 This idea was not unique to the UNC. An undated and unsigned document in 
the archives o f the UF’s Rene Cassin specified that police and security service auxiliaries would 
be recruited among those who were not mobilised. The author counted upon collaboration 
between the UF and the authorities for the maintenance of internal security. Les Cahiers de
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I ’UF echoed these sentiments in May 1939.307 However, though these plans appeared to outline a 
French-style Home Guard, they were not limited to times of war. In fact, Aubert wrote: “Deja 
dans quelques communes ou des elements etrangers commen9 aient a s’exciter au cours des 
demiers jours, il a suffi que quelques anciens combattants fassent la police pour que tout rentre 
dans l’ordre”.308
The UNC believed that reform could neither come from within parliament nor without 
revision o f the constitution. Doumergue’s failure to initiate a reform programme appeared to 
confirm parliament’s inability to reform. The premier would not allow reformists to force his 
hand. He allowed the crisis to pass and failed to profit from the high confidence he enjoyed from 
the people and parties, which would have forced the senate to accept dissolution.309 In May, the 
Doumergue government abstained from the vote on electoral reform (the first condition of 
reform in most parties’ programmes). The partisans o f PR lost by 11 votes.310
If electoral reform enjoyed cross party support, why did it fail to pass? For the socialists 
and communists, Doumergue had come to power through the action of leaguers and fascists, a 
fact that undermined the perceived legitimacy o f his government. Although hailed by some as a 
national saviour, for the left he was still a man o f the right. Leon Blum led a concerted campaign
■5 I 1
against Doumergue’s plans, behind which he saw the threat of Tardieu. Denouncing the 
autocratic designs o f the Doumergue-Tardieu partnership, Blum found support in the Radical 
party.312 On the right, supporters o f the FR and the AD were not unanimous in their support for 
dissolution and revision. The question of constitutional revision was still the bete noire of the 
conservative camp. After the Chamber voted to suspend discussion of electoral reform, 
Aubert remarked bitterly that this should come as no surprise. Politicians were not in the habit of 
committing political suicide. The men of the Chamber were concerned only with remaining in 
office until the end o f their mandate whether this was in accordance with the will o f the nation or
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not. Deputies would not enact any serious reform o f the state because, Aubert concluded, “...they 
are the State”.314
8 July 1934: The veterans’ ultimatum
Having posed itself as the self-appointed agent o f national renovation since the 1920s, in spring 
1934 the mouvement combattant reasserted its moral monopoly. Some observers saw the 6 
February protest as the eruption of the veterans onto the political scene.315 After the riot, pre­
existing political allegiances still split the two largest associations yet the UF’s conversion to a 
reformist mentality at least brought it onto common ground with the UNC. Significantly, though 
the UNC initially backed the Doumergue government while the UF did not, both now agreed on 
the necessity o f state reform. Even during times of conflict between the organisations, both 
pursued reformist policies and would come together again in 1938 in the campaign for a 
government o f public safety. The seriousness o f thought now devoted to state reform ideas 
caused excitement in the ranks of the veterans’ movement. Some veterans believed that the era 
of the parties was truly in its death throes. It appeared that finally their programme would come 
to the attention o f a wider audience.
The Confederation’s own commission on state reform, the so-called commission des 19, 
gained new impetus. At a meeting o f its national council on 23-25 March 1934, the associations 
met to discuss the findings of this commission. The principle of political action within the remit 
of the Confederation was agreed with a large majority as were the other recommendations of the 
commission: a programme of reform similar to the UNC’s that supported proportional
• • 316representation, female suffrage and the dissolution o f the legislature after electoral reform.
The following month, in response to a threat to pensions provision, the veterans’ 
movement made its most audacious public demand, spurred on by the new found consensus and 
enthusiasm that permeated the Confederation. In an attempt to economise, Doumergue requested 
that the veterans accept a 3% reduction on all pensions. If the veterans refused, the premier 
would resign. On 12 April 1934, an extraordinary meeting of the Confederation’s council met to 
discuss the government’s offer. Split between those who wanted to reject the offer and those 
who were concerned that the veterans would be blamed for the fall o f the government, the
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Confederation accepted the reduction under the proviso that the government begin the process of 
national recovery defined according to the veterans’ reform programme of March, with a 
deadline o f 1 July. The associations would review the government’s progress at the meeting of 
the Confederation on 7-8 July 1934 and pass judgement on whether or not the government had 
acted upon the good faith of the veterans. Speaking to the veterans in attendance, Goy sent out a 
warning to the government: “Donnons un rendez-vous au Gouvemement et qu’il fasse appliquer 
son programme controle par nous. C’est l’avant-demiere carte du regime qui se joue. Vous, vous 
representez la demiere carte. Gardons la notre en reserve, car nous n ’aurons pas le droit de ne 
pas reussir”.317 If the Confederation decided that the government had not acted in a satisfactory 
manner, they would topple the government by forcing Rivollet, minister for pensions and head o f 
the Confederation, to resign his portfolio.
In May 1934, the UNC held its annual national congress at Metz. Following the 
veterans’ demonstration in February and the meetings of the Confederation in March and April, 
the national press devoted more attention than usual to the national veterans’ congresses that 
year. Le Matin recognised the significance o f the UNC’s meeting. Articles emphasised the 
strength o f the association and described it as ‘powerful’ and a ‘formidable army’ similar to that
318which had entered Metz after the Great War. Moving beyond the concerns o f a single 
association, the veterans were meeting to decide once again whether to respond to the call o f the 
country. Le Matin reported: “Ce sont des assises graves, dramatiques presque ou devront dire 
s’ils doivent abdiquer ou, au contraire, faire acte de salut public ceux qui, au prix du plus lourd
319sacrifice, ont jadis sauve un pays qui tombait” . Reports devoted special attention to Goy’s 
statements on electoral and state reform.320 The left-wing press saw more sinister motives behind 
the UNC’s congress. L ’Humanite warned that the fascists in the UNC were using the congress to
'XO 1prepare another assault in the style of the February troubles.
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For Lebecq and the UNC, the Metz congress marked the association’s re-orientation 
towards civic action and national politics. The arrival in power of the ‘national’ Doumergue 
government was but the first step on the road to French salvation. In his report on state reform, 
Goy explained that 6 February had witnessed the initial stage of a revolution. 322 It was not 
intended to be the end o f the UNC’s political action. The UNC had not prepared a team to take 
power by force and so, Goy claimed, the revolutionary period continued even after the arrival of 
the Doumergue government. The next step would be constitutional and state reform, specified as 
the right for the president to dissolve parliament without the Senate’s agreement, a reduction in 
the number o f ministers, the appointment o f some ministers from outside parliament, the removal 
of spending initiative from the legislature and the strict separation o f powers.323 Responsible for 
the installation in power of a new government, the veterans were now accountable to the people 
of France.
The U F’s congress at Vichy fell under the spotlight later that month. Pichot was 
convinced o f the necessity o f reform to the survival o f the Republic. Discussion o f politics was 
useless if  the means by which to pursue this politics -  parliament -  was faulty. The congress 
unanimously accepted Pichot’s report on 22 M ay 1934 and on the strength of it returned him to 
the presidency o f the organisation. Having previously condemned the 6 February riot, Pichot 
issued a warning to the Doumergue government: “Quel a ete le premier resultat de cette 
intervention violente?....un gouvemement de «vieux» au pouvoir, une treve qui n ’est ni 
l’equilibre, ni l ’ordre, ni la securite; un apaisement qui n ’est que de l’inertie et n ’a meme pas fait 
revenir la confiance”.324 Le Matin reported Pichot’s statement to the congress. His stance 
hardened further:
M. Pichot fixe la date, le 8 juillet. Si le gouvemement, a cette date, n ’a ni reprime la fraude, ni 
clos les affaires judiciaires, ni fait reculer le prix de la vie, ni engage la reforme fiscale, c ’est la 
rupture. L’equipe de coalition, dont M. Pichot a parle nettement, se met a l ’oeuvre et prend le 
gouvemail. L ’assemblee, eberluee sans doute, mais dominee, applaudit.325
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Similar threats appeared in the UNC’s press. Desire Tritsch compared the 8 July 
deadline to the decision in 1791 to build the Republic on the ‘burning walls o f a tired and
326impotent regime’. Aubert warned o f government dupery if  the deadline was postponed, yet he 
was aware o f the consequences if the veterans decided to break with the government:
En d ’autres termes, l’experience se poursuit. Convient-il d’y mettre fin? Si l ’on dit oui, je  
demande a connaitre celle qu’on veut entreprendre: d’autant que le Ministere a une majorite a la 
Chambre et au Senat et que 1’opinion publique lui est encore sympathique. En brisant 
brutalement, nous ferions acte revolutionnaire. Est-ce bien le moment?3
Attention remained fixed on state reform and the 8 July deadline. Meetings o f the 
commission des 19 became more frequent as the veterans planned for the failure of the 
government. Heightening public anticipation o f the day, the left-wing coalition, the Front 
commun, announced its decision to convene at Place de la Nation. That same evening, the Croix 
de Feu was to march to the Arc de Triomphe. A UNC ceremony at the inauguration o f a war 
memorial in the fourth arrondissement would be preceded by a parade at Place de la Bastille. 
With the forces o f the left and right taking to the streets, a revolution appeared likely to some. La 
Croix reported that the deadline had caused some amount o f fear in ‘high places’.328 Yet this was 
not only true o f those in government. The UNC recognised that the Confederation’s apparent 
ultimatum had caused fear among certain sectors o f public opinion, as did the police. In 
Quimper (Finistere), the police superintendent reported that the public feared that if  the veterans
309
pronounced themselves dissatisfied then violence would follow. “ Similar anxiety was 
expressed in Lille and Lens. Le Populaire reported: “Tout le monde parle du 8 juillet”. Paul 
Vaillant-Couturier offered the hand o f the communist party to veterans. He feared that the 
veteran movement’s leaders would dupe their former comrades-in-arms. La Rocque warned 
his followers to maintain their sang-froid, amid stories of ‘mysterious meetings’ and
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‘interchangeable and sensational alliances’ that threatened bloodshed in the capital.333 Referring 
to the recent congresses, Le Matin concluded that the policies outlined at these meetings 
demonstrated that the veterans were not just ‘talking hot air’.334 Gustave Herve o f Victoire was 
more sceptical: “Une Assemblee Constituante nominee par les organisations d’Anciens 
Combattants? On ne voit pas cela sans effroi. Quelle pagaille! Quelle Tour de Babel! Une 
nouvelle Chambre de deputes, quoi!”.335 Revolutions, Herve wrote, did not occur on fixed dates. 
Le Temps warned that the veterans would become simply another political formation if they took 
up politics. They had defended the entire nation during the war and not their individual 
conception o f this nation that now threatened to split the movement.336
Ultimately, the UNC’s announcement on its decision not to vote in favour o f toppling the 
government allayed some fears. In the national press, Goy made it clear that the UNC did not 
want to cause another ministerial crisis. The association did not believe that Doumergue had 
satisfied the veterans’ demands but it favoured the postponement of the deadline.337 hi spite of 
the apparent growing unity within the combatant movement, at the meeting o f 7-8 July the 
veterans could agree upon little else but the failure of the government. A motion intended to 
oblige Rivollet to resign was defeated, 292 votes to 290.338 The Confederation split along 
established political lines. Groups on the right, such as the AGMG supported Doumergue; the 
UF, FNCR and FOP on the left did not.
The UF’s reaction when the July deadline arrived indicated just how far it had moved 
into the reformist camp. The UF delivered a stinging criticism of the Confederation for failing to 
follow through with the veterans’ threat to topple the government. Whereas the UNC favoured a 
postponement o f the deadline, the UF judged that the government had failed to institute reform. 
Moreover, as we will see below, the UF was now prepared to accept an extra-parliamentary 
method of reform through a constituent assembly. This was a remarkable turnaround for an 
association that had once shunned all discussion of reform. It appeared that following the
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manner in which Doumergue had come to power and his failure to bring about reform, the UF 
had lost faith in the ability o f parliament to change the regime.339
For the UNC, the postponement o f the deadline would be the best course o f action, but 
the group reassured members that it would not be duped.340 Provincial UNC groups did not 
unanimously support the national association’s decision. On 8 July, the Limousin group voted 
against granting the government an extension, in opposition to the vote of the national UNC.341 
Gerard de Cromieres, the section president, criticised the Parisian leadership for its ignorance of 
provincial opinion and its vulnerability to government intrigue.
Henry de Kerillis congratulated UNC members Goy, Lebecq and Beauregard for 
defeating a politically motivated motion against the government.342 Le Figaro expressed relief at 
the veterans’ decision, as did La Croix, which claimed that the veterans had avoided being drawn 
into the revolutionary plans of the neo-socialists and syndicalistes,343 While affording the 
veterans the right to judge the acts of the national government, Le Temps nevertheless required 
that this judgment be moral and not political.344
One should not regard the UNC’s action as supportive of parliamentary democracy. The 
UNC reacted to successive administrations in different ways despite the fact that the 
constitutional regime remained the same. The perceived undesirability of left-wing governments 
meant that when administrations of this political allegiance gained power, the UNC framed the 
change in composition o f the government as a change o f regime. In brief, at times the value and 
legitimacy of the Republic in the eyes o f the UNC was dependent upon the political colours o f 
the incumbent government. A right-wing administration was more acceptable than one of the 
left. The advent o f the right-wing Doumergue administration gave the UNC a renewed sense of 
optimism. The association claimed the credit for the fall o f a corrupt government. It would 
appear that the UNC found more palatable a right-wing government installed by street action, 
than the left-wing cartelliste rule. With the association declaring its confidence in the 
government, Galland wrote that at last the ‘abscess had been lanced’ and that the new
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government imposed by the veterans could now begin the purification o f parliamentary mores.345 
In contrast, the UNC’s reaction to the Popular Front government, an elected left-wing 
combination, was one o f concern for the nature o f the regime at large. Amid accusations of 
treachery and fear o f communist revolution, the UNC questioned the continued existence of the 
Republic in France: “Ce sont des methodes bolchevistes qui sont ainsi instaurees en France... Et 
Ton pretend que nous sommes en Republique!”.346
However, the UNC’s opposition to the parliamentary regime ran deeper than partisan 
politics. During the Doumergue’s reign, the UNC placed its confidence in the government but 
still expressed ‘some anguish in this confidence’.347 In June 1935, Galland, claimed that all 
politicians whether ‘good’ or ‘bad’ should be thrown together ‘in the same sack’.348 Aubert 
warned that the ‘gangsters are still the masters’ o f the Third Republic.349 As the July deadline 
approached and the long-awaited reforms failed to materialise, the UNC’s faith in the 
Doumergue government began to falter. Perhaps even the saviour from Toumefeuille could not 
remedy the situation. According to Galland, the UNC would only be satisfied once the politicians 
and the population understood that its veterans intended to be at the heart o f and to direct state 
reform.350
In October, Doumergue took up the revisionist cause once again in an attempt to shore up 
his failing popularity. Though he proposed measures that were accepted as necessary in spring, 
Doumergue’s plan now scared deputies who feared constitutional revision and its implications 
for the parliamentary regime. The fever of February 1934 had passed and cool heads reasserted
I
themselves. The Radicals, searching for allies on the right to oppose Doumergue, found 
support in Pierre-Etienne Flandin’s AD and his centre-right allies. The AD renounced reformism 
and opted to effect improvement through a concerted bi-partisan effort. In November 1934, 
Flandin succeeded Doumergue to the premiership and the following January expressed his 
opposition to constitutional revision. The centre right reaffirmed its conservatism in matters of
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reform and its adherence to the Republican ideal. Reliant on the support of Radicals, Flandin did 
not wish to jeopardise his position.353
Ten days after the Doumergue government came to an end, Lebecq spoke at a meeting of 
the Lyonnais UNC. Expressing the discontent within the UNC, he claimed that ultimately the 
state of France before and after the 6 February had remained the same.354 The UF was now 
satisfied to see the Radicals back in government. As the Doumergue administration entered what 
would be its final months, the UF’s language on state reform had come to resemble that of the 
UNC. It spoke o f prioritising one’s duty over one’s rights and discerned a divorce between the 
present parliament and public opinion.355 However, in spite of Pichot’s warning to Flandin that 
it was the last chance for parliament, the UF’s more extreme demands now faded. Tellingly, no 
motion on state reform was published in the motions of the national congress in 1935. There was 
no renewed call for a constituent. Indeed the UF now criticised parliament for placing too much 
power in the hands o f the executive, the reverse o f the UNC’s argument.356
The veterans had long decried the defects of the parliamentary regime and presented 
themselves as the only men qualified to restore France to her former self. The 8 July deadline 
marked an escalation in veteran tactics. An unelected body, the Confederation now formally 
attempted to act as a self-appointed auditor. The movement showed signs of an increasing 
authoritarianism as it threatened the government and held Doumergue to ransom. The demands 
of the veterans stemmed from a belief in their own moral and ideological superiority and do not 
give cause for surprise. After all, the UNC’s ideas, as expressed in the Wagram manifesto, 
gained new impetus after the association’s participation in the direct action of the February riots. 
Expressions in favour of more extreme tactics provide evidence of a move to authoritarianism 
within the combatant movement at this time.
Wedded to particular ideologies, political groups chose absolute and definitive solutions 
instead of following formulas that would allow interaction and negotiation.357 The right’s 
distrust of the socialist-communist alliance and the left’s suspicion of fascism precluded any 
unified attempt to solve problems. Ultimately, reformers could not escape the fact that their
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campaign began on the night of 6 February. O f course, the veterans’ revolution did not 
materialise yet this should in no way diminish the seriousness of the UNC’s plans. With the 
apparent failure o f Doumergue, it seemed that reform would not come from within the Chamber. 
Would reform, then, be imposed by extra-parliamentary means? Aubert mused upon this option 
on 7 July, the day before the veterans’ meeting. While the government had improved in some 
areas, the experience o f this parliament mirrored that of its predecessors.358
‘Une Constituante! Ou le pays est f...!’
As the Doumergue administration entered its final weeks, the UNC’s disillusion seemed 
complete. Confronted with a regime that could not reform itself, Aubert suggested a more 
radical treatment: “Le temps est passe ou les pilules oratoires pouvaient faire effet. Aujourd’hui, 
c’est un traitement severe qu’il convient d ’administrer au pays malade, quelques coups de 
bistouri qu’il faut avoir le courage de dormer ici et la pour eviter que ne gagne plus largement la 
gangrene”. A week later, Etienne Bourrut-Lacouture of the UNC wrote: “Si la reforme 
electorale... ne se fait pas avec le Parlement, elle se fera sans lui”.360 The UNC’s calls for a 
constituent assembly placed it in the sphere o f  the right and extreme right rather than the centre. 
Unconcerned with solely improving the quality o f  parliamentarians, the right and extreme right 
attacked parliamentarianism itself. The FR advocated PR, female suffrage, the family and 
obligatory vote, limitations on parliamentary spending initiative, a reduction in the number of 
parliamentarians and the introduction o f a supreme court. In January 1934 party chief Louis 
Marin demanded a ‘true’ constitution and the FR aligned with Tardieu’s views on reform in June 
1934.362 The UNC’s programme included the features of the FR’s campaign, although the 
veterans’ association did not intend to make voting obligatory. Both the UNC and the FR 
required constitutional revision after dissolution o f the Chamber.
Plans for a constituent assembly were not unique to the UNC. On the initiative of the 
Semaine du combattant (SDC) an inter-associational meeting took place in February 1932.
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Members reached a decision on four changes to the constitution: a strengthening of the 
executive, an independent and reorganised legislature, the representation of economic and social 
forces in the state and the creation of a supreme court. The motion ended with a call to form a 
constituent assembly. While the discussion of a constituent worried orthodox Republicans 
within the movement, the argument o f the SDC’s Maurice de Barral persuaded attendees at the 
meeting to back the idea. De Barral argued that the most serious circumstances demanded 
exceptional remedies.363 The meeting created a permanent executive commission charged with 
making the French understand that, in the present situation, constitutional reform was the first 
condition of any recovery.364
A year later, veteran Robert Monnier’s report of 27 January 1933 on constitutional 
change concluded that the present parliament was unable to reform itself. The report repeated 
the call for the formation of a constituent assembly composed of about 100 elected 
representatives and extra-parliamentary elements, specifically 50 ‘great personalities’ chosen by 
their peers.365 Reported in La Voix du combattant, the article concluded with a desperate call for 
reform, legal or otherwise: “Quel que soit l’homme qui, demain, prendra legalement ou 
illegalement les renes du pouvoir, nous lui soumettrons la motion d ’avoir a reunir une 
Constituante reclammee par la Confederation des AC. II faut que s’exprime, souverainement, la
volonte nationale. Une Constituante!... ou le Pays est f. ”. Several days earlier, Henry
Rossignol, at the time president o f the UNC, had taken part in a conference on state reform at the 
Sorbonne. He diagnosed problems in the legislature, which had slowly been taken over by
' l f . n
syndicalism and was now more powerful that the executive. This meeting also ended with the
i / : o
condition that state reform would come from within a national constituent assembly.
The idea persisted into 1934. The meeting o f the Confederation in late March 1934 heard 
secretary general o f the FNCR Jean Sennac’s report on direct action in which he spoke of ‘the
• 369coming Constituent assembly as if  its meeting was only a matter of days away’. In the UNC’s 
pre-congress reports o f April 1934, Goy, Leon Berthier and Victor Beauregard envisaged the
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eventual creation of a constituent assembly to modify the constitution.370 The following month, 
the UNC section in the Deux-Sevres called for the convocation o f a National Assembly to 
‘correct’ the constitution.371 Similarly, the UF, in its ordre du jour  o f 7 July 1934, specified that 
if parliament could not enact the necessary reforms then a constituent assembly should do so.372 
The date o f this declaration was not insignificant. Immediately prior to the Confederation’s July 
deadline, it appeared at a time when a veteran attempt on power seemed possible.
The UNC’s own youth movement, the JUNC presented a somewhat contradictory plan 
for the state. French youth organisations had shown their interest in state reform at the Etats 
generaux de la jeunesse in June 1934. Hopeful o f an accord based upon a perceived shared 
generational identification, the youth groups unanimously condemned the capitalist regime and 
affirmed the revolutionary nature o f French youth.373 The following month, the 9 July Plan 
represented another attempt by youth groups o f  various affiliations to demonstrate their will to 
unite across political cleavages.374 The plan detailed reforms common to most groups including 
the UNC: a reinforcement o f the executive through the granting of the right to dissolution and 
control over financial initiative, the use o f technical bodies in legislative work and the 
intervention o f the National Economic Council and the Council of State in the economy. With 
parliament unable to reform itself, change would come about through a constituent assembly.375
JUNC doctrine developed under the influence of young intellectual thinking at the 
time.376 Rejecting the established order, conventional politics, Marxism and fascism, the JUNC 
campaigned for a revolutionary renovation o f human civilisation. It is in JUNC discourse on the 
state that the contradiction lays. The youth group moved from a position that advocated an 
almost anarchic revolutionary destruction o f French institutions with little idea of what would 
follow, to a stance that endorsed order and authority. The movement qualified itself as
revolutionary, not in the Marxist sense o f the term, but as a youthful force ready for action. In
May 1934, the JUNC was clear on the need for the destruction of contemporary Republican and 
democratic institutions. A simple modification would be insufficient.377 It was vague on what
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would be created after this destructive action. But the movement’s support for the veterans’ 
public safety government in 1938 contains some clues. The new regime would not include 
parliamentarians. Political pluralism would be severely curtailed if not suppressed altogether.378 
In December 1938, Rene Franconi of the JUNC prescribed a dose of ‘healthy and hard’ authority 
for which the French were ‘ripe’. National demands would dictate the extent and absoluteness of 
this authority.379 The evolution of JUNC doctrine perhaps reflected the spirit o f the time. Its 
‘revolutionary action’ plan developed in the enthusiasm of spring 1934, while the demand for 
authority came in 1938 against the background o f a failed general strike and the Daladier 
government’s use o f decree powers.
Prost does not take seriously the veterans’ calls for a constituent assembly. He claims 
pronouncements on extra-parliamentary reform came from hotheads and utopian thinkers. These 
outlandish ideas, Prost alleges, perhaps lay behind the lack of attention given to veteran doctrine. 
As with other points o f the veterans’ programme one should neither discount ideas nor dismiss 
their seriousness because they did not come to fruition. Reforms may not have been anti­
republican in themselves but an extra-parliamentary method of reform had scope for 
authoritarianism. Furthermore, the fact that the right favoured such a method means that one 
cannot locate the UNC at the Republican centre o f the Third Republic.
State and Economic Reform: The Organised Profession
As groups searched for a solution to the economic crisis corporatism appeared increasingly 
attractive to business leaders and the right. Corporatists drew on the work o f Rene de La Tour 
du Pin and Social Catholics at the turn o f the century.381 The Estates-General reformist 
campaign of 1923-24 attracted businessmen, wealthy farmers, professionals and not a few AF 
activists to its cause. Followers o f the campaign favoured a corporativist state based on two 
assemblies, one for fathers and one for producers. Parties would not be represented. Both 
assemblies would come together in a superior body through which they would advise an
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authoritarian leader and his colleagues.382 Though Georges Valois, a participant in the Estates- 
General campaign, ensured that these ideas survived, the relative prosperity o f the decade 
diminished the urgency o f economic reform.
The following decade, class and industrial conflict brought a new significance to
383corporatism. While various advocates o f corporatism contested its content, with no single 
project agreed upon, all recognised that outside intervention alone could restore harmony to the
384economy. The right took up the cause once again. The FR formulated the fundamental 
precepts o f its own corporatism in which French employers and workers would collaborate. 
Bosses would act responsibly and workers would abandon industrial action. Yet far from 
infringing on employers’ rights and benefits, the FR sought to curb the freedom of labour unions, 
which they considered foreign-funded and dangerous to the social order.385
The new enthusiasm for corporatism went hand in hand with antiparliamentarianism and 
the well-worn debate over competence in government. Business leaders hoped that the 
Marchandeau law o f January 1935 would establish corporations in professions where a majority 
of producers agreed to a ‘legally enforceable entente’. However, their hopes would be dashed 
and their suspicions o f parliament confirmed when the law was first amended by the left and 
subsequently sidelined in the Senate.386 Corporatists claimed that the pandering of deputies to a 
variety o f interests in order to secure their re-election meant they could not fully represent the 
interests o f a profession.387 Moreover, politicians did not possess the requisite competence for
■>oo
economic and social intervention. As a solution, corporatists recommended the organisation 
of professions that would represent the interests o f ‘natural’ social groups, namely the profession 
and the family.389 Regional professional federations would regulate their profession, implement 
laws for local syndicates to follow and send representatives to a national consultative body. 
Membership o f syndicates would be voluntary but the decisions and laws o f the regional bodies 
would affect members and non-members alike.
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The political context of the 1930s often meant that corporatism was a move towards 
fascism or authoritarianism.390 The assumption o f a common interest among all members of a 
profession allowed corporatists to evade discussion o f coercion.391 However, the authoritarianism 
of the corporative system lay in the very claim to the existence o f a single professional and 
national interest. O f course this national interest depended on the person, but it was always 
perceived as identical to the individual’s self-interest.392 Enemies of the professional interest 
such as communists, trade unions and foreign elements were therefore deemed enemies o f the 
national interest and to be eliminated.
The UNC favoured a corporative organisation o f the economy. A man’s profession was 
his second family. Employers and workers would work together for the good o f the nation. In 
economic matters, UNC veterans once again depicted themselves as the most competent: 
“Deputes ou Senateurs n ’ont evidemment pas la competence approfondie qui serait necessaire 
dans tous les domaines de l’economie. Leurs methodes de discussion sont d ’ailleurs peu propres 
a traiter des problemes techniques”. Corporations would put an end to industrial conflict, 
favour French nationals in the job market and remove the welfare burden from the State.394
Isaac formulated the UNC’s plans for the organised profession. At the most basic level, 
workers and employers would form comites communs to rule on disputes and the interests o f the 
profession in the locality. The comites would manage labour hours and regulate working 
conditions, such as hygiene and safety, in order to end the ‘proletarian condition’. 
Membership o f trade unions within the comites would remain voluntary yet while non-unionised 
workers could gain representation on the comites through an electoral process, they would be 
afforded a lower proportional share of members than those workers who had showed ‘a sense o f 
solidarity’ and joined a union.396 Superior to the comites, regional professional councils would 
establish regulations regarding their profession after careful study and a vote or referendum if  
necessary. Selected delegates from each regional council would form a departmental federation
390 Passmore, From Liberalism, p. 169; ‘Business, corporatism’, p. 961; Kechichian, Les Croix deFeu , pp. 278 and 
pp. 318-333.
Berger, Peasants, p. 129.
392 Passmore, ‘Business, corporatism’, p. 982.
393 Goy et al, Le programme d ’action civique, p. 88. Italics in the original.
394 ‘Role et fonctionnement de la Corporation’, La Vdc, 17 September 1938; Joublin, ‘La corporation, c ’est l ’union 
organique des classes’, La Vdc, 24 September 1938.
395 H. Isaac, ‘La Profession dans la Nation’, in XVCongres National de I ’UNC: Rapports, Discussions, Discours 
(Paris, 1934), p. 244.
396 Ibid., p. 244.
88
with the power to rule on disputes between professions and extra-professional bodies. 
Nationally, Isaac prescribed a reinvigoration o f the Conseil national economique (CNE). The 
government would be obliged to consult the CNE on all matters relating to economic and social 
(especially family) legislation, whether this was in the object of a law or its implications. In 
addition, amendments made in the Chamber would return to the CNE for further consultation.397
The plan for the organised profession did not require immediate reform of the 
constitution. It reflected the moderate wing o f the UNC to which Isaac belonged. The UNC 
planned to spread the corporative message and nurture a ‘corporative conscience’ that it 
recognised may take generations to achieve its goal. Nevertheless, the association determined 
that the partiality o f the state in a democratic society meant that it could not fulfil its role as 
arbiter in industrial and social matters.398 Isaac admitted that his plans did not go far enough for 
those elements in the UNC who desired that a ‘mixed assembly’ o f elected political and 
economic figures replace the Chamber. UNC executive committee member Taudiere argued that 
the CNE’s powers should stretch ‘to the heart o f parliament’ and be integrated into national 
sovereignty. This seemed logical to him as, according to Isaac, the UNC’s vision was for a 
society that rested upon the two fundaments o f the profession and the family. Though it would 
act initially as a consultative body, Isaac did envisage further powers for the CNE if  this role 
proved successful. It would perhaps hold a type o f veto power to force parliament to vote on a 
law after the second reading of a bill.399 Furthermore, Isaac saw ‘nothing to prevent reflection’ 
upon the CNE replacing the Senate in the future. The CNE would be better qualified to represent 
the social and economic forces of France than the upper chamber. At this point the French 
regime would function like a business, with the government as management, parliament as the 
executive committee and members of the CNE as technical advisers.400
The UNC’s programme contained the potential for authoritarianism of other corporatist 
reform projects. In comparison to the FR’s corporatism, the UNC also encouraged class 
harmony yet this would certainly work to the detriment of the unions. Considering the plans of 
the Faisceau and the Estates-General, the UNC did not go as far as to suggest replacing 
parliament with an assembly of families or producers. The CNE would act in an advisory
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capacity at first. Though it would have the power to vet legislation and force elected 
representatives to vote on a bill, moderates in the UNC resisted the calls for a more authoritarian 
plan for corporate assemblies.
Representing the people
At a time when only two conceptions of action existed, that o f reform through parliament, and 
reform from the people, elements o f the UNC’s plan situated itself in the anti-parliamentarian 
camp.401 The association’s exclusion from political power meant that a populist appeal to the 
pays reel for a veteran-led reform was its only means to pursue reform. The veterans’ campaign 
used press and propaganda to establish a direct contact with the people.402 Though the UNC did 
not make the need for a constituent assembly a defining point o f its doctrine, the association 
came to believe that the power to reform the French regime lay within the people.
The conception o f popular sovereignty was not unique to the UNC within the veterans’ 
movement. After February 1934, the streets o f France became an important staging ground for 
political expression where left and right respectively claimed to give voice to the will o f the 
people.403 What followed was a conflict between popular sovereignty as expressed in street 
demonstrations and the legal representation o f this sovereignty in the Chamber o f Deputies.404 To 
cite several examples, Maurras stated: “Devan t les scandales de l ’heure, tout citoyen est 
magistrat”.405 Introducing an interview with Philippe Henriot in Le Figaro, Gaetan Sanvoisin 
wrote: “Le pays vous approuve parce que vous ne jouez pas le regie du jeu parlementaire”.406 
From 13 February 1934 to 5 May 1936, 1063 street demonstrations took place throughout 
France. Danielle Tartakowsky calculates that in the provinces 45% o f these demonstrations had 
political aims, with 85% of this number originating from the left and 17% from the right. Paris 
differed to the provinces in that 67% of street action was in the pursuit of political goals. But in 
the capital, the right’s share was higher, claiming 45% of demonstrations.407 Street action often 
resulted in clashes between rival groups or the forces o f order.408
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One can perceive a watershed in the UNC’s treatment o f the ‘people’ between the pre- 
and post-riot periods. In February 1930, for example, Rossignol spoke to a meeting o f the 
Limoges groups in which he stated that due to their service in the war the etat d ’esprit o f the 
veterans was different to that of the general population.409 Furthermore, in January 1934, de 
Cromieres denounced the ingratitude o f the French masses in regard to the wartime sacrifice of 
the veterans, an ingratitude also common to politicians and army chiefs.410 That same month, 
Aubert questioned whether the realm o f the street would establish itself as ‘the righter of 
wrongs’. However, at this point he described the streets as being in the grip of the party spirit and 
violence.411
The UNC’s conception o f the people changed after the riot. As we have seen in chapter 
one, following the bloody night on the Place de la Concorde, the veterans o f the UNC depicted 
themselves as in perfect communion with the will o f the people. It was now on the streets of 
Paris and France, no longer in the grip of the party, that the true will o f the sovereign people 
found expression.412 The UNC’s participation in a protest allegedly sanctioned by the people of 
France had legitimised the street as a valid political arena in stark contrast to the failing legal 
process in the Chamber. In February 1934, La Voix du combattant printed a picture that depicted 
deputies surrounded by soldiers. The caption read: “Nous sommes ici contre la volonte du peuple 
et nous nous y maintiendrons par la force des baionnettes”.413 It is interesting that the bayonet 
was chosen as the weapon behind which the deputies were shown to be taking refuge. Reports of 
the night mention the use o f machine guns, revolvers, pistols and sabers but not the close-combat 
weapon so iconic o f trench warfare. Whether used to emphasise the desperation of the 
politicians’ situation or the brutal lengths to which they would go in order to stay in power, the 
significance o f using this weapon o f last resort against former trench soldiers would not be lost 
on the veterans.
In their newfound role as ‘interpretes fideles de l’opinion publique’, the UNC spoke of a 
divorce between parliament and the nation.414 The association’s letter to the President o f the
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Republic in the days following the February violence claimed that a discrepancy existed between 
the political conduct o f ministers and the wishes o f the nation. It alleged that the constitutional 
agreement between the two no longer existed.415 Roux-Desbreaux wrote: “...le divorce entre le 
Parlement et la nation a-t-il jamais ete plus flagrant qu’en cette joum ee du 7 fevrier? Le 
Parlement ne peut plus dire qu’il reflete l’opinion du pays, puisqu’il accordait la veille une 
majorite a un Gouvemement que l’opinion publique chassait le lendemain” 416 Francisque 
Gauthier stated in Le Combattant du Sud-Est that the veterans were the masses. If like before 
February 1934 the government had not enacted reform then the veterans would once again 
protest peacefully in harmony with the will o f the masses.417 Roger Dorlanne o f the landais 
group placed 6 February 1934 alongside other expressions of French popular will: “Le 6 Fevrier 
reste et restera dans l’histoire, une revoke du peuple de France, comparable aux joumees de 1830 
et 1848”.418 Jacques Pericard, writing in L 'Ouest-Eclair, congratulated the UNC for truly having 
“...le genie des masses”, in evidence during the closing parade at the Metz congress in 1934.419 
By m id-1934, the UNC believed that sovereignty lay with the people and not with the Chamber.
In June 1935 the UNC attributed to the masses a common spirit and the power to express 
it. Hubert Aubert’s son, F ran c is , who was JUNC secretary general, urged the masses to ‘dictate 
its will’ and control the elected representatives.420 However, in November 1935, Emile Veysset, 
responsible for propaganda in the JUNC, claimed that the youth groups needed to infiltrate and 
guide the French masses: “...nous aurons la masse, nous la guiderons, nous irons la chercher 
partout, dans des milieux ou Faeces des autres mouvements s’avere difficile, certains milieux 
paysans notamment....” .421 F ran c is  Aubert restated this aim in 1936 when he urged a new 
recruitment effort in order to “...conquerir chaque jour davantage la masse”.422 Perhaps a reaction 
to the success o f Popular Front recruitment, the masses now needed guidance and persuasion.
Public space became a contested territory in the struggle to win over the masses. 
According to Jacques de Rufz of Action combattante, after the February riots the UNC’s
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veterans had remained in the streets as an invisible presence that guaranteed the stability and 
function of the regime. These men were still driven by the spirit o f the demonstration. They 
continued to express the will o f the free people.423 Francis Sagnat, president o f the Federation de 
la Haute-Vienne des Mutiles et Anciens Combattants, also claimed the streets for the veterans:
Prenez garde, messieurs les responsables, s ’il en est temps encore, les Combattants en ont 
assez.... Ce ou ces responsables doivent etre impitoyablement punis,.. Plus que jamais, pour 
l’ordre, la justice et la paix, entre les Fran^ais d ’abord, entre tous les peuples ensuite, dans le 
cadre que sauront se choisir nos groupements, nous voulons avoir le droit absolu de dire ce que 
nous voulons, de le dire dans la rue s’il est necessaire. La rue est a nous!424
The JUNC asked its sections to organise street marches: “Un des moyens de propagande les plus 
remarquables est la propagande de masse. Elle frappe l’opinion, par son ampleur et montre la 
vitalite et la force de notre mouvement”.425 The leadership advised that JUNC members attend 
national commemorations and festivals.
The success o f the Popular Front, first as a mass movement and then as an electoral force, 
prompted a change in the UNC’s relationship with the people. Unable to prevent the left-wing 
coalition’s victory, it appeared that the French had rejected the UNC’s policies. The masses, no 
longer regarded as the repository o f legitimate popular sovereignty, were now dupees, 
inconscientes and something to be feared.426 The strikes that followed the election o f the Popular 
Front prompted the UNC to attempt to reclaim the streets of France. In a supplication to the 
French people, the association denounced left-wing agitation expressed, it claimed, through 
public demonstrations under the red flag. Strikers undermined the freedom to work while 
agitators had practically abolished the ‘freedom o f the street’.427 The UNC’s answer was to ask 
the people o f France to display the tricolour in every window in France. With each town and 
village decorated in the national colours, the UNC hoped to take back French public space.
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Other options remained available. In July 1936, Lebecq asked members to begin immediately 
their counter-revolutionary propaganda through large street demonstrations.428
When in February 1937 Blum announced a pause in reform, the CGT condemned the 
government. This prompted the UNC to declare that the CGT, which it now termed the 
gouvemement des masses, was attempting to rule against the legal government. Aubert claimed 
that CGT leader Leon Jouhaux was using his organisation to impose the people’s will onto the 
elected government.429 The violence at Clichy in 1937, in which supporters of the left clashed 
with the police after a legally sanctioned PSF film screening, starkly exposed this ‘dictatorship o f 
the masses’: “Le quatrieme pouvoir, celui des masses, s’exerce dans l ’incoherence, a la
dictature  il rend difficile la recherche des responsables et impossible l’exercice de
l’autorite”.430 The association’s reaction revealed a fear of the irrational masses under the 
direction o f Jouhaux.
Already unhappy with the Popular Front, the clashes between demonstrators and the 
police appeared to herald a coming revolution backed by the forces of unionised labour. The 
UNC could not claim to represent the will o f the rioters at Clichy. In the final analysis, this 
‘people’ was different to the ‘people’ for which the UNC had claimed to speak. The association 
thus chose to remove popular sovereignty from the masses. Yet its discourse at the time 
expressed little confidence in the rule o f the Chamber. By 1938, neither the people nor 
parliament could be trusted with the future of France. This task fell to the veterans.
1938: Authority returns to France
The victory o f the Popular Front deepened the political division of France. The parliamentary 
right moved closer to the extremes as anti-communism came to dominate political concerns. The 
FR, once a party o f conservative republicanism, now counted Xavier Vallat and Henriot amongst 
its leading activists. Anti-communism was not unique to the right. From the outset, neither 
right-wing Radical deputies nor the party’s supporters were unanimously in favour o f a left-wing 
coalition. Furthermore, among sectors o f the left the industrial unrest o f summer 1936 planted
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the seeds o f disquiet. Certain members of the radicals, socialists and trade unions began to 
question the alliance with communism.431
As discontent simmered beneath the surface, the government faced challenges that would 
prove insurmountable. In foreign policy, Blum refused to engage France in the Spanish Civil 
War, much to the anger of the communists. Domestically, capital continued to leave France. 
Blum devalued the Franc in September 1936. Able to satisfy neither the left nor the right in his 
attempts to shore up the French economy, Blum announced a pause in reform in February 1937 
and requested decree powers in June. Refused by the Radical-controlled Senate, he resigned. By 
1938, after the unsuccessful attempts o f two governments to regain some momentum, divisions 
in the alliance seemed irreconcilable. Dissenting Radical deputies found support among the 
largely conservative body o f Radical senators and the jeunesses radicales-socialistes. Sensitive 
to the concerns o f the mass o f the party’s supporters (the petits proprietaries) the right o f the 
party feared further social disorder and labour legislation as the Popular Front neared two years 
in office.432
The concerns o f conservative Radicals influenced the veterans’ movement. The UF’s 
rapprochement with the UNC reflected a shift to the right of the middle classes and the Radical 
party. The Radicals had renounced their claim to represent the people in founding the 
Confederation generale des syndicats des classes moyennes (CGSCM).433 Middle class groups 
supported the veterans’ second plan for a public safety government. Pichot and some provincial 
UF veterans certainly moved closer to the UNC. In one instance in early 1937, a group o f UF 
veterans (who incidentally were also members o f the PSF) expressed a desire to defect to the 
UNC.434 During the course o f 1938, members o f the UNC’s executive committee disagreed over 
the extent o f support in the UF for the associations’ joint action. The UNC perceived a split in 
the UF. Pichot’s politics now resembled that o f the UNC yet it was unclear whether this was a 
personal move or one that reflected the opinion o f his association. President o f the UNC’s 
Correze group Lacoste informed his colleagues that the vast majority o f UF ‘troops’ were ‘UNC
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100%’ yet he had encountered opposition from the association’s leadership. This was not the 
case in the Nord, Goudaert explained, where he had made every effort to co-operate with the UF 
without success. Moreover, certain UF members had attempted to entice UNC veterans away 
from their sections. By February 1939, the U N C’s wariness o f the UF had dissipated. In fact, 
Pichot’s association had consulted the UNC on everything since the public safety campaign. 
Isaac recognised that there was now no divergence between the two groups’ doctrines.435 To 
sum up, the UF’s relationship with the UNC was closer than it had ever been. The UNC had 
neither softened its stance nor its rhetoric. It had not moved towards the centre. The UF had 
moved towards the right.
Blum’s second tenure as prime minister, which began on 9 March 1938, lasted barely a 
month and sealed the coalition’s failure.436 The Daladier government, formed on 10 April 1938, 
would eventually allay the fears of conservative radicals. Initially, Daladier appeared ready to 
leave intact the coalition’s legislation. However, in August, the premier announced the end of 
the forty hour week. France would be put back to work. This measure signalled the beginning 
of a move to the right for the Radical party. In October, the communist party voted against the 
government, angry at the Munich agreement and the Radicals’ increasingly conservative 
policies. Daladier promptly wound up the Popular Front. Some Radicals called for the 
dissolution o f the Chamber and electoral reform. After he crushed the CGT’s general strike on 
30 November, the course that Daladier took resulted in the complete defeat of the left. Framing 
his actions as in the interest of national and moral renovation, Daladier profited from the 
widespread feeling that France needed a return to authority. Where Blum had attempted to 
strengthen the presidence du conseil in co-operation with parliament, Daladier conceived the 
office as in opposition to the Chamber. He ruled largely with decree powers and used the radio 
to establish a direct link with the people. The approval of parliament became a largely symbolic 
gesture. In July 1939, Daladier postponed the parliamentary session until 1942.437
There was little opposition to Daladier’s increasing authoritarianism. For the UNC, 
Daladier was once again worthy of the title homme du front, his role in February 1934 apparently
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43 8 •forgotten. With war looming, the socialists were factionalised between Blum’s policy of anti­
fascist resistance and pacifists around Paul Faure. Soon after the failed general strike the AD 
rallied to the government.439 Joseph Barthelemy’s evolution from liberal Republican to architect 
of Vichy’s 1941 constitution exemplified the drift of the centre right to an authoritarian style of 
government.440 The FR and Jacques Doriot’s Parti Populaire Fran9 ais (PPF) launched a 
campaign to ban the communist party entirely. Though the PSF opposed Daladier, its opposition 
stemmed from a fear that the premier’s rightward shift would trump La Rocque’s policies.441 
Indeed the PSF’s poor showing in the elections o f 1937 seemed to confirm this. The Radicals 
and the PSF now came into competition for the same political constituency.442
The veterans’ associations could not escape the climate o f authoritarianism. On 11 
March 1938, a meeting o f the Confederation demanded a strengthening of the executive by way 
of a government o f national safety. Similarly, the UF’s plan for a government of public safety, 
which the UNC publicly endorsed in March 1938, sought to return authority to France. So began 
a period of unprecedented co-operation between the two organisations that would last until the 
founding of Vichy’s Legion ffan9 aise des combattants. This represented a turnaround for 
relations between the UNC and the UF. In summer 1936, their relationship had hit a new low.
At this time, Pichot demanded that the UNC leave the Confederation. He argued that the UNC 
should declare itself a political association, a political league even, as its actions in the recent 
elections had shown this to be the case.443 He repeated the accusation a month later despite 
Goy’s response in defence of the UNC.444 Yet after March 1938, united in the campaign for a 
new government, the associations decried dishonesty and inequality in fiscal matters, called for 
measures to absorb unemployment, re-establish discipline in work and increase industrial 
production 445 The UNC and UF’s dissatisfaction with the government meant that both were 
happy to see the end o f the Popular Front in late 1938.446
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The UF had not always opposed the Popular Front. It certainly did not react to Blum’s 
government in as violent a manner as the UNC. Though it repeated the call for veterans to 
replace the ‘old men’ of politics, it welcomed the inclusion of the CGT in the government’s 
plans.447 Pichot reaffirmed his support for democracy in rejecting an Italian-style dictatorship.448 
The UF’s anti-parliamentarianism remained intact but it recognised that the parliamentary 
regime had found some stability under the Popular Front.449 Yet for the UF, the Anschluss 
appears to have had a direct relation to the call for the public safety government. Once 
Germany’s designs on Austria became clear Cassin wrote that France had capitulated in the face 
of the dictators. Pichot named the date February 1938 alongside those of 1815, 1843 and 
1871.45° The following month, the UF printed its plan for the public safety government.
Writing in the Cahiers de VUF, Pichot and Cassin specified that France needed a strong 
and just government. Cassin called on the French to ‘temper’ their liberties in favour o f a 
‘necessary discipline’.451 The UF presented an ordre du jour of 17 March 1938 to the President, 
the Chamber and the Senate, which outlined the new government:
L’heure a sonne d ’un gouvemement de salut national, attendu par le pays, compose d’un nombre 
restreint d ’hommes, parlementaires et non parlementaires, volontaires et desinteresses, d ’un 
republicainisme sur, large et sans compromissions, offrant au pays la garantie morale et 
technique necessaire, auquel le Parlement confiera le mandat expres de prendre les mesures 
d’urgence exigees par la situation 452
Jacques Raudot, president of the JUNC in 1938, did not see an answer in parliamentary 
democracy. His plea saw a return to the idea o f popular sovereignty in the UNC. However, the 
UNC no longer relied on the people’s natural national sentiment; they should follow the UNC’s 
ideas:
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C ’est illegal, (le gouvemement de salut public) direz-vous mais la legalite, c’est vous qui 
la faites... Ne suis pas nos idees, Fran9 ais moyen, et tu paieras...nous, les Jeunes, nous ne serons 
jamais les dupes de ce mensonge qu’on tente de tous cotes de te faire avaler: Le salut du pays par 
un ministere d’union des partis parlementaires!453
The UF also located the power to effect change within the people o f France. Pichot warned that 
if the parties refused to accept the tmce outlined in his plan then they would find the country 
ranged against them, with parliament as a ‘Bastille’ and a ‘feudal tower’.454 The UF’s Paul Patou 
argued that parliamentary democracy had momentarily ‘exhausted its virtue’ and would need to 
‘take its medicine’ if  it was not to become defunct.455 A year later, Pichot continued to make the 
distinction between the sovereignty of the people (and the veterans) and that o f parliament: “...il 
y a la France elue, la France electorate, la France officielle, qui n ’accorde a la France non 
partisane qu’une audience distante et condescendante: le souverain par delegation, hisse sur le 
pavois, oublie de qui il tient son titre et son pouvoir” 456
Initially, the veterans’ first plan for the government of public safety relied upon the 
willingness of President Lebmn to appoint a new government. The plan of March 1938 involved 
a campaign intended to arouse public pressure to this end. The UNC circulated petitions of 
support for the veterans’ plan, which would be presented to President Lebmn. Accordingly, 
Lebmn, as the pouvoir constitue, would then call honest men to form a government.457 Outside 
of direct action this was the only means available to the UNC and the UF. The veterans’ 
associations were not political parties and so could not undertake change from within the 
Chamber. Unlike parliamentary parties, their only course of action was extra-parliamentary.
In October 1938, the UF’s second call specified that the government should be given full
458powers for one year or even until the elections in 1940. It found support from within and 
without the veterans’ movement. In La Voix du combattant, Andre Gervais, a prolific author
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within the veterans’ movement, listed as in support of the UNC and the UF: the AGMG, the 
UN MR, the Association des ecrivains combattants, the Ligue des droits du religieux ancien 
combattant (DRAC), and the Association des prisonniers de guerre. Support in the non- 
combatant world came from the Confederation generate des classes moyennes, the Confederation 
nationale des syndicats agricoles and the Comite du plan. Gervais claimed that six million men 
were willing to join the ‘last battle’ o f the veterans.459
The second plan did not involve a petition campaign. The veterans had long claimed 
both to represent the people and, by virtue o f the trench melting pot, ‘to be’ the people o f France. 
Deriving their legitimacy from these self-appointed posts, the UNC and the UF, appropriated the 
right to reform the French regime. The associations would undertake this reform through the 
government o f public safety, a sovereign dictatorship akin to a constituent assembly.460 A reason 
for this change o f tactic may have been Pichot’s failure to persuade President Lebrun to appoint 
an extra-parliamentary leader, in the form o f Marshal Petain. The UNC backed this new 
action.461 Among provincial sections some veterans supported the associations’ plan. In March 
1939, Henri Tessier o f the Drome UNC recommended a ‘surgical operation’ on the ‘heart’ and 
the ‘brain’ o f the regime (the constitution and the government respectively). Tessier stated that 
in addition to a legislature and a professional chamber, a third chamber (the Senate) elected by 
‘suffrage restreint’ would control the actions o f the other two.462
The UNC and UF’s second plan did not allow for the political pluralism familiar to the 
Third Republic. Raudot stated that all parties should disband and if they refused, the government 
should forcibly dissolve them. He wrote that during the period of reform, parties should not be 
allowed to operate. The government would ‘adopt parliamentary methods, without parliament’. 
‘Liberated’ from the encumbrance o f elections the government would be able to act with 
complete independence. In the same issue o f La Voix du combattant, UNC activist Gabriel
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Berthau supported the idea that no one in the new government should come from a party.463 
According to the rhetoric of the UNC’s anti-communist campaign after 1936, it is likely that the 
communist party would be banned. In fact, this measure was listed on the youth page in 
February 1939 as part o f a plan for national salvation.464 Would the political parties continue to 
exist? If one takes into account the sometimes violent discourse against politicians and parties 
throughout the UNC’s existence it is possible that political parties would disband too: “....nous 
condamnons,” claimed Galland in 1933, “ ...dans leur formation et leur action passee, presente et 
future, les partis politiques”.465 In October 1939, Dr. Patay, president of the UNC in the Ille-et- 
Vilaine, wrote that while he applauded the dissolution of the communist party he would liked to 
have seen the voluntary suspension o f all parties.466 Indeed, Pichot’s initial plan for the 
government insisted that the parties ‘se mettre en vacances’. Parliament should resign.467 Patou 
advocated the ‘mise en sommeil’ o f the parties as the only way to get to the root o f the evil in 
parliament.468
Conclusion
The UNC’s state reform programme placed it close to the right of French politics. The 
association’s proposals were neither modest nor limited. They were not merely technical 
responses to objective malfunctions, intended to improve the efficiency of the parliamentary 
regime. Prost concludes that it is only when placed in comparison to the Fourth and Fifth 
Republics, and not the totalitarian regimes o f the 1930s, that the veterans’ plans can be seen for 
what they truly were: an attempt to make the regime more efficient. This teleological approach is 
problematic as it obscures the ignorance o f historical actors of their role in the seemingly 
inevitable route to the present day French regime. If one judges liberal democracy, a market 
economy and ‘modernity’ as the goal to which all societies are (and should be) striving, then 
digressions from this course become ‘dysfunctional and morally reprehensible’ 469 Conversely, 
anti-parliamentarianism becomes a reaction to objective systemic problems with state reform 
projects seeking to adapt the ‘archaic’ regime to the challenges o f modernity. They become,
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therefore, a ‘neutral’ and ‘technical’ matter.470 This argument legitimates the Fifth Republic as 
the supreme goal toward which the French (as conscientious citizens) endeavoured. As Kevin 
Passmore has argued, historians should seek to explain the ‘how and why’ in history rather than 
measuring particular histories against a dubious historical norm.471
One can argue that the UNC’s plans were more moderate than other groups. The UNC, 
for example, did not support the establishment of a dictatorship like some o f the leagues did.472 
It did not envisage taking power for itself under a providential leader as fascist groups desired. 
Nevertheless, to disprove the fascist attributes of a reform plan does not prove its democratic 
nature. To show that particular features of the UNC’s programme were common to other groups 
and personalities does not prove its Republican quality, even if other plans went further in their 
demands. While one should not class all revisionist campaigns as fascist, one should no more 
ignore the potential for authoritarianism within the Combatants’ movement by claiming that their 
plans were moderate and democratic across the board. In instances where the veterans’ campaign 
contained elements of more extreme programmes, these should not be ignored. Why should 
certain points of the UNC’s reform programme be given precedence over others? Such an 
essentialist approach is always proved right.
Whether the UNC’s plans are interpreted as authoritarian or for an authoritarian Republic 
depends on definition. Taking into account the points of UNC policy, one can say that their 
plans were not democratic. The UNC believed that sovereignty lay with the veterans and 
conservative veterans at that. It opposed party competition and once in government planned to 
curtail political pluralism. The association sought to punish the enemies of France, including 
communists, deputies and other anti-national elements. The government of public safety would 
act as a temporary dictatorship o f competent men, the choice of whom would not be based on the 
elective principle. The government would rely upon the natural elite o f the veterans in two ways. 
Firstly, veterans would join the governing committee of the public safety government, their 
morality and work in the combatant movement being qualification enough to restore French 
fortunes. There would be a reduced number o f parliamentarians and ministers. In March 1934, 
UNC section vice-president Roux-Desbreaux suggested the number be limited to as low as 200
470 Ibid., p. 162.
471 Ibid., p. 162.
472 Prost, III, pp. 204-210.
102
deputies and 100 senators.473 Secondly, the mass of the movement would function as a reservoir 
of support for the new regime and, as discussed above, perhaps be responsible for the 
maintenance of order. If normal parliamentary government were to be restored, the left’s hope 
of re-election would be damaged with the introduction of proportional representation. However, 
limited pluralism would possibly see parties greatly reduced in their power and function. 
Authoritarianism allows for some institutional pluralism but not o f a democratic kind.474 While 
ostensibly concerned for the well-being o f the Republic, this concern stemmed from the UNC’s 
definition of effective government: a strong right-wing government of military figures and 
veterans that would restore order, break the means of the left, limit political pluralism and reduce 
the role of parliament.
Between February 1934 and M ay 1936, groups from the Croix de Feu to the Popular 
Front sought to establish a dense network o f local organisations. An expansion of associational 
and grass-roots activity lay at the heart o f these attempts to assume the mantle o f ‘people’s 
representative’.475 The UNC itself widened its activities through the foundation of Action 
combattante and the JUNC. The programme o f Action combattante, used as a basis for electoral 
action, centred on the UNC’s plans for state reform. Action combattante propaganda reflected 
the views o f its parent organisation. This action was part of a wider plan to penetrate non­
veteran sections o f society and create “...un large courant populaire...” in favour of the veterans’ 
ideas.476 The UNC no longer rejected militant political action. Drawing inspiration from the 
Croix de Feu’s success, the veterans of the UNC attempted to establish themselves as a political 
force as never before.
473 Ibid., p. 192.
474 Kennedy, Reconciling France, p. 118.
475 Wardhaugh, ‘Between parliament and the people’, p. 216.
476 H. Aubert, ‘On parle serieusement des elections’, La Vdc, 18 January 1936.
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Chapter Three 
The UNC and the extreme right
Nos camarades sont prets a suivre leurs dirigeants, mais ils attendent les ordres, les 
directives, la doctrine. Ils sentent que si une force morale de l’importance de l’UNC ne sait pas 
ou n ’a pas le courage, dans ces temps difficiles de dire au pays la verite et de construire une 
doctrine, la desagregation continuera ses ravages... Nous apporterons notre collaboration ardente 
a tous ceux, quels qu’ils soient, d ’ou qu’ils viennent, et ou qu’ils militent, qui conscient de leurs 
devoirs, auront le courage de les remplir.477
Henry Rossignol, UNC national president, 1926-1934
Rossignol’s endorsement o f collaboration with other groups immediately preceded the 
ratification o f the Wagram manifesto in October 1933. The manifesto expressed the UNC’s 
desire to take a more active role in national affairs. The events of February 1934 further engaged 
the UNC in political action. The association was not alone. The mobilisations of the left and 
right during February 1934 alerted each side to the threat of their opponents. Fearful of a 
‘French fascism’ that had narrowly failed to take power in February, the socialists and 
communists agreed a Unity Pact on 27 July 1934 and formed the ‘Front commun’. In response 
to this nascent coalition, the right founded its own alliance. The JP and the SF created the ‘Front 
national’ in May 1934. Through L ’Ami dupeuple, its official organ, the Front national appealed 
to diverse nationalist movements in the name o f counter-revolution.478 As left-wing co-operation 
continued through the elections o f October 1934, the socialists and communists sought to include 
the Radicals in the alliance. Initially reluctant but frustrated at the persistence of the right in 
power under Laval, the party joined the renamed ‘Front populaire’ alliance on 14 July 1935. The 
combined forces o f the left seemed stronger than ever.
The highways o f France became a staging ground for extra-parliamentary politics as 
groups across the political divide mobilised their troops. On the streets o f Paris the right 
appeared dominant. Patriotic processions that accompanied numerous ceremonies at the tomb of
477 H. Rossignol, ‘Reflexions de Vacances’, Le Combattant du Poitou, October 1933.
478 Tartakowsky, ‘Strategies de la rue’, p. 39.
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the Unknown Soldier added to this impression.479 Nationalist marches on days of national 
commemoration were often a cover for violent activity. On 13 May 1934, for example, the 
national day for Joan o f Arc saw the JP and came lots du roi attack an ARAC protest against the 
decree laws. Later that month, L 'Ami du peuple called for battle in the street against the left.480
Veterans took part in the manoeuvres o f the left and right. The presence of ARAC 
mutiles at the forefront o f communist processions was a deliberate choice on behalf of 
organisers. It allowed marchers to advance as far as possible to a politically symbolic objective 
such as the Hotel de Ville without heavy-handed police intervention.481 The largest involvement 
of veterans came in November 1934. At a time when the fall of the Doumergue government 
served to raise tensions, nationalist associations planned to commemorate the armistice with a 
large procession. In response, 28 veterans’ associations decided to parade from the Place de la 
Bastille to the Place de la Nation on 11 November. This symbolic show of unity was intended to 
wrest the claim to the anciens combattants from the leagues. The two processions took place 
without confrontation 482
The UNC did not shy away from political activism in the aftermath o f February 1934. 
The association attempted to launch a structure for activists that would facilitate local electoral 
action and aid in the diffusion o f its ideas on state reform. The UNC founded Action
AQ 1
combattante to this end. As we will see, Action combattante was an auxiliary group of the 
UNC. It had access to established UNC networks and personnel. Local UNC sections were 
responsible for founding Action combattante sections. Action combattante helped to create new 
UNC sections and aided the association’s candidates in the municipal elections of 1935. In some 
cases UNC sections provided office space and financial resources for the new group. Its purpose 
was to disseminate the UNC’s programme among veterans and non-veteran sympathisers. To 
this end, the veterans intended Action combattante to create a grass-roots movement that would 
be sympathetic to their association’s policies on state reform.
479 Ibid, p. 33.
480 Ibid, p. 40.
481 Ibid, p. 37.
482 Ibid, pp. 44-45.
483 UNC/EC, 9 December 1933. In this meeting the UNC’s leaders discussed the association’s future political 
action. Though they did not mention Action combattante it seems that the group arose out of this discussion.
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The executive committee agreed that because the veterans alone could initiate national 
renovation, it was necessary to increase the number of anciens combattants in the Chamber.484 
However, in at least one incidence of public mobilisation in the Ille-et-Vilaine, Action 
combattante used tactics that were comparable to those of the leagues. But in general, when it 
came to street demonstrations, the UNC proper preferred to show its presence rather than rely on 
Action combattante.
The existence o f Action combattante shows that sections of the UNC’s membership 
desired its political action to go further than it previously had. In April 1935, La Voix du 
combattant reported an incident in the Drome that marked an escalation in UNC tactics. At a 
meeting of the Ligue des Droits de l ’Homme, held in protest against the extension of military 
service, an altercation occurred between members of the Ligue and UNC activists. The 
speaker’s pacifist declaration that he would rather be shot by French bullets than fight an 
invading enemy sparked the clash. Vigorously opposed to this view, the veterans in attendance 
prevented the adoption of an ordre du jour. La Voix du combattant did not state whether this 
involved violence or the simple shouting down of the opposition. In any case, as a result of the 
disruption the organisers abandoned the meeting. Pleased with this outcome, the UNC 
congratulated its loyal comrades. A new style of political confrontation had proved successful 
and La Voix du combattant urged readers to do the same.485
In the first case, this chapter examines the veterans’ participation in militant political 
activity through Action combattante. It then discusses the UNC’s co-operation with extreme 
right-wing leagues. The chapter begins with an investigation into the origins and recruitment of 
Action combattante. An examination of the methods and activities of the group reveals an action 
similar to that of the nationalist leagues. Penetrating the veteran and non-veteran milieus, Action 
combattante managed to establish itself in some departements. The second part of this chapter 
focuses on the relationship between the UNC and the extreme right. Primarily concerning 
relations with the Croix de Feu, the chapter argues that some UNC veterans were attracted to 
extreme right-wing militant political action. Consequently, one cannot claim that the veterans 
were integral to French democratic political culture. Some collaborated with and joined groups 
that were not Republican in the parliamentary and democratic sense of the word.
484 UNC/EC, 28 July 1934.
485 Report from the Action combattante page, La Vdc, 13 April 1935.
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Action Combattante de l’UNC
Humbert Isaac’s private papers first mention Action combattante in a note from Alfred Charron, 
president of the poitevin group and a national vice-president of the UNC, on 19 December 1933. 
Yet it was only after the events of 6 February 1934 that the movement gained real momentum. 
‘Quelques constatations’, a document produced by Jean Goy, marks the second phase of Action 
combattante’s development. It was perhaps produced between 7 February and 10 March 1934, 
the date at which an appel appeared in La Voix du combattant calling for the intensification of
A O f i
propaganda efforts and subscriptions. Two subsequent appels appeared on 14 and 21 April 
1934. Without mentioning a specific organisation, they appeared under the heading ‘L’Action 
Combattante’.
Goy wrote that despite the fact that the UNC possessed a membership of 900,000
veterans and a team of propagandists and orators its action was proving ineffective. As a result,
the association had not been able to attract the French to its programme on state reform and
0
moral and economic renovation. In contrast, the Croix de Feu was in the ascendancy. The 
stagnation of the UNC’s membership amplified the urgency of the situation. In fact, Goy 
acknowledged that a section of the UNC membership also participated in the activities of other 
groups notably the Croix de Feu. The difference in tactics between the two organisations lay at 
the root of this unhappy situation: “D’ou vient done leur succes? De leur propagande dans tous 
les milieux jeunes et non-combattants! De leurs rassemblements a caractere mysterieux! De 
leurs grands “meetings” avec imposante mise en scene! De leur discipline! De la mystique du 
Chef!”.487
‘Quelques constatations’ reveals how closely Action combattante’s foundation was 
linked to the perceived dynamism of the Croix de Feu’s political tactics.488 At this time, the 
Croix de Feu was changing. No longer the preserve of decorated veterans, the league was
486 Le Comite de Propagande et d’Action, ‘Appel’, La Vdc, 10 March 1934. ‘Quelques constatations’ mentions the 
February 1934 riots. The fact that Goy’s document refers to the growing success of the Croix de Feu suggests that it 
was written in mid-1934. The Croix de Feu’s membership grew from between 58, 000-62, 000 in January 1934 to 
over 100, 000 after February. It is difficult to assess the size of Croix de Feu membership. Estimates for January 
1934 come from Paul Chopine, former head of the dispos and Henry Coston, an extreme right-wing publicist. The 
figure for February 1934 is Gareth Howlett’s estimation. The Bonnevay Commission into the 6 February riots 
estimated 125, 000 members at this time. La Rocque claimed there were 140, 000 members. See Kennedy, 
Reconciling France, p.37.
487 Jean Goy, ‘Quelques constatations’, undated document in the Rossignol folder, UNC archive, 18 rue Vezelay, 
Paris.
488 Ibid.
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attempting to become a mass movement that encompassed ex-servicemen, youth and women. It 
did this through auxiliary movements such as the Volontaires Nationaux (VN), which was 
founded in December 1933. It is possible that Goy desired to imitate the Croix de Feu’s 
auxiliaries through Action combattante. Indeed, he located the key to the Croix de Feu’s growth 
not only in their propaganda methods (rass emblements and meetings) but also in their populism, 
which reached beyond the veterans to “...les milieux jeunes et non-combattants”.489
The only way for the UNC to regain the initiative was to adopt similar tactics and 
undertake, in Goy’s words, ‘a rapid and brutal reform’. If not, the UNC would continue to lose 
its members and perhaps its moral authority. Goy prescribed essential reform in a number of 
areas. La Voix du combattant would inculcate a faith in its readership. It would use simpler 
language to create a mystique or at least encourage enthusiasm. The president of the UNC 
would act like a true leader and take a greater role in the UNC’s direction, propaganda and 
action. Finally, the dissemination of propaganda would be intensified, particularly through 
meetings. Four ‘equipes orateurs’ comprising three speakers each would be able to hold four 
meetings a day in large French towns. Goy concluded with the suggestion that the Seine and 
Paris group take the lead in this reform and thereby set an example for the rest to follow.490 Goy 
was not alone his appreciation of the Croix de Feu’s development. Provincial sections were also 
aware of this. In March 1935, Jacques Toutain, president of the Seine-Inferieure group, wrote of 
the ‘striking’ and ‘almost incomprehensible’ advance of La Rocque’s league 491
In spite of the importance that some members of the leadership placed on Action 
combattante, others on the executive committee were ignorant of its workings. Several disputes 
in the executive committee over the UNC’s political action demonstrate a split between a 
moderate section of the association and an activist tendency. Originally, the leadership had 
agreed to undertake civic action within the UNC, and so remain ‘100 % UNC’, rather than 
establish a separate group, which would recruit non-veteran sympathisers. To found a new 
group, Leon Berthier alleged, would attract ‘political black balls’ who wished to improve their
490
Ibid.
Ibid.
491 J. Toutain, ‘Rapport succinct sur la Question de l ’UNC et des Elections Municipales du 5 mai 1935 envoye a tous 
les Presidents de Section du Groupe le 22 fevrier 1935’, L ’UNC de Normandie, March 1935.
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reputation through membership of the UNC. It was decided that civic action would be taken 
within the structure o f the UNC and would concern only veterans.492
Yet Action combattante functioned as a separate group, a fact that contravened the earlier 
decision of the leadership. Reservations were expressed in June and July 1934 that the new 
association had been founded without the express permission or the knowledge even of the 
committee.493 Patay, Francisque Gauthier, vice-president of the Lyon section, and Daniel 
Desroches, UNC president in the Finistere, feared losing control of a group that acted with 
apparent independence yet was funded largely by the UNC.494 Gauthier complained that the 
committee had not been informed from the start that the UNC was responsible for the new 
group.495 Citing the Croix de Feu as an example, Charron explained that it was necessary to 
found a separate group in order to take action as quickly as possible. Other executive members 
objected to the rumoured provenance o f Action combattante funding, namely from industrialist 
Ernest Mercier. A ‘ranking member’ o f the Paris UNC and with ‘numerous friends among its 
leaders’, Mercier was not new to the combatant world.496 During the twenties, his Redressement 
Fran9 ais group utilised the esprit combattant in an attempt to unite the Redressement’s 
industrialists with right-wing veterans’ associations. This group was closely associated to the 
national UNC and Goy collaborated with the Redressement from its creation.497 In the end, 
acting in secret, the activists in the executive committee had out-manoeuvred their colleagues.
Action combattante recruited veterans and sympathisers. On 16 June 1934, a notice in La 
Voix du combattant warned of the widening divorce between parliament and the nation. It 
contained a statement on the UNC’s aims for state and electoral reform. The notice ended with 
an appeal to join Action combattante. A footnote explained that this appeal was only for those 
French who could not for whatever reason join the UNC proper but who nevertheless desired to 
collaborate in its action. The only stipulation was that non-combatants be ‘hommes sinceres’. 
Patay emphasised that youths, women and ‘all honest people’ should be encouraged to attend 
Action combattante meetings.498
492 UNC/EC, 9 December 1933.
493 UNC/EC, 10 May 1934; 30 June 1934; 28 July 1934.
494 UNC/EC, 30 June 1934.
495 UNC/EC, 28 July 1934.
496 Kuisel, Ernest Mercier, p. 107.
497 Ibid., p. 106-108.
498 Patay, ‘A tous les AC’, Le Combattant d ’Ele-et-Vilaine, September 1934.
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The UNC was especially desirous that French youths become involved. The Metz 
congress in May 1934 decided that all young people, not just the sons and daughters of veterans, 
should be allowed to join Action combattante.499 These non-combatants would likely be the 
activists of the association as the leadership of the UNC did not believe the veterans were able to 
fulfil this role.500 Isaac’s papers reveal that: “Dans chaque departement, il faut recruter des 
orateurs, prendre des contacts prudents avec d ’autres organisations (pas necessairement de 
combattants), lancer des etudes techniques et recruter des commissaires pour les reunions”.501 
Furthermore, the UNC did not possess the funds to train orators. This task was left to local 
sections. It is possible that local UNC section chiefs would find it hard to resist the recruitment 
of ready-made leaguers from within the Croix de Feu. Indeed, Prost writes that the national 
UNC leadership sent men, probably Croix de Feu, under the auspices of Action combattante to 
preside over departmental UNC meetings.502
An open recruitment policy did not please all members of the committee. Nerisson, 
president of the UNC’s 15th section, was disgruntled that the advertising campaign for the group 
used the work of Italian artist Leonetto Cappiello, doubly unsuitable for being a foreigner and a 
non-combatant.503 In July 1934, Lebecq reassured executive committee member and vice- 
president of the Marne group Rasse on the veteran quality of Action combattante officials.504 
The leadership of Action combattante included veterans from the UNC specifically UNC 
treasurer Alfred de Pontalba, and vice-presidents Charron, Goy and Paul Galland.505
At the Metz congress, Charron presented a report on the restructuring of propaganda 
activities. He suggested that France be divided into zones of four or five departments each, 
presided over by a leader and a small administrative staff. The chef de region would be 
responsible for moulding public opinion, informing local newspapers of group actions and 
producing posters and tracts. Each department would be responsible for training orators and 
conference organisers. When the time was right, the chefs  staff would organise meetings 
through a ‘Comite d’Action combattante’.506
499 ‘Assemblee Generate Statutaire, Vendredi 11 Mai: Les Jeunes’, La Vdc, 19 May 1934.
500 UNC/EC, 30 June 1934.
501 Prost, I, note p. 156.
502 Prost, I, p. 166.
503 UNC/EC, 20 June 1934.
504 UNC/EC, 28 July 1934.
505 UNC/EC, 30 June 1934.
506 A. Charron, ‘Organisation, propagande et presse’, XVCongres National, pp. 346-348.
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Two months after the first appeal, La Voix du combattant announced the beginning of a 
national subscription campaign. Powerful financial resources were needed, it claimed, to launch 
a vast action on a civic, moral, financial and economic front.507 From 25 August until 17 
November 1934, six lists of subscriptions were published. The dramatic fall in figures between 
the first and last lists suggests that the published results are reliable. One must still be wary that 
they were published in the movement’s national newspaper and so subject to distortion. The 
results of the appeal can be seen below.
C A O
Results of Action combattante subscription campaign
No. of contributors Amount in Francs
1st list (25/8/1934) 102 46, 985.75 F
2nd list (1/9/1934) 32 11,334
3rd list (15/9/1934) 76 3, 739
4th list (13/10/1934) 121 4, 452
5th list (20/10/1934) 81 2, 472
6th list (17/11/1934) 76 4, 144.25
Total 488 73, 127
The table shows that there was an initial flurry of donations. One donation of 10, 000 F 
accounted for a large proportion o f this. The amount donated in the remaining five lists totalled 
26, 141.25 F, 56 % of the original list’s total. The disappointing response to the campaign did 
not go unnoticed. In May 1935, an article addressed to all section chiefs of the UNC demanded 
their efforts in support o f Action combattante.509 The same article appeared four months later. 
The poor results of the campaign contrasted sharply with the amount received to fund a 
monument to King Albert I, which had raised 802, 452.80F by February 1935.510
Did this disappointment result from a rejection of politics among the membership? 
Certainly, regional editions o f La Voix du combattant neither published all the appels for Action
507 Action combattante, ‘Pour 1’Action combattante: Appel a tous nos camarades’, La Vdc, 11 August 1934.
508 Lists appeared in 6 issues o f La Vdc, from 25 August 1934 -  17 November 1934.
509 Notice in La Vdc, 25 May 1935.
510 Results o f the campaign were published in La Vdc, 9 February 1935.
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combattante nor dedicated a whole page to the movement as the national edition did from 
December 1934. Found on page three of the newspaper, it published articles on all manner of 
political concerns.511 The organisation was aware of concerns among members. Patay wrote, 
“Oui je sais, Faction de l ’UNC en faveur d’un relevement national (ce que nous appelons 
FAction Combattante) etonne et inquiete quelques-uns entre vous”.512 Nevertheless, readers were 
assured that this political action was the ‘good’ politics of the veterans and not the ‘bad’ politics 
of corrupt politicians. Some members may have rejected the new association out of their 
rejection of politics in general.
However, the group did find favour among some provincial sections. There was a limited 
implantation outside Paris. In the months following the February 1934 riots, police reported that 
a poster campaign took place in the Aisne, the Alpes-Maritimes, the Drome, the Oise, the
•  ^1 'XMorbihan, the Vaucluse, the Vienne, the Ille-et-Vilaine and the Pas-de-Calais. Action 
combattante founded new UNC sections and groups affiliated to the UNC that could then be 
absorbed into the organisation proper.514 It was successful to this end in areas where the UNC 
had not been, namely in the Drome, the Var, the Alpes-Maritimes, the Hautes-Pyrenees, the 
Basses-Alpes and the Gard.515 In 1934, each of these departments had a very small UNC 
membership if  a section existed there at all.516 At a meeting held in Rodez, in the Aveyron, and 
attended by the president of the Port d’Agnes UNC section, Action combattante activist de 
Chalain presented the programme to local residents. New members soon joined up and this
517marked “...le premier jalon pose dans 1’Aveyron”.
Some existing provincial groups showed support for Action combattante. The UNC’s
518Berry group donated 100 F to the association. In May 1934, the departmental congress of the
511 The articles that appeared on the first ‘L’action combattante’ page provide a clue to its diversity of subject: 
‘L’Etat ecartele’; ‘Planistes et revolutionnaires’; ‘M. Benes optimiste’; ‘Le systeme sovietique’; ‘La filibuste’; ‘Vers 
le suffrage familial’; ‘Reponse a un neutre’.
512 Patay, ‘L’Action Combattante’, La Vdc, 20 October 1934.
513 AN F7: 13024, weekly report from the Aisne, 23 July 1934 and 19 November 1934; 13025: weekly report from 
the Drome, 17 September 1934; 13026: weekly report from the Loire-Inferieure, 11 June 1934 and weekly report 
from the Ille-etVilaine, 18 June 1934; 13027: weekly report from the Oise, 4 June 1934 and weekly report from the 
Morbihan, 13 August; 13029: weekly report from the Vaucluse, 11 June 1934 and weekly report from the Vienne 16 
July 1934; 13039: weekly report from the Pas-de-Calais, 15 August 1934.
514 UNC/EC, 28 July 1934.
515 Report on ‘L’Action combattante’ in the pre-Brest congress issue, La Vdc, 31 May 1935.
516 Prost, II, p. 63.
517 ‘Chronique d’action: Aveyron’, La Vdc, 5 January 1935.
518 ‘Groupe de Berry’, L ’Ancien Combattant du Berry, September-October 1934.
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Basque and Beamais group voted in favour of Action combattante’s state reform project.519 An 
Action combattante group existed in the Pyrenees-Orientales.520 In the Seine-et-Mame, the 
Action combattante section counted 22 members in January 1935.521 By March, the group had 
40 members. During the months o f April, May, June and August 1935, the section spread Action 
combattante propaganda, mainly through meetings, conferences and the sale of the Action 
combattante edition mensuelle. Commandant Thibaut of Action combattante spoke about the 
group’s programme for civic action and national renovation at the general assembly of the 
Fontainebleau section o f the UNC.522
UNC speakers held meetings to unveil the role and aims of the new group. The largest of 
these meetings took place at Rennes on 14 October 1934. Action combattante already had a 
presence in the area at least since June 1934, when a meeting of 40 men took place under the 
auspices of local UNC president Patay. At the October congress of Action combattante, Goy 
and Roger d ’Avigneau, founder o f the UNC’s Loire-Inferieure group and secretary of the 
Federation interalliee des anciens combattants (FIDAC), addressed a reported 8000-strong 
audience. Local police stated that the meeting demonstrated the discipline of the group and its 
willingness to ‘enter into the struggle’ if  its ‘demands were not satisfied’.524 Later in October, a
C *)C
similar meeting took place in Caen at which 8, 000 people attended.
The same month, the Eure group accepted the task of founding an Action combattante 
section in the department. Non-UNC members were to pay 10 F for admission while UNC 
members could join free. At the meeting o f the Eure departmental commission on civic action, 
Victor, founder of Action combattante in the department, reported that the organisation was 
doing well. It had already recruited regional and cantonal commissaires. The local Action 
combattante shared the UNC’s headquarters in Evreux. In addition, the commission agreed that
519 Report from the departmental congress o f the Basque and Beamais groups held on 27 May 1934 reported in Le 
Poilu Basque, June 1934.
520 Hoffmann, ‘Tribune des militants: Les Anciens Combattants et la politique’, La Vdc, 2 March 1935.
521 ‘Chronique regionale’, La Vdc: Seine-et-Marne, January 1935.
522 ‘Chronique regionale’, La Vdc: Seine-et-Marne, May 1935.
523 AN F7 13026, weekly report from the Ille-et-Vilaine, ‘Le Mardi 26 juin, a Rennes, “1’Action Combattante” a tenu 
une reunion...’ , 2 July 1934.
524 AN F7 13026, weekly report from the Ille-et-Vilaine, ‘Les Anciens Combattants’, 28 October 1934.
525 ‘L’Action Combattante: Le meeting regional de Basse-Normandie a Caen, 28 octobre’, La Vdc, 17 November
1934.
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as both groups had identical programmes, meetings of the departmental Action combattante 
group and the departmental civic action group would be combined.526
Within the UNC, the meaning o f Action combattante varied. This conflict over the aims 
of the new group reflected the different tendencies that co-existed in the wider UNC. In some 
cases, Action combattante activity was organised for street confrontation with the left. In the 
Ille-et-Vilaine, the local UNC designated district and cantonal Action combattante delegates. 
Each delegate possessed a telephone and a car. It was thanks to this organisational structure, 
wrote Patay, that the group had been able to mobilise an entire arrondissement against potential 
political demonstrations, probably o f the left.527 Patay congratulated Action combattante in the 
department for helping the UNC sections to form the basis of the parties against the Front 
commun in the elections. This tactic was not dissimilar to Croix de Feu action. For example, 
at Tours on 27 June 1935, La Rocque declared, “From now on we are able to affirm that thirty-
529six hours would suffice to muzzle the red suburbs and to take power if necessary”. In 
‘Quelques constatations’, Goy had demanded that future UNC gatherings be like those of the 
Croix de Feu. In the Ille-et-Vilaine, Action combattante used technology to assemble members 
in a short space o f time when left-wing action threatened.
Perhaps Action combattante could have ultimately functioned as a combat group. Indeed, 
Isaac described Action combattante as an auxiliary force in which a taste for action, even 
combat, motivated the devoted activists. Yet for Isaac and others of the more moderate trend in 
the UNC, street action held less appeal. The use of Action combattante in the association’s 
broader campaign for state reform trumped its use as a combat group, for the time being at least:
Nous pouvons constater avec satisfaction le chemin parcouru par nos idees.... Nous sommes a 
pied d’oeuvre devant une besogne bien definie, pourvus d’une doctrine, d’une organisation, d’un 
auxilaire precieux en la personne de «1’ Action combattante», de militants convaincus et devoues, 
animes du gout de Faction, voire du combat, et du sens de l’Apostolat. Dans notre mentalite a 
tous, dans notre action, dans les luttes a soutenir entre les deux tendances l’Apostolat doit
530l’emporter jusqu’a nouvel ordre sur le combat.
526 ‘Commission departementale d’Action civique de l ’Eure’, L ’UNC de Normandie, November 1934.
527 Patay, ‘L’organisation de l ’action combattante en Ille-et-Vilaine’, La Vdc, 22 June 1935.
528 Ibid.
529 Passmore, ‘Boy scouting for grown ups’, p. 549.
530 H. Isaac, ‘Propos de Rentree’, La Vdc, 22 September 1934.
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Action combattante was not a paramilitary arm of the UNC. It was neither a tool of 
violence nor a service d ’ordre to be used against the UNC’s adversaries. Street action was not 
the primary aim o f Action combattante. Even Lebecq admitted that this tactic had proved 
fruitless.531 The group was oriented more towards local electoral participation. It would aid the 
campaigns o f local UNC members but also put up its own candidates for election. The UNC 
hoped that electoral action would prevent communist revolution and attract the peasant classes 
away from extremist groups.532 Goy summed up this new political direction: “Ce qu’il convient 
plutot d ’etablir, c ’est une entente avec les Municipalites sympathiques... constitution de listes 
avec les jeunes et au titre de l ’Action Combattante... [agir sur] le seul terrain ancien combattant, 
ce serait aboutir a un echec” .533 By the elections of May 1935, the work of 23 departmental 
delegates and 700 communal activists had allowed Action combattante to discern the ‘electoral 
mentality’ o f each area.534 Participation in the municipal elections would serve as preparation for 
the legislative elections in 1936. In Normandy, each section was charged with establishing a list 
of combatants ‘in the UNC sense of the word’. The aim was to win all seats on the municipal 
council and install a UNC mayor in each area. Candidates would be listed as ‘delegue de 
l’UNC’.535
Results were varied. In Gers, a mayor won office as an Action combattante candidate. 
During the elections to the council in Clermont in the Nord a member stood unsuccessfully as an 
independent republican and a delegate of Action combattante. In the Ardeche municipal 
elections, 812 UNC and 569 ‘youths and sympathisers’ succeeded out of a possible 2096 seats 
available.537 A proportion of the UNC sympathisers may have been Action combattante 
members. In the month following the election, Toutain hailed the victories of UNC delegates in 
the elections. He chastised some presidents for not communicating the previous month’s 
instructions on Action combattante to their members. In these areas, candidates had failed.538
531 UNC/EC, 28 July 1934.
532 Ibid.
533 UNC/EC, 24 November 1934.
534 Report on ‘L’Action combattante’ in the pre-Brest congress issue, La Vdc, 31 May 1935.
535 J. Toutain, ‘Rapport succinct sur la Question de l ’UNC et des Elections Municipales du 5 mai 1935 envoye a tous 
les Presidents de Section du Groupe le 22 fevrier 1935’, L ’UNC de Normandie, March 1935.
536 ‘Chronique d’action: Gers, Puy-de-Dome’, La Vdc, 29 December 1934.
537 ‘Chronique d’action: Ardeche’, La Vdc, 22 June 1935.
538 J. Toutain, ‘Apres les elections des 5 et 12 mai 1935’, L ’UNC de Normandie, June 1935.
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Le Combattant d ’Ille-et-Vilaine published the outcome of local UNC electoral efforts in 
the department. In total, UNC members or candidates won 53% of council seats (701/1317), 
with a majority share on 68% (63/93) of councils. The organisation boasted a UNC mayor in 
54% of councils (50/93). Only 4% (25/701) of elected UNC members were presidents or vice- 
presidents of provincial sections. Prost claims that section presidents and their deputies were the 
most politically active o f UNC members. These results, in an area where Action combattante 
was well established, perhaps attest to a political militancy that extended beyond the local 
leadership.539
With the political crisis worsening, the Croix de Feu’s dynamic tactics (their large 
meetings, public marches and populist appeal) caught the UNC off guard. In order to halt a 
potential loss of membership and regain the initiative, Goy hoped to emulate these tactics and 
hopefully their success. A more political direction for the UNC would satisfy those who were 
calling for just such a change o f tactics. However, whereas the Croix de Feu was oriented 
towards street action, Action combattante was intended to support electoral participation. It was 
not a reserve of shock troops. The results were mixed. The response to several appels 
disappointed the leadership. This lack o f enthusiasm was not characteristic of all sections of the 
membership. Action combattante fared well during 1934 and 1935. The evidence above shows 
that this came from the involvement o f provincial members especially during the municipal 
elections of 1935.
Despite the more complete picture of Action combattante’s fortunes provided above, the 
movement failed, a fact that the UNC accepted at the national Pau congress in 1936. Does this 
prove a general distaste for political action among the veterans? In some areas this was the case. 
In the absence o f membership lists one cannot specify the proportion that was favourable to 
Action combattante. One can argue that the veterans’ rejection of militant political action was 
not unanimous. The favourable reaction of some members to the UNC’s new group meant that a 
desire for politically motivated action existed, even after the apparent failure of Action 
combattante. Such a desire did not pervade the association but it was perhaps greater than 
historians have estimated. In June 1936, when the national UNC accepted the failure of Action 
combattante, the general assembly of the Seine-Inferieure group decided to discontinue Action
539 ‘L’UNC aux elections municipales’, Le Combattant dllle-et-Vilaine, July and August 1935.
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combattante in the department. However, at the 14th regional congress at Pont-Audemer in the 
on 27 and 28 June, 200 attendees representing 36,000 veterans decided to continue Action 
combattante in backing the idea o f the UNC’s new initiative, the Rassemblement ffan9 ais, 
initiated at the national Pau congress.540 Toutain explained that the Rassemblement would spread 
the ideas approved at Metz in 1934 and Brest in 1935. It would operate within the framework of 
Action combattante.541 In April 1939, the Seine-Inferieure group took the apparently 
spontaneous initiative of creating a cantonal Action combattante group, “...un mouvement de 
propagande et d’action en faveur de l’UNC et ses idees”.542 This revival further attests to the 
political militancy and initiative o f some provincial members. Moreover, Action combattante 
was still in existence as late as February 1939.543
Action combattante entered the political arena at a time when the Croix de Feu was 
experiencing unprecedented membership growth. Indeed, the VN came into being at largely the 
same time as Action combattante, and went onto absorb the Briscards and the Fils et Filles des 
Croix de Feu (FFCF) in mid-1934. It became the most dynamic of all the Croix de Feu’s 
formations.544 For veterans who wished to pursue political action Action combattante did not 
present the best option. Even within the UNC framework itself, Action combattante faced 
competition for youth members with the JUNC, which outlasted its rival. With the Croix de Feu 
having appropriated the mystique of the veteran and 6 February, some UNC veterans may have 
preferred to join a group with a record of successful action. The Croix de Feu had ostensibly 
similar ideas to the UNC and appeared to be a veterans’ association. Indeed, the UNC itself 
attributed the failure to the broken promises o f members but also to the theft of its ideas by other 
groups. Action combattante was evidently not to the liking of some, but to others who welcomed 
the UNC’s political turn, better-established alternatives existed.
The extreme right
The forces of the extreme right had long confronted the Third Republic. In the late 1880s, the 
emergence of Paul Deroulede’s Ligue des Patriotes and the success of General Georges
540 Report from the general assembly o f the Seine-Inferieure group, L ’UNC de Normandie, June 1936. Chapter five 
examines further the Rassemblement fran?ais.
541 J. Toutain, ‘Mise au point’, L ’UNC de Normandie, January 1937.
542 ‘L’Action Combattante C a n to n a lL ’UNC de Normandie, April 1939.
543 UNC/EC, 18 February 1939.
544 Passmore, From Liberalism, p. 220.
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Boulanger’s opposition to the Republic saw the right combine authoritarian nationalism and 
populism. In 1898, the AF was founded in response to the Dreyfus Affair and the subsequent 
revitalisation of the left. For the next forty years, under Maurras’s leadership the group 
relentlessly attacked the Republic, while it championed monarchism and integral nationalism. 
After the Great War, the extreme right once again took up the anti-Republican cause in the wake 
of left-wing electoral victory in 1924. Groups such as Valois’s Faisceau and the JP under 
Taittinger often engaged in violence in their campaigns for an end to the parliamentary Republic. 
In the early 1930s, as the economic crisis worsened and dissatisfaction with the regime grew, La 
Rocque’s Croix de Feu, F ran c is  Coty and Jean Renaud’s SF and Marcel Bucard’s Francisme 
swelled the ranks o f the Republic’s enemies. In rural areas, Henry Dorgeres exploited economic 
hardship to attract peasants to his anti-Republican Greenshirts movement.
While nationalist groups jealously guarded their independence, members could adhere to 
several groups at once. As we will see, UNC members were not different in this respect. The 
case of Yves Nicolai is emblematic o f the cross-membership of extreme right-wing groups in 
France. Member and ‘maillon central’ of the Gironde UNC, as well as of the Camarades de 
combat and the Legionnaires decores au peril de leur vie, Nicolai joined the Faisceau in 1926. 
He was responsible for the recruitment o f veterans. The same year, Nicolai* founded a section of 
the JP. During the thirties, he went on to become secretary general of the Ligue des 
contribuables in 1934, an influential member o f the Bordeaux Croix de Feu and subsequently 
departmental president o f the PSF in 1936.545
UNC president Georges Lebecq was a familiar figure in extreme right-wing circles. A 
member of the JP and backed by the FR, Lebecq won a seat on the Parisian municipal council in 
1929. His connection to the JP paid dividends after the loss of his seat to a Popular Front 
candidate in May 1935. Lebecq quickly found a post as conseiller general of the Seine in 
Neuilly, where de Kerillis forced the local JP leader in the town, de Chardon, to withdraw his 
own candidature.546 Within the UNC, Lebecq was not alone in his patronage of the JP. Among 
those members affiliated or sympathetic to the league were vice-president of the UNC Nord 
group Andre Auguste, president of the UNC in the Aisne, Parmentier, Henri Rillart de Vemeuil
545 Sylvain Trussardi, ‘Faisceau, Croix de Feu, PSF. Trois mouvements girondins, du milieu des annees 1920 a la 
fin des annees 1930’, Parlementfs], 3 Hors-serie (2005), p. 59.
546 Philippet, Le Temps des Ligues, IV, p. 2020; V, annex III-B-3, p. 276.
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and national executive committee member and deputy of the Deux-Sevres Emile Taudiere.547 
Members and section leaders of the JP were present in the leadership of the JUNC.548
Concerning the Croix de Feu, the UNC’s Jacques Pericard was a founding member of the 
league. He would remain a president of honour.549 Alexandre Loetz, president of the UNC’s 
federation in the Deux-Sevres, contributed to articles in Le Flambeau.550 Goy was a member of 
the Croix de Feu at least as early as April 1930.551 While he was reported to have only attended 
one meeting, as mayor of Perreux he always invited the local section to patriotic ceremonies. 
Many of its members sponsored his candidacy in the elections of 1932.552 As we will see, 
patronage of the Croix de Feu in the UNC was not limited to high-level members.
In rural France, Dorgeres channelled rural discontent into his anti-Republican Greenshirts 
movement. By 1935, he had established himself as the principal right-wing activist in rural 
France. The experience o f the peasant poilu  was central to his appeal. Dorgeres claimed that 
the peasants had paid the ultimate price during the war, the ‘blood tax’, only to be beset with 
financial difficulties and abandoned by the state. He founded a veterans’ association, the Union 
des Paysans Anciens Combattants in an effort to unite disgruntled tax-payers, veterans and 
peasants.554 Combined with his appeal to the material difficulties of veterans, his peasant 
movement embraced the symbolic and commemorative sites of the ancien combattant world. 
After a peasant rally, the crowd often visited the local war memorial to lay a ceremonial sheaf of 
wheat at its foot. Dorgeres claimed that statistical data made it certain that the Unknown Soldier 
had been a peasant. When the agricultural crisis hit in the mid-thirties and farmers’ incomes 
suffered, veterans filled the ranks o f Dorgeres’s Comites d’action paysanne. Based on 
departmental membership estimates for the Dorgeriste movement, one may observe that where
547 Ibid., pp. 189, 201 and 210.
548 E. Veysset, ‘La propagande: Nous unissons, nous federons, nous ne demolissons pas’, La Vdc, 7 September
1935.
549 Jean-Paul Cointet, La Legion frangaise des combattants: La tentation du fascisme (Paris: A. Michel, 1995), note 
65, p. 429.
550 Kechichian, Les Croix de Feu, note 1, p. 48.
551 Ibid., p. 70.
552 Ibid., p. 147.
553 Paxton, French Peasant Fascism, pp. 3-4.
554 Ibid., pp. 52-62.
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Dorgeres attracted most sympathisers - the Seine-Inferieure, the Eure, the Ome, the Calvados 
and the Manche -  the UNC claimed a lion’s share of organised veterans.555
In December 1934, JUNC member Jean Chamant endorsed Dorgerisme in La Voix du 
combattant:
Ce que, je voudrais ici, c’est souligner l’identite de vues qui s’est manifestee entre eux et nous a 
la salle Wagram. Et puis -  pourquoi ne pas le dire? -  cet article a l’ambition legitime de poser 
des bases pour des contacts prochains et feconds entre le Front paysan et les jeunes de l’UNC .556
Chamant welcomed Dorgeres’s ambition to found a new order: “...une prophetie dont la
557realisation n’est peut-etre eloignee et pour laquelle nous travaillons depuis un an a l’UNC”. 
Chamant compared 28 November 1934, the date of a large peasant meeting in Paris, which he 
termed the ‘awakening’ of the peasants, to the ‘awakening’ of the people on 6  February that year. 
He concluded: “L’heure de la grande reconciliation franipaise approche: elle se fera, au moment 
voulu, par 1’union des fils de la terre et des sauveurs de cette meme terre” .558
The cause of anti-communism multiplied the UNC’s links with groups on the extreme 
right. Since February 1934, the communist party had denounced the UNC as fascist. It 
organised counter-demonstrations against the parades of the UNC. In turn, the UNC threatened 
to demonstrate against communists.559 In the Vaucluse, in response to a loss of membership 
since February 1934, the president o f the local UNC section promised to end political action 
except for the struggle against the Front commun.560 The AF was successful in gaining the aid of 
some UNC veterans for its political action .561 In May 1934, the leaders of the Front national, 
Taittinger, Renaud and Jacques Fromentin, courted the UNC in an effort to secure the veterans’
562membership of the anti-revolutionary alliance. The UNC had reportedly already given its 
agreement to an ‘Interligues’ association that was ready to act in case of trouble from the left.563
555 Compare the figures on the UNC’s departmental membership in Prost, II, pp. 63-64 to Paxton’s evidence on the 
success of Dorgerisme in the same areas in ibid., pp. 60, 96, 100, 103 and 109.
556 J. Chamant, ‘Vers la reconciliation frangaise’, La Vdc, 8 December 1934.
557 Ibid.
558 Ibid.
559 AN F7 13029, weekly report from the Vaucluse, 7 May 1934.
560 AN F7 13029, weekly report from the Vaucluse, 24 September 1934.
561 AN 382 AP: 10, Comite d’entente d’anciens combattants et volontaires juifs de France to Rene Cassin, 10 April 
1937.
562 FM, 19 940 500: 237, ‘Activite du Front National’, 23 May 1934.
563 FM, 19 940 500: 237, untitled document, 3 May 1934.
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Police reported that F. Mollin, named as Lebecq’s ‘grand patron electoral’, advised the president 
of the UNC against signing a pact with the Front national. Mollin believed that this would 
provoke attacks from the left and could entail the resignation of some UNC members. He 
suggested that Lebecq encourage members to work with the Front national and attend its 
meetings without signing an open agreement. This tactic would obtain the desired collaboration 
without officially compromising the organisation.564
Collaboration with the Front national did not please all UNC veterans. In July 1934, 
president of the Nord group Aime Goudaert advised his colleagues on the executive committee 
to avoid involvement in both the Front commun and the Front national. In the Nord, the UNC 
had remained neutral. This stance meant that the association could hold meetings even in ‘the 
most socialist regions’ without the threat o f disruption. He recognised that the association was 
hostile to the former but warned that if  the UNC declared this publicly it could expect to lose a 
third of its members. Eugene Felix o f the Eastern group, Goy and Isaac agreed.565
Local UNC members and section presidents did indeed attend Front national meetings. 
At Metz in October 1935, Magny, president o f a sub-group of the Metz UNC, presided over a 
meeting of 600 people, with the presidents of the local JP and AF. Magny called for the fusion 
of all ‘national’ groups in order to “...nettoyer le Pays” .566 The veterans of the Association 
Marius Plateau, affiliated to the AF, and the Association Raymond Rossignol of the JP joined the
cf .n
UNC in its support for the Front national.
After the election of the Popular Front, anti-communism continued to provide common 
ground for the disparate nationalist groups. In July 1936, local representatives of the AF, JP, SF 
and Croix de Feu met in Dijon at a Front national meeting. An unnamed speaker claimed that 
local Front national spokespersons would attempt to engage local UNC leaders in collaboration 
with the Croix de Feu. 568 A meeting at Cholet in August 1936 united 25,000 attendees, including 
provincial UNC members. Guest of honour Philippe Henriot vigorously attacked 
communism.569 In October 1936, Saut, president of the Beam UNC section, presided over a 
meeting with Jean Ybamegaray, Jean Chiappe, former JP president Clapier and La Rocque in
564 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report dated 30 May 1934.
565 UNC.EC, 28 July 1934.
566 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report from the prefect of the Moselle to the Minister of the Interior, 29 October 1935.
567 FM, 19 940 500: 237, article titled ‘Une lettre de M. Charles Trochu au president de l ’UNC’, 29 July 1936.
568 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report from the prefect of the Cote d’Or to the Minister of the Interior, 17 July 1936.
569 FM, 19 940 500: 237, meeting report in ‘Le Rassemblement National de Cholet’, LeJour, 3 August 1936.
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570 •attendance. In December, the UNC’s Jeunes de Somain urged members to group nationalists 
from the extreme right to the ‘patriotic’ left. Whether the head of the local group was an ex­
member of the Croix de Feu, the JP, the SF or the AF was of little import as communism had to 
be confronted.571 In January 1937, Colonel Bertin, president of the Angers UNC section, spoke at 
a meeting with delegates of the Parti republicain national et social (PRNS, the successor to the 
JP) and Renaud.572
In June 1936, the UNC launched the Rassemblement fran9 ais, an anti-communist 
campaign. It attracted the support o f Jacques Doriot’s PPF, a party widely regarded to have been 
fascist.573 The UNC did not describe the PPF as fascist. For the association it was a ‘national’ 
group, ready to combat communism like the Croix de Feu and the PSF. The JUNC encouraged 
its members to liaise with the PSF and PPF within the structure of the Rassemblement.574 Was 
this the first instance o f collaboration between Doriot and the UNC? In April 1935, Grancoin, a 
communist in Saint-Denis, told a meeting that if Doriot was re-elected he could thank the 
UNC.575 In the Cotes du Nord, UNC departmental president Rual advised members to read 
Doriot’s La France ne sera pas un pays d ’eclaves. After doing so they would no longer doubt 
that communist revolution was underway.
Doriot launched the Front de la Liberte in March 1937. Intended to coalesce all
cnn
‘national’ forces, the UNC’s executive committee considered joining the Front. Certain 
members reacted strongly against joining Doriot. De Pontalba declared himself hostile to both 
the Popular Front and the Front de la Liberte. Toutain, Isaac and Charron refused to allow the 
UNC to make the mistakes of the past in collaborating with political groups. The UNC did not 
join Doriot’s alliance. Some provincial members acted differently. In June 1937, the Antibes 
section of the UNC sent a telegram to Doriot himself. The signatories of the telegram included 
Dr. Ulm, UNC vice-president and PPF member plus six other UNC veterans. They proposed a
570 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report from the prefect of the Basses-Pyrenees to the Minister of the Interior, 26 October 
1936.
571 Gyde, ‘Rassemblement de toutes les bonnes volontes!’, Entre Nous, December 1936.
572 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report from the prefect o f the Vienne to the Minister of the Interior, 9 January 1937.
573 AN F712966, ‘Reunion dite de ‘Rassemblement fran^ais’ organisee par les groupements nationaux du Ixe 
arrondissement, Salle du Petit Journal, 21 rue Cadet, le 25 fevrier’, 26 February 1937; ‘Assemblee generale du 31 
Janvier 1937: Compte rendu de la seance’, Le Combattant des Cotes du Nord, February 1937.
574 ‘IV Assemblee Generale des JUNC, 14 mars 1937’, La Vdc, 20 March 1937.
575 AN F713320, ‘Meeting organise par le Parti Communiste, Cinema Ivry Palace me de Paris a Ivry’.
576 Rual, ‘Soyons unis....’, Le Combattant des Cotes duNord, September 1936.
577 UNC/EC, 8 May 1937.
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new Front national, which would fuse the UNC’s Rassemblement and Doriot’s Front de la 
Liberte. The telegram ended with a call for militant and perhaps violent action against the 
government: “Avec banniere Jeanne d’Arc et Saint-Denis en avant pour marcher sur Paris, 
bouter l’etranger hors de France.. . ” .578
The UNC saw no problem in co-operating with the extreme right, which it considered an 
ally. Anti-communism provided common ground between groups. Their programmes too were 
ostensibly similar, based around a return of authority to France. If, as we will see, there is 
disagreement over the political categorisation o f the Croix de Feu, with whom the UNC readily 
collaborated, the association’s co-operation with the PPF demonstrates that the UNC was willing 
to work with a party widely regarded as fascist by both Anglo- and Francophone historians. 
Whether through double memberships, attendance at meetings, combined street demonstrations 
or the open endorsement o f political programmes, UNC veterans sought allies in the anti- 
Republican camp .579
The Croix de Feu: Fascisme a la fran^aise
Upon its foundation in 1927, the Croix de Feu was one of a number of ex-servicemen’s 
organisations that catered for a specific clientele, namely soldiers decorated for their bravery at 
the front and under fire. 580 Like many other combatant associations, its discourse condemned 
political figures and laid claim to the heritage of the trenches. Passmore suggests that the Croix 
de Feu appropriated the veteran myth in order to appear “...in conservative eyes... as the 
incarnation of the national interest, fraternity and class collaboration” .581 The Croix de Feu 
sought to situate itself as a new force within the mouvement ancien combattant. It differed from 
‘regular’ veterans’ organisations in its emphasis on military-style discipline and hierarchy. In the 
early days of its existence, the group’s elitism and its anti-Briandist foreign policy set it apart 
from the veterans’ movement.
578 FM 19 940 500: 229, document dated 20 June.
519 See J. Chamant, ‘Vers la reconciliation fran9aise’, La Vdc, 8 December 1934.
580 In addition to those works cited above in footnote 16 of the Introduction see Philippe Machefer, ‘Les Croix de 
Feu (1927-1936)’, L ’information historique, 34 (1972), pp. 28-34; ‘Le Parti Social Fran?ais’, inZ aFrance et les 
Frangais, pp. 307-326; Jacques Nobecourt, Le Colonel de La Rocque (1885-1946): ou, Lespieges d ’un nationalisme 
chretien (Paris: Fayard , 1996).
581 Passmore, From Liberalism, p. 223.
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Although the league did not play a central role in the riot of February 1934, the 
movement appropriated the plaudits in its aftermath. This contributed to its rapid growth at this 
time. While declarations o f the size o f the membership are not wholly reliable, it is safe to 
assume that the Croix de Feu had under 100,000 members on the eve of the riot. This would 
increase to approximately 500,000 only two years later.582 In November 1935, the Mouvement 
Social Fran9 ais des Croix de Feu (MSF) was established as an umbrella group for various Croix 
de Feu organisations and auxiliaries, which included women’s and youth sections. Aimed at 
addressing the concerns o f the economically and socially disadvantaged, the MSF sought broad 
support among, for example, women, shopkeepers and peasants.583 After the Popular Front’s 
victory, Prime Minister Leon Blum’s government dissolved the leagues and with them the Croix 
de Feu. La Rocque established the PSF and ostensibly embraced electoral politics. The PSF 
would become the largest political party in France during the interwar years with over one 
million members in 1938.
In recent years, controversy surrounding the Croix de Feu has centred on its political 
categorisation. In short, was it fascist or not? Rene Remond’s Les Droites en France de 1915 d 
nos jours (1954) argued that the Croix de Feu’s vague programme did not threaten the existence 
of the Republic. According to Remond, fascism in France existed on the margins of politics and 
attracted only a small number o f fellow travellers and malcontents. Moreover, La Rocque’s 
move into electoral politics ‘proved’ his moderation and inherently Republican aims. For its 
part, this thesis has proved hugely influential on a school of thought that claims La Rocque’s 
movement prefigured a mass democratic conservative politics in France. Emphasising La 
Rocque’s moderation, historian Jacques Nobecourt judges the Croix de Feu as ‘Christian 
nationalist’. Kechichian argues that La Rocque followed a ‘traditionalist authoritarian’ course. 584 
Historians who believe that France was immune to fascism (the ‘immunity thesis’) usually 
interpret the Croix de Feu/PSF as moderate, Republican and a precursor to post-war Gaullism.585
582 Kennedy, Reconciling France, pp. 37-52.
583 Ibid., p. 74.
584 Some historians make their conclusion clear from the start. The subtitle of Nobecourt’s Le Colonel de La Rocque 
gives away the author’s view. Kechichian’s standpoint can be inferred from the introduction to Les Croix de Feu, 
pp. 7-10.
585 Zeev Stemhell presented the most controversial challenge to the immunity thesis in La Droite revolutionnaire, 
1885-1914: les origines frangaises du fascisme (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978) andM droite ni gauche: I ’ideologie 
fasciste en France (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1983). The following works appeared largely in response to Stemhell’s 
challenge: Serge Berstein, ‘La France des annees trente allergique au fascisme: a propos d’un livre de Zeev 
Stemhell’, Vingtieme Siecle, 2 (1984), pp. 83-94; Philippe Burrin, ‘La France dans le champ magnetique des
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In opposition to this orthodoxy, historians such as Soucy, Irvine, and Samuel Goodfellow judge 
the movement to have been fascist and a threat to the Republic. Passmore provides a middle 
way, deciding that the Croix de Feu was fascist in the turbulent years of 1934-1936 but came to 
resemble a more traditional conservative party thereafter.586
Fundamental to the disagreement over the fascist credentials of the Croix de Feu is the 
problem of defining the concept itself.587 The apparently irreconcilable difference of definition 
regarding fascism has left the debate sterile with neither pro- nor anti-immunity thesis historians
588able to agree. Sean Kennedy defines the Croix de Feu/PSF as authoritarian nationalist rather 
than fascist yet in his opinion this does not lessen the danger to the Republic that both
f O A
movements represented. This caveat avoids the traditional definitions within the debate that 
link fascism with anti-Republicanism and non-fascism with moderation. Indeed, why should one 
be forced to choose between seeming opposites? This dichotomy is too constraining, as the non- 
fascist-ergo-moderate judgement is false.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to prove or disprove whether or not the anciens 
combattants were fascist. UNC members who joined the Croix de Feu and extreme right-wing 
groups cannot solely be understood as fascist. A variety of reasons governed their decisions. 
Yet one can no more judge the veterans o f the UNC as deeply Republican. Those veterans who 
rejected the Croix de Feu should not be considered as unqualified moderates, where the term 
implies support for the parliamentary and democratic Republic. To classify the UNC or the
fascismes’, Le Debat, 32 (1984), pp. 52-72; Michel Winock, ‘Fascisme a la frangaise ou fascisme introuvable ?’, Le 
Debat, 25 (1983), pp. 35-44; Pierre Milza, Fascisme frangais (Paris: Flammarion, 1987). Recently, the publication 
of the French translation of Soucy’s Second Wave (with a rather notable change of title), Fascismes frangais? 1933- 
1939. Mouvements antidemocratiques (Paris: Autrement, 2004) seems to have reignited the debate to some extent, 
yet consensus is still a long way off. Winock’s response to Soucy, and Soucy’s reply, largely rehash old arguments. 
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veterans’ movement as moderate leads one to dismiss all discourse and actions contrary to this 
label as either out o f character or lacking conviction as Prost does.590 As the 1930s progressed 
and France’s political civil war worsened, the attractions of the extreme right exerted a pull on 
the wider membership o f the movement.
Important to this chapter is Dobry’s idea on the perspective relationnelle.591 Dobry 
doubts the validity o f what he terms the logique classificatoire in which the study of fascism 
seems to be trapped. He prefers to examine the political, social and cultural context within 
which fascism emerged. One should not consider political groups as isolated entities defined and 
constrained by a historically conditioned nature.593 Instead of classifying groups as fascist or not, 
(a categorisation that is then deemed to govern a group’s behaviour) one should focus on how 
these groups operated in society. They existed in an environment in which their actions, 
ideology and discourse were subject to interaction, collaboration and competition with other 
groups in response to new and diverse situations.594 It follows then that a group’s comportment is 
best explained by its strategies and tactics regarding rivals and allies, and how groups perceived 
themselves and others, rather than by an examination of its ideology.595 On the right, a ‘pool of 
similar ideas’ was common to many groups and their boundaries were therefore permeable. This 
fact allowed members to share or switch allegiances at will, in spite of each organisation’s 
jealously guarded independence.596
The Croix de Feu: A veterans’ association?
Should one exclude the Croix de Feu from the veterans’ movement? Certainly it would be 
wrong to judge the mass of veterans on the practices of one group. As Prost points out, scholars 
must not fall into the trap of classifying the ‘whole forest’ (the veterans’ movement) on the basis 
of ‘one exotic tree’ (the Croix de Feu) . 597 Furthermore, he claims that the veterans’ movement 
itself perceived the Croix de Feu as ‘a foreign body’, something different and otherworldly.598 La
590 Prost, m, p. 213.
591 Dobry, ‘La these immunitaire’, pp. 47-48.
592 Dobry, ‘February 1934’, p. 131.
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595 Ibid., p. 18.
596 Ibid, p. 17.
597 Prost, I, p. 119.
598 Prost, m , p. 179.
126
Rocque emphasised the uniqueness of his movement in the combatant world. He condemned 
other combatant association leaders whom he blamed for the inertia o f the veterans and their 
failure to capitalise on the prestige they enjoyed after the war.599 He separated the Croix de Feu 
from the rest o f the veterans’ movement with the use of the terms ‘Anciens vrais Combattants’ 
and ‘ACs des premieres lignes’ .600 In short, only members of the Croix de Feu were true to the 
veteran ideal.
In spite o f these differences, Prost hints at an ambiguous relationship in his claim that the 
Croix de Feu ‘seduced’ the UNC .601 Indeed, in the veterans’ movement, the Croix de Feu had 
more in common with the UNC than other associations. The lack of military music and parades 
at veterans’ marches symbolised their apparent rejection of militarism but the standard bearers at 
UNC national congresses did march in time. Active officers, although unpopular in the ranks of 
veterans’ associations, were common in the Croix de Feu and the UNC .602 La Rocque sought to 
maximise recruitment among anciens combattants. He carefully cultivated his image as the 
perfect veteran. Croix de Feu section chiefs advised members to portray their action as 
‘strictly Republican’ in an attempt to belay the fears among provincial UNC members that the 
association was fascist.604 Given the UNC veterans’ rejection of political violence and their 
association of this with fascism, one may speculate that this order implied that Croix de Feu 
members should refrain from violent action or at least provocation. Perhaps in this instance then, 
Croix de Feu activists did work to ‘seduce’ UNC members.
Moreover, Prost claims that whichever association a veteran chose to join, politics 
weighed little upon his choice. Local elites may have encouraged the founding of a particular 
association, such as the UNC in catholic Brittany, yet often the first group to be founded in the 
locality dominated throughout the interwar decades. Members thus joined the group most 
convenient to their location rather than the one that most accurately reflected their politics.605 
Adherence to an association constituted an expression of solidarity with the generation du feu
599 La Rocque, ‘Triptyque’, Le Flambeau, 1 December 1933.
600 See for example La Rocque, ‘Realisations’, Le Flambeau, 1 October 1933.
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and little else: “...la masse des anciens combattants viendrait grossir indifferemment les rangs de 
telle association ou de telle autre” .606
However, in the politically charged atmosphere of the 1930s political considerations may 
have counted for more in a veteran’s decision. Several questions require attention. Is it right to 
dismiss out of hand the Croix de Feu’s importance? If the league was so foreign to the veterans, 
why did it attract UNC support, from the highest to the lowest level? Why would a veteran who 
was already a member o f the UNC join the Croix de Feu too? As we will see, some veterans of 
the UNC saw no contradiction in belonging to their association and the Croix de Feu/PSF, a 
collaboration that La Rocque encouraged. Given the collective wartime experience that their 
members shared, it is unsurprising, that the UNC and the Croix de Feu referred and laid claim to 
similar ideals, activities and styles. The Croix de Feu presented itself as a veterans’ association 
and participated in the events o f the veteran calendar throughout France. While it did not 
conform to the mainstream of veterans’ associations, differences between the groups have 
perhaps been exaggerated.607 Steeped in the veteran mystique and using similar language and 
rhetoric, both the Croix de Feu and veterans’ groups targeted the same clientele in the veterans’ 
world. What each group offered its ancien combattant members was ostensibly the same: a form 
of national renewal through the revival o f the trench brotherhood.
In order to explain why the Croix de Feu exerted an attraction on some UNC veterans one 
may look at the similarity in discourse between the two groups. While elements of the UNC’s 
antiparliamentarian discourse were common to the extreme right in general, La Rocque 
specifically drew on the veterans’ mystique in his discourse at least until 1936. According to 
Didier Leschi, no other nationalist league enjoyed the same “...travail d’accreditation...” that the 
veteran mystique brought to the Croix de Feu.608 Both groups spoke of a future action referred to 
as heure H. In this action, the veterans would take centre stage. Their past sufferings gave them 
the right to such a role. In November 1933, for example, the Croix de Feu met to discuss: 
‘Comment les hommes de victoire sauveront la Paix franchise’. La Rocque informed the 10,000 
strong audience that salvation would come from:
606 Ibid., p. 132.
607 For a discussion o f similarities between the Croix de Feu and the veterans’ associations see chapter one of 
Rymell, ‘Militants and militancy’.
608 Leschi, ‘L’etrange cas La Rocque’, p. 167.
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Une force a la fois morale et physique, affranchie de toute appartenance aux factions, aux 
hommes politiques, parlementaires et autres... une force vigoureuse et libre sera capable de 
coordonner, alors, les initiatives divergentes et de mettre tout le monde d ’accord sur la premiere 
phase inevitable de tout relevement: le retour a l’ordre.609
The anciens combattants were this new force.
Both associations used similar rhetoric. Le Flambeau made it clear that the emphasis was 
on action unlike the agitation and parlottes of politicians, “...le rendement et non le bruit” of 
parliament.610 La Rocque condemned the parliamentary system and its preference for words 
over action, the deputies “ ...tremblant devant la magie des mots...” and playing “...le miserable 
jeu de l’electoralisme souverain” .611 The UNC expressed a similar contempt for the vain words 
of politicians: “Assez de parlottes inutiles, assez de declarations, de tribunes, assez de discours! 
assez de combines, assez de divisions! Un programme puissant. Des hommes. Des chefs. 
Voila ce qu’il nous faut” .612 La Rocque denounced the failure of successive governments and
(\ 1 "Xtheir “... incapacity de prevoir, de vouloir, d’organiser, de guerir”. Politics was “...un 
synonyme de demagogic, de contradiction, d ’arrivisme, d’affairisme, de mediocrite” .614 For the 
UNC, Galland attacked “...ces jeux nefastes de la politique de parti que nous nous inscrivons; 
c’est cette action des partis, aboutissant a la manoeuvre deloyale, que stigmatise le manifeste (de 
Wagram), la designant comme un des effets de la demagogie” .615
The Croix de Feu’s anti-parliamentarian rhetoric was often bound up in the language of 
biological metaphor. It depicted France as an organism, whose body would decay if the infected 
part was not cut off. No part o f the parliamentary system was spared criticism, neither the 
deputes nor “...les malades permanents que sont les electeurs. . . ” .616 The economic crisis would 
not be resolved as long as “...le pays est encore trop profondement intoxique par 1’ideologic 
socialiste. . . .” .617 Croix de Feu Francis Georges warned that socialism “...consiste a rechercher les 
maladies nationales pour les aggraver jusqu’a les rendre mortelles” .618 Similarly, the UNC
609 AN 451 AP Fonds La Rocque, 83: 24, La Rocque, ‘Comment les hommes de la victoire sauveront la paix’.
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referred to politics as a virus. Beset by political infighting the country had contracted a disease, 
‘ infectiens politicus ’:
Ce petit betail, d ’allure si simple, possede toutefois la particuliarite curieuse d’etre 
excessivement et rapidement prolifere, au point que, dans le champs visuel du microscope, je  le 
vis d’abord seul, puis j ’en vis beaucoup plus encore, des foules, des nuees, qui se superposant a 
elles-meme, devinrent d ’abord une couche, puis un mur, gagnant vivement, et de la largeur et de 
la hauteur.619
The UNC recommended amputation, surgery and the lancing of abscesses for the various 
problems that beset the Republic .620
Given the ostensible similarity between UNC and Croix de Feu rhetoric and ‘national’ 
aims, what difference did veterans perceive between the associations? They perhaps gained 
something from the league that they found lacking in the UNC and other anciens combattants 
associations. Founded almost ten years after the majority of other veterans’ associations, the
A 9 1group appealed to veterans who did not consider existing organisations up to the task. This 
fact was recognised within the wider veterans’ movement. Reflecting the growing political 
division in France, this trend affected associations on the left and right. Andre Gervais wrote:
Le combattant de la FOP qui s’inscrit au Front commun ne quitte pas la FOP; le combattant de 
l’UNC qui s’inscrit aux Croix de Feu ne quitte pas l’UNC; mais ils ne comptent desormais sur 
leurs anciennes associations que pour la defense de leurs droits materiels, parce qu’ils ont trouve 
ailleurs, hors des vieux groupements, l ’apaisement au moins momentane de leurs inquietudes, 
l’apparente satisfaction de leur desir d ’action, l’illusion d ’une ardeur utilement et efficacement 
dirigee.622
La Rocque’s movement provided an image of action and success that was attractive to 
many. The mid-1930s did not witness a move towards restraint within the league.623 Some 
members may have subscribed to conservative ideas in the past yet extreme measures began to 
seem attractive. Moreover, at this time it was apparent that the association was more than just a
619 D. Tritsch, ‘Ou il est question de microbe’, La Vdc, 29 July 1933.
620 For examples of the UNC’s use o f medical language see D. Tritsch, ‘Ou il est question de microbe’, La Vdc, 29 
July 1933; P. Galland, ‘Ambassadeurs de la justice’, 10 March 1934; P. Galland, ‘La Revolution dans l ’ordre’, 21 
April 1934.
62 Rymell, ‘Militants and militancy’, p. 8.
622 A. Gervais, ‘Les Anciens Combattants pensent-ils prendre le pouvoir?’, La Vdc, 10 August 1935.
623 Kennedy, Reconciling France, p.94.
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mutual aid association. Although the number of veteran members declined numerically, with the 
deaths of ex-servicemen, and proportionally, as the group expanded to admit non-veteran 
members, by July 1935 perhaps one in three members were veterans.624 Veteran members may 
have joined the Croix de Feu for the relatively benign reason of showing solidarity with their 
former comrades-in-arms. Yet in some cases, Croix de Feu activists neither led UNC members 
astray nor did they deceive them. A proportion of UNC veterans were willing to join a 
movement that promised national and moral renovation. For some, whether this came at the 
expense of democracy did not present much of a concern.
It is true that the importance o f the veteran both in Croix de Feu and PSF discourse 
declined as the thirties progressed. Indeed the 16 page final manifesto o f the Croix de Feu in 
1936 devoted only three lines to the veterans.625 Yet throughout this period the image of the 
Great War soldier, whether fallen or a veteran, was used to encourage the cohesion of the group. 
Like its predecessor, the PSF continued to recruit veterans. In late 1936, in order to better 
combat the Popular Front, the Senlis (Oise) section of the UNC offered to combine with the PSF. 
The section’s members had previously rejected this course of action.
The increase in activity o f the Croix de Feu and its high gains in membership during 
1934-1936 suggest that Action combattante faced a difficult situation from the outset. The Croix 
de Feu appeared to be a more dynamic wing of the UNC, the very image that Action combattante 
hoped to cultivate. In October 1935, executive member Desroches informed the committee that 
a Croix de Feu in his department had stated, “Nous sommes l ’aile marchante, TUNC est le gros 
du troupe” .628 This caused consternation among executive members, particularly because this 
very Croix de Feu was also a member o f the committee of the local UNC section. La Rocque 
continued to urge his followers to use the UNC as a resource of potential membership: “...si 
vous descendez dans la rue, ne soyez pas seuls, marchez avec l’UNC... les chefs de section 
[doivent] recruter parmi les membres de l ’UNC... car la place de ceux qui veulent vivre, agir, 
faire quelque chose est chez nous” .629 In competition for members with the Croix de Feu, a
624 Rymell, ‘Militants and militancy’, p. 20.
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group that appeared effective in combating the left and energetic in its actions and designs, 
Action combattante found little room for development.
The UNC and the Croix de Feu
Having established why the Croix de Feu may have attracted UNC members, I will now turn to 
the scale of co-operation between the groups. A section of the UNC’s membership rejected 
collaboration with the Croix de Feu. In the movement, Isaac was the most prominent critique of 
the league. In October 1935, in the article ‘Camps hostiles’, he set out his views regarding the 
Croix de Feu. Admitting that the UNC and Croix de Feu programmes were similar, Isaac 
warned that to follow the league would lead to violence and civil war. If an ostensible alliance 
had existed between the two organisations in the past, it was now time to clarify matters: this had 
never been the case. While he recognised that some UNC members did hold sympathies for the 
other ‘camp’, to leave the UNC and succumb to the colonel’s siren call would be to betray the 
generation du feu  and the country itself. His opposition therefore came from his defence of 
legality.
There were two parts to Isaac’s hostility to the Croix de Feu. Firstly, his warning to his 
fellow activists represented an attempt to avoid a loss of members. In the absence of 
membership lists, one cannot say for sure how many UNC members were also members of the 
league but for a veteran to hold a membership of both organisations was not uncommon. The 
JUNC, which Isaac actively patronised, encouraged collaboration with political groups such as 
the VN and, after 1936, the Croix de Feu’s successor the PSF. Isaac himself had experience of 
cross-association membership in the Rhone department. He refused patronage to the Croix de 
Feu in the Ardeche, founded by a UNC Rhone member. The Croix de Feu group in the Rhone 
recruited from the UNC and the war generation in general. In 1934, 31 % of members were aged 
36-39, men who would have seen most action during the Great War.
A follow up article published soon after ‘Camps hostiles’ in December 1935 clarified the 
points of his earlier article:
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Les idees doctrinales mises en avant par les Croix de Feu ne sauraient nous deplaire puisque 
nous les avons exprimees avant eux. Leurs preoccupations nationales cadrent largement avec les 
notres. Leurs methodes ont differe, de plus en plus, avec des objectifs assez incertains, attirant 
les uns, pouvant inquieter les autres, faisant craindre a bien des esprits reflechis rentrainement 
de beaucoup de bons Frangais, anciens combattants ou jeunes, dans une impasse.634
UNC members were not forbidden to join the Croix de Feu as some readers appeared to believe. 
Put simply, it would be disastrous for the UNC if its activists spent their energies on Croix de 
Feu action, rather than on the important tasks for which they were needed in the UNC. Some 
provincial members feared too that an alliance with La Rocque would ultimately see the UNC 
absorbed into the colonel’s league. This was an obstacle to their membership of the Croix de 
Feu. In April 1934, eighteen months before the publication of ‘Camps hostiles’, a new Croix de 
Feu section in Amiens met with little enthusiasm. The veterans of the local UNC felt that to join 
the new group would be detrimental to the internal cohesion of their association.635
Veterans in the wider movement were aware of the Croix de Feu’s advances to the UNC. 
In December 1935, the Cahiers de I ’UF reported that the Croix de Feu was attempting to attract 
veterans into its fold. The plan was to infiltrate a veterans’ association, recruit the ‘best 
elements’ but instruct them to remain in their association ‘to maintain their influence’. Croix de 
Feu scouts had already found a UNC section president who was responsible for 150 members. 
The UF warned that if  the Croix de Feu was successful in recruiting local veteran leaders it could 
gain a foothold in their associations without the knowledge of members. Ultimately, the veterans 
of a village or a district could wake up one day and find they were Croix de Feu.636 The UNC 
faced infiltration from the left too. Goudaert claimed that in some cases members of the FOP 
and the FNCR were attempting to destroy UNC sections. In these cases, the committees of local 
sections were re-elected only to declare themselves independent of the UNC. After a short while
637they joined another veterans’ association.
Secondly, Isaac’s articles demonstrate too that it was the league’s violent methods that 
repulsed moderates in the UNC. The rejection o f political violence was common in the 
association and may explain why many UNC veterans were not attracted to the Croix de Feu. 
The UNC rejected both fascism and communism (which it termed le fascisme rouge). It
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considered both doctrines largely the same in their violent pursuit of power and penchant for
638dictatorship. Though a minority suggested that fascism was the antidote to communism, a 
denunciation of both characterised UNC pronouncements on the matter.639
What did the veterans o f the UNC understand by the term fascism? During the thirties, 
few groups claimed to be fascist. At the very least this rejection stemmed from fascism’s 
association with foreign political movements and the desire of usually right-wing groups to be 
perceived as thoroughly French. Particularly after the riot of February 1934, the left used the 
term against its enemies and particularly the Croix de Feu. The UNC fended off too the 
accusation that it was fascist. It recognised the power of the word, which it claimed few who 
used it could even define .640 The association alleged that it was employed to discredit everything 
and everyone that was not part o f the Popular Front.641 Galland described it as the ‘werewolf 
that had frightened people into voting socialist in the municipal elections of May 1935.642
The rejection of the violence o f fascism may have deterred UNC veterans from joining 
the Croix de Feu. The group o f veterans that resigned from the UNC in the aftermath of the riot 
accused the Croix de Feu o f being fascist in its plans to install a dictatorship under La Rocque.643 
Certainly, some UNC members were suspicious of Croix de Feu action. The size of the UNC’s 
membership precluded political homogeneity and political action was not to the taste of 
everyone. In the Cotes du Nord, the UNC’s campaign against Radical deputies caused several 
members to resign. Some subsequently founded UF sections in the department.644 In 1937, UNC 
executive committee member Maillard proposed the candidature of Goy in the Mortain by- 
election as a means of combating the PSF in the area.645 Le Flambeau complained that the UNC 
and PSF were allies against communism and should not compete with each other.646 Though 
UNC member Dr. Malon claimed the patronage of the UNC president in the election, Goy used a 
poster campaign to disown him publicly.
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Indeed, while UNC members were perhaps amenable to the Croix de Feu’s programme, 
defections did not occur en masse. A comparison of departmental Croix de Feu membership 
with that of the UNC for the year 1933-1934 draws mixed results. In some departments both 
groups were strong. In the Nord, where the Croix de Feu had between 15 and 20,000 members 
in December 1935, the UNC had approximately 44,000 members at the same time. The UNC 
attracted the largest number o f veterans compared to other associations in the Aisne (14,609), 
Cote d’Or (12,721), Gironde (18,305) and Seine-et-Oise (33,374) .647 Figures concerning Croix 
de Feu membership in these departments show that in each one the Croix de Feu experienced 
success and a rapid rise in membership .648 However, in the Bouches-du-Rhone, where the most 
conservative estimate shows that Croix de Feu membership between 1932 and April 1936 rose 
from 700-15,000, the UNC counted only 2200 members in 1933.649 In this department the UF 
claimed 24,700 members.650 Conversely, where there was a strong UNC contingent, the Croix de 
Feu was not always guaranteed success. In 1933, for example, the UNC had 8000 members in 
the Ardeche. In 1935, the Croix de Feu had only six members in this department.651 The same 
was true in other rural areas from where veterans’ associations attracted most of their members. 
The Croix de Feu was an urban movement.
In the UNC, the tendency to reject the Croix de Feu co-existed with a desire to 
collaborate with the league. Provincial co-operation and membership of the league demonstrates 
that some were sympathetic to its advances. From their foundation, new Croix de Feu sections 
relied in part on the membership and in some cases the leadership of UNC members in the 
locality. The combatant world was the ‘compost’ in which La Rocque’s league grew .652 In 
February 1931, the Rhone section of the Croix de Feu admitted in its press, La Releve, 
“Beaucoup de ses membres (les Croix de Feu) appartiennent a d ’autres Associations. (UNC,
UMAC, Gueules Cassees, etc....) et y occupent meme des places importantes”. New sections
attempted to establish a liaison with UNC groups to varying degrees of success.654 In some cases, 
the UNC was willing to collaborate. The association’s 9th section went as far as to open the
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pages of its bulletin to other groups, including the AGMG, the Medailles Militaires, the Ligue 
des chefs de section and the Croix de Feu. It claimed that the arrangement would allow groups 
to ‘better exchange their ideas’ .655
Perhaps symptomatic o f the nature of multiple loyalties among members of extreme 
right-wing organisations but also because o f the behaviour of successive UNC presidents, UNC 
veterans sometimes regarded with confusion their association’s external relations. In the case of 
La Rocque’s league, an informal alliance did seem to exist between the associations. In June 
1933, the Colonel announced that alliances with other groups were possible but that each 
opportunity should be judged on the form o f collaboration and the commonality o f programme 
between the Croix de Feu and the group in question.656 Similarly, in October 1933, Rossignol, at 
the time UNC national president, declared that the UNC was now willing to co-operate with any 
group committed to fulfilling its national duty. The associations expressed a mutual abhorrence 
of parliamentarians, the left, the liberal establishment and so-called anti-national forces that 
included communism and freemasonry. Equally, the UNC and the Croix de Feu sought to 
strengthen the executive and return authority to government, perhaps at the expense of pluralist 
democracy. Both considered state and constitutional reform as the means to do this.
Some UNC members considered the Croix de Feu a veterans’ association and an ally. 
Invited to the first official meeting o f the Rouen Croix de Feu section in November 1933, 
Jacques Toutain was impressed by what he saw. While the large combatant associations were 
formed around the basis o f material demands, Toutain reported, the Croix de Feu based itself on 
cordial and intellectual affinities in the work of national renovation. For Toutain, a ‘particularly 
evocative sight’ was that o f the Croix de Feu marching “...au pas cadence... traversant les 
grandes rues de la grande ville, brusquement enregimentes”. This demonstration of discipline 
revealed that the Croix de Feu was a group o f the highest calibre, and perhaps the ‘something’ 
that France had been waiting for since the victory. It was one of the finest groupements de
657combattants one was ever likely to meet.
After the February 1934 riots, Croix de Feu membership increased rapidly as La Rocque 
presented the league as the only alternative between governmental impotence and the
655 ‘La vie des groupements: UNC Par la Concorde vers la maitrise’, Le Combattant du IXe, December 1932-January 
1933.
656 La Rocque, ‘Parasitismes’, Le Flambeau, 1 June 1933.
657 J. Toutain, ‘Chez les Croix de Feu et Briscards’, L ’UNC de Normandie, December 1933.
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revolutionary threat o f the Popular Front. During this period new Croix de Feu sections ‘very 
probably’ recruited members from the veterans’ movement and especially the IJNC .658 Indeed, in 
the Parisian suburb o f Meudon, UNC activists abandoned their association and defected to the 
Croix de Feu.659 Certainly, even before the February riots, Le Flambeau, reported warm relations 
between sections of both organisations. On 4 February 1934, the 65th Croix de Feu section held 
a meeting at Choisy-le-Roi at which speakers Varin and Bernard outlined the ‘perilous terrain’ 
that faced the mouches communistes. Croix de Feu members, dispos and the Choisy UNC 
attended. All were noted to have ‘d ’un meme coeur unanime acclame’ the orators.660
In March 1934, Le Flambeau, recognised the participation of the UNC in the February 
protest and gave the following praise:
Vous n’en appreciez pas moins avec une admiration meritee, la generosite valeureuse de vos 
camarades de l’UNC, de tous les patriotes dresses comme vous contre le regime de la boue et du 
sang. Vous vous etes associes a leurs deuils, vous pleurez leurs morts, qui sont nos freres, vous 
criez vengeance contre les responsables d ’assassinats odieux.661
Co-operation between local groups persisted. In April 1934, the Croix de Feu section in the 
Vaucluse thanked and congratulated the Avignon UNC and especially its president for his 
‘attitude’ to the Croix de Feu .662 Two months later, the same UNC section invited Croix de Feu 
members to attend its departmental congress and banquet. The Croix de Feu accepted and asked
• 663that members attend in as great a number as possible.
In May 1934, after a conference held by La Rocque in Bordeaux, the local Croix de Feu 
section welcomed 500 new members, the majority of which came from the UNC. The police 
report on this membership increase suggested that UNC members preferred the Croix de Feu as 
this association only admitted anciens combattants reels.664 This reflects the success of the 
league in presenting itself as the only association worthy of true combatants. Furthermore, it
658 Nobecourt, Le Colonel de La Rocque, p. 286.
659 Rymell, ‘Militants and militancy’, pp. 12-13.
660 ‘A travers les sections: 65e section’, Le Flambeau, 1 March 1934.
661 La Rocque, ‘Croix-de-Feu, Briscards, Volontaires Nationaux’, Le Flambeau, 1 March 1934
662 ‘A travers les sections: Section de Vaucluse’, Le Flambeau, 1 April 1934.
663 ‘A travers les sections: Section de Vaucluse’, Le Flambeau, 1 June 1934.
664 FM, 19 940 500: 237, report from the commissaire divisionnaire de police speciale (Bordeaux) to the directeur 
de la surete generate, 24 May 1934.
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suggests that, rather than being a foreign body, some UNC veterans considered the league a 
respectable ancien combattant association.
Informal collaboration was the norm. In January 1935, for example, La Rocque held 
meetings at the Salle Bullier, the Salle Magic-City, the Salle Wagram and the Maison de la 
Mutualite in Paris, in which he spoke o f co-operation with the UNC. Approximately 17,000 
Croix de Feu attended across the four venues. A press communique was published in the 
following days that bore the signatures of both Lebecq and La Rocque. Without stating that an 
official alliance existed, it nevertheless confirmed the “...pensee commune...” and 
“...collaboration etroite et unie...” o f both associations.665
Encouraged by their national leaders, Croix de Feu and UNC members worked together. 
Members of both associations attended each other’s meetings and parades. In October 1934, at a 
meeting of 2000 UNC veterans in Caen, police noted the presence of numerous Croix de Feu and 
camelots du roi , 6 6 6  In April 1935, the montmartrois section of the UNC reported the death of the 
mother-in-law of UNC comrade Lesur, president of the Croix de Feu in the 18th 
arrondissement. In October o f that year, La Rocque advised his members to march with the 
UNC in the coming Armistice Day parades .668 Sometimes UNC section leaders were also Croix 
de Feu. This was the case in the Loiret where a local president was a ‘very active’ member of 
the Croix de Feu’ .669
Although UNC members could belong to both associations at once, La Rocque’s plan 
was to entice veterans away from the UNC. Regarding UNC veterans, Croix de Feu members 
tailored their rhetoric to maximise recruitment. The colonel ordered that new recruits from 
within the ranks o f the UNC: “...ne doivent pas y venir en tant qu’UNC mais comme Croix de 
Feu” .670 In Brittany, Cdt Leclerc resigned from the UNC and founded the first Finistere section 
of Croix de Feu.671 In a letter to Goy, La Rocque claimed that a chef de groupement, presumably 
from the UNC, had ‘offered’ his members to the Croix de Feu. La Rocque denied that he had 
ever sought to entice UNC members to the Croix de Feu despite the “...sorte de ‘concurrence’...”
665 AN F713320, reports from all four meetings, 25 January 1935.
666 AN F7 13032, monthly report from the Calvados, 5 November 1934.
667 ‘Conference du 27 mars 1935’, L ’Echo montmartrois, April 1935.
668 APP BA 1901, 31 October 1935.
669 Prost, I, p. 188.
670 APP, BA1901, 31 October 1935.
671 Bensoussan, Combats, notes 9 and 10, p. 608.
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between the associations under Goy’s predecessor Lebecq.672 Instances o f co-opted membership 
did not always favour the Croix de Feu. In November 1936, after the PSF joined the 
Rassemblement fransais, La Rocque sent a memo to all local officials denying rumours that he 
had advised members to join the UNC en masse after the dissolution of the league. Accusing 
traitors, provocateurs and police officers o f spreading this rumour, he feared that the influx of ex- 
Croix de Feu into the UNC would threaten the veteran association’s existence, lest it be 
perceived as the league reconstituted .673
In January 1937, members o f the executive committee, including Goy, believed that the 
PSF was attempting to infiltrate the UNC. Maillard of the Manche UNC and Desroches from the 
Finistere stated that this was the case in their departments. Worse still, Morizot claimed that a 
local PSF leader had advised fifty o f his members against leaving the UF to join the UNC. 
These veterans had been told ‘to wait’ but it was not clear what for. Another member stated that 
he had had no trouble from any political party except the PSF. Some present at the meeting 
blamed the public accord between Goy and La Rocque for the fact that the UNC and PSF 
members believed the two associations were now ‘marching together’. Collaboration was not to 
the liking of some. Patay told his colleagues that he never missed an occasion to declare that the 
UNC was hostile to the recruitment o f veterans to political parties.674
The actions of successive UNC presidents affected members’ perception of relations. 
Lebecq did not hide his personal endorsement o f the Croix de Feu yet he was reticent on the 
precise nature of relations. When pressed on this issue in November 1934, Lebecq denied co­
operating with the league and refuted the claim that he was in contact with La Rocque. He added 
that he had forbidden members o f the GRP’s executive committee from being members of other 
groups.675 However, on 10 November 1934 La Rocque and Lebecq jointly attended a ceremony 
under the Arc de Triomphe to pay their respects to king Alexander of Yugoslavia. In response to 
a telegram from La Rocque, which expressed his ‘cordial feelings’ for the UNC, Lebecq wrote, 
“J ’ai ete tout particulierement heureux de notre reunion au tombeau du Soldat Inconnu: ce geste
672 Fonds La Rocque (Sciences Po), LR 5611C3, La Rocque to Goy, 13 January 1936.
673 AN 451 AP: 108, circular from La Rocque to local presidents, 3 November 1936.
674 UNC/EC, 16 January 1937.
675 UNC/EC, 24 November 1934.
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sera compris par nos camarades et par le pays” .676 What was to be understood from this gesture? 
At the very least, Lebecq appeared to endorse the compatibility of UNC and Croix de Feu goals.
A year later, certain UNC veterans were still unclear on whether the UNC and the Croix 
de Feu were allies. Once again the actions o f Lebecq were under scrutiny. Lebecq and 
Charron’s presence at a Croix de Feu march on 14 July 1935 had caused confusion in the ranks 
of the UNC. Charron was at the time directeur o f Action combattante and liaison to the JUNC. 
In a meeting of the UNC’s executive committee the week before, members had unanimously 
decided not to take part.677 Lebecq protested that he had attended, “...en mon nom personnel et 
en pleine independance, voulant ainsi m ’associer a une manifestation patriotique” .678 If the UNC 
and Croix de Feu had taken similar action in the past it was coincidental as both groups acted 
“...dans une pensee purement nationale” .679 Fie stated categorically that the UNC had never 
colluded with the Croix de Feu and offered to resign if  the leadership believed him to be sullying 
the good name of the organisation.
Publicly, the Croix de Feu took great profit from the apparent entente. Maillard 
complained that Croix de Feu propaganda in the Manche had focused on Lebecq’s attendance at 
the march.680 Certain UNC sections interpreted Lebecq’s attendance as evidence that the
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associations were ‘solidaire du meme esprit’ as the Croix de Feu. Relatively unconcerned, de 
Pontalba added that once the UNC became more proactive, Croix de Feu propaganda would have 
no effect on UNC members. However, the UNC’s campaign for Action combattante was nearly 
18 months old by this time. Goy and Rossignol profited from Lebecq’s uncomfortable situation. 
Police reported that they had stirred up opposition among provincial members. If the right wing 
of the UNC, behind Lebecq, split from the left wing, then police expected the former would join 
the Croix de Feu.682
Lebecq’s lack o f forethought concerning the consequences of his attendance at a Croix de 
Feu march is unlikely to have simply been a matter of political naivety. A public association 
with the Croix de Feu may have pleased a man who had led street action on 6  February 1934 and 
desired political activism from his organisation. The president supported Action combattante
676 ‘Manifestations et propagande: A Paris, 10 novembre’, Le Flambeau, 1 December 1934.
677 UNC/EC, 5 October 1935.
678 Lebecq to UNC executive committee, Lebecq folder, UNC archive, undated.
679 UNC/EC, 5 October 1935.
680 Ibid.
681 AN F7 13040, monthly report from the Haut-Rhin, 18 July 1935.
682 AN F7 12960, report, ‘La situation chez les Anciens Combattants’, 22 July 1935.
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from the start and was part o f the select few on the executive committee who were fully aware of 
its existence and actions. This episode was not the end of Lebecq’s collusion with La Rocque. 
In February 1936, La Rocque advised Croix de Feu voters in the 8 th arrondissement to vote for 
his ‘sympathique ami, Georges Lebecq’ in the upcoming municipal elections in the Roule 
quartier.m  Electoral co-operation took place again in April 1937 when the PSF federation in the 
Falaise decided to support Goy’s candidacy in the area. Endorsed by the PSF’s executive 
committee and parliamentary group, La Rocque’s party hailed this anti-communist inspired act 
of unity.684
With the election o f the Popular Front in May 1936, the UNC’s fear o f communist 
revolution grew. A police report from June 1936 alleged that, along with Ybamegaray, Vallat, 
Henriot, Chiappe and Darquier de Pellepoix among others, Lebecq and Goy attended the general 
constitutive assembly o f La Rocque’s PSF. Goy and Lebecq were both elected to the executive 
commission of the new movement. These men hoped that local PSF anti-soviet committees 
would aid the fight against the enemies o f France.685 The UNC’s anti-communist Rassemblement 
fran9 ais, launched in mid-1936, attracted the collaboration of several groups on the extreme right
/ r o r
including the PSF, the AF and the PPF. Goy and La Rocque released a statement outlining 
their plans to form, “...les ententes locales susceptibles de denoncer Faction de Moscou et de 
desarmer ceux qui preparent la guerre civile et veulent nous entretenir dans un conflit 
general” .687 Both leaders were at pains to stress that neither group would be subordinated to the 
other.
As the Popular Front experience wore on, solutions became extreme. In his biography of 
La Rocque, Nobecourt cites UNC section president Nerisson as stating that the UNC was 
preparing for paramilitary action. According to Nerisson, Marshal Petain, Goy, Lebecq and 
Chiappe had succeeded in stockpiling weapons at secret locations below a ‘Bordeaux-Lyon’ line. 
In the case of communist revolution, these arms would be distributed to members for combat.
683 Fonds La Rocque (Sciences Po), LR 5611B4, letter from La Rocque to Mssrs Risacher and Brunhes, 11 February
1936.
684 Le Flambeau, 17 April 1937.
685 FM, 19 940 500: 238, report titled ‘Creation du ‘Parti Social Franfais’ et les ‘Comites de Rassemeblement 
National’, 26 June 1936.
686 AN F7 12966, ‘Reunion dite de “Rassemblement fransais” organisee par les groupements nationaux du Ixe 
arrondissement, Salle du Petit Journal, 21 rue Cadet, le 25 fevrier’ 26 February 1937. See the report from 24 
February 1937 on the scheduling o f this meeting.
687 AN 451 AP: 121, undated.
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Franco, Mussolini, Hitler and a French army contingent had apparently given their support to this 
plan. Nerisson assured his audience that this was no joke. Sections in the Midi were already 
waiting for the signal. He hoped that in return for the moral support that the UNC had given the 
Croix de Feu/PSF, La Rocque would lend his substantial manpower to this effort. A veteran 
member of the PPF confirmed the words of Nerisson. A police investigation turned up arms in
ro o
the Var and the Alpes-Maritimes but little else.
The UNC’s relationship with the Croix de Feu/PSF bordered on an alliance that was 
tacitly understood but not openly agreed until the Rassemblement fran9 ais. Even then, this 
agreement was more an expression of shared aims than a commitment to collaborate assiduously. 
La Rocque’s movement was successful in recruiting UNC veterans. While it pursued co­
operation with the association the league also attempted to encourage veterans to leave the UNC. 
Certainly there was opposition to the Croix de Feu in the UNC and this stemmed from an 
opposition to violence and fascism and the concern for lost members. Influenced by the words 
and behaviour o f successive UNC presidents, some members joined what they perceived to be an 
anciens combattants association with a difference. It was not concerned with defending the 
material rights of ex-servicemen. Its mission was to restore discipline to the nation through 
authoritarian methods and the decimation of the left. When one takes into account the doctrine 
of the Croix de Feu, its political action and the polarised climate in France not a few veterans 
may have joined for political purposes. These men backed La Rocque’s project for national 
renovation. A taste for political extremism was not absent among UNC veterans.
Conclusion
UNC veterans may have rejected Action combattante because o f its political orientation. 
However, one should not attribute the group’s failure exclusively to this reason. Political 
militancy existed within the association and so an alleged wholesale rejection of politics among 
veterans does not explain its failure. Rather, some veterans preferred to pursue political action 
through one of the many more successful alternatives than through Action combattante. 
Veterans were not allergic to extreme political action. They expressed this action in a variety of 
ways.
688 Nobecourt, Le colonel de La Rocque, p. 578-579.
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To examine the UNC from a relational perspective reveals several points. It serves as a 
reminder that groups in interwar France did not operate in a vacuum. They interacted with their 
allies and adversaries within a political, social and cultural context. The UNC sought 
collaboration, officially and unofficially with groups that did not support the parliamentary 
Republic. Collaboration with the leagues existed from the highest to the lowest level of the 
UNC. Undoubtedly an admirer o f La Rocque’s league, Lebecq wanted to take the UNC in a 
new, more openly political direction. This view found echo among section members throughout 
France, not just the more reactionary section presidents and vice-presidents. Provincial veterans 
joined these groups too. The anciens combattants were willing to join associations whom they 
perceived to have common goals. In fact, they perceived the Croix de Feu to be an ex- 
servicemen’s association with which co-operation could be pursued. In certain cases, veterans 
even abandoned the UNC for another group. Nevertheless, one must be cautious about the size 
of UNC defections to the Croix de Feu. Many members rejected political involvement. A strong 
UNC presence in a department did not hinder the success of the Croix de Feu but a weak UNC 
implantation did not necessarily mean that the Croix de Feu would founder.
One cannot therefore reduce the UNC to a single definition whether this be democratic, 
authoritarian or otherwise. To reprise the view of Gervais, the leagues and especially the Croix 
de Feu offered the veterans something that they had not found in their anciens combattants 
associations. The UNC had not been successful in its political action. As the perceived 
communist threat grew, a proportion o f moderate members were pushed to extremism. They 
joined established organisations with a history of fighting the left.
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Chapter Four 
Youth versus Age: The Jeunes de 1’UNC
La machine continue a toumer, trainant derriere elle ceux qui, incapables d’etre nuisibles 
aujourd’hui peut-etre, se contentent d’etre inutiles et empechent ainsi les reformes qui les 
effraient. Et il faut, pour qu’ils partent, qu’une broncho-pneumonie ou un accident de circulation 
les arrachent en meme temps aux assemblies deliberantes et a la vie. Et pourtant, que de choses 
a faire dans cet Etat trop vieux.689
Roger Pinoteau, JUNC vice-president, February 1936
The discontent expressed in JUNC vice-president Roger Pinoteau’s condemnation was not 
unique to the young Frenchmen in the UNC’s youth group, the JUNC. The interwar period saw 
politically organised French youth enter national life as never before.690 Radical young 
intellectuals defined far-reaching solutions to the French crisis in revues such as Esprit, Jeune 
Droite and Ordre nouveau.691 These men perceived a sharp conflict of generations. They 
opposed the established order, or ‘disorder’ as they termed it. This critique went further than a 
denunciation of political corruption. It not only entailed a wholesale rejection of conventional 
politics and contemporary values but also a redefinition of human civilisation. On the left and 
right, political movements attracted young recruits to their vision of society.
Certainly, youth organisations existed before the Great War. Conservative youth groups 
in the Association catholique de la jeunesse (ACJF) aimed to provide members with wholesome 
values, lifestyle advice and a sense of collective identity. These groups espoused a doctrine of 
spiritual renewal that implied a conservative and authoritarian transformation of the Republic. In 
1912, the Agathon survey of bourgeois Parisian youths claimed to have discovered a generation 
gap.693 Compared to the bookish, intellectual and liberal youth of the 1880s, Agathon found that
R. Pinoteau, ‘La France serait-elle le pays de vieillards?’, La Vdc, 8 February 1936.
690 On youth movements in interwar France see in particular Aline Coutrot, ‘Youth movements in France in the 
1930s’, Journal o f Contemporary History, 5 (1970), pp. 23-35; Remi Fabre, ‘Les mouvements de jeunesse dans la 
France de l ’entre-deux-guerres’, Le Mouvement Social, 168 (1994), pp. 9-31; Wilfred D. Halls, The Youth o f Vichy 
France (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Kalman, Extreme Right, pp. 145-185; Loubet del Bayle, Les non- 
conformistes; Antoine Prost, ‘Jeunesse et societe dans la France de l’entre-deux-guerres’, Vingtieme Siecle, 13 
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691 Loubet del Bayle, Les non-conformistes, p. 214.
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contemporary young men were men of action who loved sport and technology. They rejected the 
corruption and perceived lethargy of the Third Republic.694 However, in pre-war France, in spite 
of the innate anti-democratic culture of conservative groups and Agathon’s dynamic youth, only 
the young men of the AF’s came lots du roi and the Institut d’Action fran9 aise could claim any 
real success in challenging the Republic.695
The Great War exacerbated the perceived generation gap. During the war, the generation 
du feu  counted millions of men from late adolescence to middle age.696 The conflict seemed to 
have cut all ties with the pre-1914 world. Servicemen differentiated between the war and pre­
war generations. Some soldiers believed that one epoch was coming to an end and another,
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‘their’ epoch, was about to begin. After the war, veterans’ associations continued to use the 
language of generational conflict. Though the myth of the trench fraternity was largely 
constructed after 1918, the idea of the ‘front generation’ loomed large throughout Europe.698 
The veteran became an important symbol of change, for veterans and non-veterans alike. He had 
survived mankind’s greatest ordeal and this strengthened the belief in the uniqueness o f his 
generation. In France, anciens combattants associations may have ostensibly shunned politics 
yet the claim to a shared identity made the veterans’ associations a potentially potent political 
movement.699 The desire to break with pre-war ways saw their associations pit the dynamism, 
action and youth of former trench fighters with the allegedly ineffective polices of aged career 
politicians.
The French placed great hope in the parliamentary renewal of the elections of 1919, in 
which the front generation claimed many elected representatives. As a coming together o f the 
political and social elites, for some the composition of the Chamber offered a unique 
opportunity. Yet the first post-war parliamentary experience proved unable to bring about the
694 Savage, Teenage, p. 133.
695 Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 146.
696 On the concept of generations see Philippe Beneton, ‘La generation de 1912-1914: Image, mythe ou realite?’, 
Revue frangais e de science politique, 21 (1971), pp. 981-1009; Peter Loewenberg, ‘The psychoanalytical origins of 
the Nazi youth cohort’, American Historical Review, 76 (1971), pp. 1457-1502; Mark Roseman, ‘Introduction: 
Generation conflict and German history’, in Generations in Conflict, pp. 1-47; Jean-Fran?ois Sirinelli, ‘Generation 
et histoire politique’, Vingtieme Siecle, 22 (1989), pp. 67-80; Michel Winock, ‘Les generations intellectuelles’, 
Vingtieme Siecle, 22 (1989), pp. 17-38.
697 Winock, ‘Les generations intellectuelles’, p. 25.
698 Bessel, ‘The ‘front generation” , pp. 121-122. In his work on Germany, Richard Bessel concludes that the 
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desired national renovation. Disillusioned, an important number o f the 326 newly-elected 
deputies either did not complete their term or did not stand for re-election .700 The ensuing 
economic difficulties and the perceived impotence of traditional politics left frustrated elements 
searching for new alternatives. Some turned to the mythologised potential of French youth.
The mid-1920s witnessed a rise in organised youth activity. The youth movement gave 
voice to a section o f society that was only just becoming aware of its distinctiveness.701 Groups 
demonstrated the desire for action autonomous of the adult world.702 By 1935, half a million
70French youths belonged to a movement. Catholic influenced movements continued to exist 
but they now faced competition from political formations. Unlike the moral goals of the Scouts 
and the ACJF groups, extremist youth wings joined the political fight against the Republic. The 
right aimed to inculcate the military discipline, selflessness and values of the trenches in French 
youth. During the 1920s, Valois’s Faisceau depicted the veterans as a youthful force for 
change.704 Having acquired a taste for action over words during the war, Valois’s vision 
opposed the energy and dynamism of youthful veterans to aged and decadent politicians. 
However, the response to the Faisceau’s youth organisations, the Jeunesses fascistes and the 
Faisceau universitaire, was disappointing because the Faisceau did not direct propaganda
70Sspecifically at youth. At a time when the Faisceau still considered veterans young enough to 
effect change themselves, Valois showed little interest in engaging with the post-war generation.
The belief in the youthful power of the veterans is an important difference between the 
two decades of the interwar period. During the twenties, the front generation still represented the 
best hope for change. By the 1930s, the situation had altered. Reformers continued to exploit 
the mystique of the veteran yet the advancing age and failing health of many ex-servicemen 
meant that, outside the veterans’ associations at least, they were no longer considered the 
vanguards o f rejuvenation. The inability of the associations themselves to renovate France 
compounded this failure. Now political organisations became concerned with engaging the 
young in their projects. From the communist left to the extreme right, groups employed a
700 Le Beguec, ‘L’entree au Palais-Bourbon’, pp. 376-398.
701 Coutrot, ‘Youth movements’, p. 26.
702 Ibid., p. 32.
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Bourgin.
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language of youth, energy and dynamism. Despite differing in ideological terms the movements 
all believed that their organisation would unleash the new forces needed to change the country.
The Croix de Feu/PSF demonstrated this shift in attitude. Drawing heavily on the veteran 
mystique, the Croix de Feu/PSF nevertheless regarded the younger generation as vital not only to 
the toppling of the Republican system but also to the construction of a new order.706 PSF youth 
doctrine in particular provided for the participation of young Frenchmen in the construction and 
leadership of the new state apparatus.707 However, French youth, decadent from years spent 
living under the Republic, required comprehensive physical and moral reform. For this reason, 
La Rocque and his collaborators developed wide-ranging plans on the reform o f education, 
physical activity and youth initiatives for all ages such as the successful colonies de vacances. 
La Rocque founded several organisations to educate and train thousands of young French boys 
and girls in his movement’s values. The FFCF alone counted approximately 30,000 members in
70S1938. Not all right-wing youth groups were as successful. The autonomy of the FR’s youth 
group, the Jeunesse de la Federation Republicaine, suffered from the presence o f party 
personalities in its executive. The FR did not intend the group to attract mass support but to 
regenerate the cadres o f the party. As a result, it became an imitation of the FR .709
The veterans themselves recognised the need to appeal to French youth. In the late 
1920s, the UF and UNC founded youth movements. Though both youth groups had their own 
programmes, their action was intended to support the politics of their parent association. The 
Jeunes de l’UF (JUF), founded in 1927, sought the entry of veterans into government in order to 
rejuvenate governing elites. The majority of sections were established by 1930. The Vichy 
congress in 1934 saw the first day of debate dedicated to youth. By June 1934, the JUF counted 
28,000 members and was represented in the UF’s executive committee.710 At first, membership 
was limited to those who had ‘contact’ with the esprit combattant. ‘True’ jeunes were the sons 
of either veterans, war disabled fathers or widowed mothers.711 Recruitment was later widened 
to include all French youth.
706 Ibid., pp. 145-185; Kennedy, Reconciling France, pp. 101-106 and 208-212.
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At the Saint-Malo congress in 1928, the UNC recommended that its members participate 
in sporting societies. If no such societies existed within the locale members should create a 
youth group for this purpose .712 The earliest youth section was the Gauchy group, Saint-Quentin, 
founded in 1930.713 Only after youth members first presented reports at the 1932 Lille congress 
did the movement gather some momentum though in January 1933 the JUNC admitted that 
membership was still small.714 Membership increased during 1934 and in May the UNC’s Metz 
congress ratified the decision to allow the sons of non-veterans to join. By April 1939, the 
JUNC claimed to have at least 100,000 members across 1100 sections.715
Unlike the Croix de Feu/PSF, the UNC did not seek to prepare young members as future 
leaders. Its plan for national renovation required the collaboration of the young yet it would be 
the veterans who took the lead. Morally and physically out of shape, French youth could not 
compete with the images o f the disciplined, enthusiastic and dynamic youth of Nazi Germany, 
Fascist Italy and Soviet Russia. Preferring detective novels and bad cinema, young Frenchmen
n-tf.
were sceptics and prematurely old, ‘clapped out’ by useless sporting competitions. As late as 
1939, the UNC still believed it was the veterans who could save France. Their job was to guide 
the young:
Les anciens combattants forment a l ’epoque actuelle, l’elite la plus saine, la plus stable, 
la plus sure...c’est pour cela, que des milliers de jeunes, conscients de leurs devoirs, mais aussi 
confiants en la force de l’esprit salvateur des Anciens Combattants -  acceptent, sous leur egide, 
de batir un ideal pour le plus grand bien de la France et celui de tous les Fran9ais.717
In its attacks on the age of politicians, the JUNC challenged the ability of deputies to 
solve the French crisis. The JUNC endorsed the programmes of and collaborated with the 
leagues. Though the JUNC stated it was neither of the right nor the left, elements of its 
programme placed it closer to the right. It was anti-communist, supported corporatism and the 
organised profession, eulogised the virtuous French peasant, family life and pursued a
712 A. Le Blanc, ‘Les Jeunes: Leur psychologie, leurs tendances, leurs aspirations. Comment agir sur les Jeunes’, La 
Vdc, 28 April 1934.
713 R. Schmitt, ‘D ’autres moyens de propagande’, La Vdc, 23 June 1934.
714 A. Lesbordes, ‘Allons les jeunes !’, La Vdc, 7 January 1933.
715 For this membership figure see ‘Notre Action’, La Vdc, 6 November 1937. The group claimed to have 1100 
sections in a report from the JUNC’s ‘Conseil National’, La Vdc 1 April 1939.
716 J. Alaterre, ‘Un appel aux Jeunes’, La Vdc, 29 April 1939.
717 J. Fourcade-Chourry, ‘Jeunes et Anciens ont des obligations mutuelles’, La Vdc, 25 February 1939.
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conservative policy on women. All were tenets of contemporary right-wing doctrine. In 1938, 
the JUNC supported the veterans’ plan for a government of public safety and the suspension of
718 •the Chambers. When considering the various tendencies in the UNC, the JUNC represents a 
trend that was closest to the extreme right in its doctrine and tactics.
This chapter concerns youth in the discourse and actions of the UNC. Firstly, the chapter 
examines the idea of a generational divide and youth as a political concept. The veterans of the 
UNC employed both tactics in their attacks on the Republic. I will investigate the relationship 
between the veterans and the jeunes in general, and why it was considered important. Secondly, 
the chapter considers the role o f the JUNC. This study will include examinations of the group’s 
development and political programme. One will see that the youth movement became a political 
wing that was in some ways more radical than the UNC. While its state reform programme was 
similar to that of the veterans, the JUNC advocated the destruction of Republican institutions. 
As the thirties came to an end, the group chose authority as the means of national recovery. In 
addition, the JUNC and the UNC differed in two areas. Firstly, the JUNC’s policy on sport 
sought to strengthen the French race and remake youth in a way similar to the aims of the 
extreme right. Secondly, the youth movement admitted women members who were afforded a 
certain prominence in the local sections. However, this relatively progressive attitude ran 
parallel to a conservative policy that aimed to return women to the home as wives and mothers.
The jeunes and the anciens 
The youthful veteran
In veteran discourse, to be jeune  was not limited to age. Youth was a quality one could possess. 
That is not to say that qualification by age did not take place. To be a member of the JUNC, for 
example, one had to have been bom after 1 January 1899, unless foreign occupation had
• 719prevented one from fighting in the war. Yet youth was also an abstract principle and a
720spiritual value rather than one defined by age. It was equated with one’s openness to new ideas 
and the perceived energy needed to overcome the ordeals of the crisis. Veterans across the 
monde ancien combattant held this view. De Barral of the SDC summed up the veterans’ policy:
718 See chapter two for a discussion o f the UNC’s state reform agenda.
719 ‘L’Assemblee generate des Jeunes de l’UNC’, La Vdc, 9 November 1935.
720 Savage, Teenage, p. 183; Michael Ledeen, ‘Italian fascism and youth’, Journal o f Contemporary History, 4 
(1969), pp. 137-154.
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Elle [la jeunesse] est un laboratoire ou s’elabore nombre d’idees que le pouvoir doit ensuite 
mettre en oeuvre. Done, quand je  dis collaboration avec la jeunesse», 9 a ne veut pas dire avec la 
jeunesse tout court, mais avec les elements jeunes de chaque force nationale. Autrement dit, 
avec les jeunes «integres» .721
Scapini, founder of the Union des aveugles de guerre, argued that youth was not a problem of 
age but of esprit. Political involvement corrupted this esprit and turned twenty-five year olds
799into old men.
The veterans regarded themselves as young for a number of reasons. Firstly, as discussed 
above, the ex-poilus were of various ages yet all experienced the same generation defining event. 
A poilu of 40 could therefore still identify with one of 18 because of this shared experience. 
Secondly, although some veterans spoke of having been aged by the war and, in some cases, o f a 
lost youth, others claimed they had returned as ‘new men’. Delore, for example, arrived in the 
trenches of Verdun aged 20 and subsequently came to believe that he had not experienced youth. 
Upon leaving the army aged 23, he claimed he had already lived a lifetime. However, Delore 
also expressed a common belief: the war had been a regenerative experience. A new life was 
beginning in which he had a civic duty to fulfil.723
Youth could be a mental state, an etat d ’esprit, even in those of advancing years: “A 
l’encontre de beaucoup d ’autres, nos aines sont tres jeunes de caractere et comprennent 
admirablement nos aspirations... ils nous apportent une mystique jeune par excellence. . . ” .724 
Upon Jean Goy’s accession to the presidency of the UNC he was 43 years old, yet La Voix du 
combattant referred to him as a jeune  because he had maintained the ‘soul’ of an activist.725 The 
JUNC group in the Ille-et-Vilaine attributed its rapid growth to the veteran Loiseleux, 
“...toujours sur la breche, toujours plus jeune que le plus jeune des jeunes” .726 As for the UF, 
Pichot argued that as long as their heart remained young and the fire of faith still burned in their
721 G. Berthau, ‘A propos d’une enquete: Les Anciens Combattants a la conquete du pouvoir. Par qui ?’, La Vdc, 3 
August 1935.
722 Ibid.
723 P. Delore, ‘Pensees d’automne’, Le Combattant du Centre, December 1933.
724 R. Schmitt, ‘Les Jeunes: Liaison avec les Jeunes’, La Vdc, 28 April 1934.
725 ‘Jean Goy est elu president general de l ’UNC en remplacement de Georges Lebecq demissionnaire’, La Vdc, 14 
December 1935.
726 ‘Au lendemain de notre magnifique congres’, Le Combattant d ’Hle-et-Vilaine, March 1935.
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souls, the grey or white hair and the deepening wrinkles of the war generation mattered not at all. 
What was important was that the jeunes took up the torch of the esprit combattant J 21
The task of remaining young concerned the youth members too. In this case, the quality 
of youth was explicitly linked to action. The JUNC advised that although the movement was 
young, as were its members, the only means by which to preserve this youth was to militer: 
“...vivre, c’est combattre... Lutter, toujours lutter, voila le ‘Modus Vivendi’ de notre 
generation” .728 Action rendered a person jeune. Those people whom the JUNC defined as old 
were: “...ces trop nombreux hommes, jeunes par 1’age, mais precocement sterilises par le 
scepticisme intellectuel et la lachete physique” and “....les incredules, les biases, les indifferents,
77  o 7  "3A
les indecis, les timores, qui sont legions”. In contrast, the jeunes were constructive fighters.
The veterans used a subjective conception of age in their political discourse. It was 
another tool by which to establish their moral authority in France. For the UNC, the quality o f 
youth, just like the quality of being a combatant, was qualification enough to supersede the 
democratic process and accede to power, in place of: “...cette triste generation d ’hommes trop 
ages et trop corrompus pour bien gouvemer [qui] abdiquera devant une generation d ’hommes 
jeunes, energiques, qui eux, seront desinteresses parce qu’ils ne voudront pas miner un pays
7*5 1
qu’ils ont eu tant de peine a defendre”. In comparison to other European countries, France 
was a pays de vieillardsP2 Not only did the UNC level the charge of senility at politicians and 
parties, it did so at the Republic too. Similar to the men of its institutions, the State was 
anarchic, aged, ill-equipped and had simply mn out of steam.733
Pichot condemned politicians in similar terms. He attacked their aged policies and 
formulas, exhausted ideas, quaint and old-fashioned habits and the worn out expedient measures 
that dominated political assemblies. It was time to make way for younger men.734 The UF’s 
Leon Viala questioned whether democracy still existed in France:
727 H. Pichot, ‘Nous voulons la France!’, Cahiers de I’UF, 10 May 1938.
728 R. Etienne, ‘Debout les Jeunes’, La Vdc, 16 December 1933.
729 Les jeunes du GRP, ‘Sont jeunes ceux qui batissent, luttent, possedent une fo i...’, La Vdc, 30 April 1938.
730 Ibid.
731 A. Deprez, ‘Des Jeunes’, La Vdc, 11 February, 1933.
732 R.Pinoteau, ‘La France serait-elle le pays de vieillards ?’, La Vdc, 8 February 1936.
733 Bordachar, ‘Plaidoyer pour les Jeunes... et contre nous’, La Vdc, 21 January 1933.
734 H. Pichot, ‘La maison en ordre’, Cahiers de I ’UF, 15 January 1933.
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...je sais bien que notre Democratic se montre vis-a-vis des jeunes actuels aussi maratre 
qu’elle le fiat vis-a-vis de nous. Quand je dis la Democratic, je me trompe: ce sont ceux qui se 
sont arroges le droit de parler et de commander en son nom. Ce sont les vieux routiers de la 
politique, les descendants degeneres des fondateurs de nos institutions, ce sont ceux-la qui 
veulent nous barrer la route comme ils ont reussi a nous decimer et a nous diviser...ces vieillards 
n’ont d’autres ambitions que de defendre leurs interets et ceux de leur classe. . . .735
The veterans’ condemnation of politicians for their age was an important component of 
their challenge to the perceived legitimacy of deputies. While generational discourse may have 
constituted a conservative attempt to conceal social divisions, and therefore deny class struggle, 
it was also a means o f political intervention.736 In their discursive offensives against the 
Republic, the veterans of the UNC used the notion of age and senility to condemn politicians, 
parties and their policies as outmoded and anachronistic formulae. The fact that they were the 
elected representatives of the nation mattered little. The politicisation of the notion o f age 
allowed the veterans to claim to speak for vast swathes of French society. They presented 
themselves as a new force in French politics while certain undesirables were denied membership 
of their own generation and exiled to the generation of an earlier period. In this way, politicians 
and their practices were consigned to the pre-1914 generation, the same cohort that had taken 
France to war and sacrificed her best sons. These men populated the institutions of the Republic, 
a fact that rendered these very institutions archaic and exhausted.
The alliance of youth and age
The veterans aimed to imbue the youth of France with the esprit combattant and thus 
ensure their moral legacy. They urged readers to stay young, to be young, and to pass on the
737torch of memory to future generations. The young would swell the ranks of the veterans’ 
moral elite in the work toward French recovery.738 Pinoteau defined this relationship in July 
1935 as a union in which the jeunes would defend the rights and interests of the veterans and
735 L. Viala, ‘Reflexions d’un ancien poilu devant la jeunesse fran9aise’, Cahiers de I’UF, 15 November 1933.
736 Prost, HI, p. 135-140. The anciens combattants presented the social body as a juxtaposition of rival generations. 
The veterans used the criticism that politicians were too old as a frequent insult and to attack the perceived lack o f 
imagination of the post-war governments in dealing with modem problems.
737 A. Guyot, ‘Anciens et Jeunes!’, La Vdc, 22 July 1933.
738 A. Guyot, ‘L’Action des Jeunes’, La Vdc, 5 August 1933.
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fight for the aims o f a common programme. The task that lay with the anciens was to initiate 
youth into the civic struggle.739
The UNC did not believe French youth was ready to lead France. The veterans had 
already undertaken their apprenticeship in the administration of their movements. When the time 
came, the veterans would enter government with youth at their sides. It would then be the turn of 
French youth to learn the methods of administration. The UNC did not state how long this 
would take.740 This view differed from other sections of the monde ancien combattant. In 1935, 
Pichot admitted that the veterans had failed and it would not be the generation du feu  that created 
a new France. He attributed this task to the jeunes. The war generation had amounted to nothing 
but a movement of transition between the old and young generations. The jeunes would ‘seize 
the reins of the state’ and in this event Pichot would submit to them: “...je mets mes cinquante 
ans, allegrement, au service de ceux qui n ’avaient vingt ans quand sonna le tocsin et quand les 
bourdons des clochers clamerent la delivrance” .741 In March 1935, Andre Gervais echoed 
Pichot’s pessimism. He stated that without the youth of France veteran action was doomed to 
failure. Gervais pointed out that due to the inefficiency of veteran action thus far the generation 
gap appeared wider than ever. Within this judgement lay a critique of the fragmented nature of 
the monde combattant, unable to unify itself never mind the youth of the day.742
The JUNC considered itself qualified to join the veterans’ moral elite but only with the 
guidance of the veterans.743 French youth had fallen into disarray, a symptom of existing within 
a decadent society that was heading for oblivion.744 Nevertheless, the jeunes co-appropriated the 
role of national saviour:
...il n’y a que les AC et les jeunes a presenter des elements sains et vigoureux et c’est a eux qu’il 
appartient dans un bel effort de collaboration de redresser le pays. II y a la un bel horizon 
d’activite et il faut que, nous, fils d’AC, nous allions grossir l’elite qu’ils represented .745
739 R. Pinoteau, ‘Pas d’assiette au beurre chez nous: Conseils aux Jeunes, Appel aux Anciens’, La Vdc, 13 July 1935.
740 G. Berthau, ‘A propos d’une enquete: Les Anciens Combattants a la conquete du pouvoir. Par qui ?’, La Vdc, 3
August 1935. Georges Rivollet o f the Union nationale des mutiles et reformes and Rene Cassin of the UF expressed 
this view on the ill-preparedness o f French youth for government.
741 H. Pichot, ‘Cloches de Paques’, Cahiers de VUF, 15 April 1935.
742 A. Gervais, ‘La releve qui vient’, La Vdc, 2 March 1935.
743 J. de Saint Louvent, ‘La Releve’, La Vdc, 2 December 1933.
744 C. Galland, ‘Le mal des jeunes ? C’est la mediocrite de l ’Esprit fran9ais’, La Vdc, 5 December 1936.
745 A. Guyot, ‘L’Action Jeune’, La Vdc, 5 August 1933.
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The youth sections were willing to take up the torch from the anciens combattants as men of 
order and high morality, better qualified to lead the country than those ‘blinded by the party 
spirit’ .746 For Humbert Isaac, youth members would become better than the generation that went 
before them .747
Some members o f the UNC spoke of the veterans’ relationship to youth in grander tones 
than the simple replacement o f politicians. Delore linked a youthful national renovation to the 
future of the French race. An infusion of youthful blood would allow France to face up to the 
problems of the time. Western culture would be reborn through institutions that befitted its
HAQ
grandeur. Under the guidance of the esprit combattant and youth, the struggle for a new 
epoch had begun, the stakes of which were no less than the future of the West and France.749 
Delore’s millenarian vision contrasted with the rather more apocalyptic pronouncements o f de 
Cromieres. As section president, he regularly used his editorial in Le Combattant du Centre to 
launch diatribes against Jewish influences in France. De Cromieres implicated French youth in 
the wider struggle for French civilisation against bolshevism and international Jewry. It was 
imperative that the anciens pass on to the jeunes the notions of good and justice. Without this 
tutelage, France would not break free from the slavery of shadowy forces. De Cromieres 
attacked the Jewish banker of the City of London and the torturer of ‘bloody and revolting’ 
Russia in his diatribe against France’s enemies.750 The veterans and their heirs were guardians of 
civilisation against the powers of international Jewry and the deceitful doctrine of bolshevism. 
Solidarity between the UNC and its youth wing would defeat both the excesses of capitalism and 
the barbarity of communism .751
The relationship between the UNC and its youth movement was not always harmonious. 
On occasion, the jeunes questioned the right of the anciens to speak for them. They cast doubt
752on the ‘sterile concepts’ of age and maturity. In spite of the promise to be at the side o f the
746 L. De J., ‘L’esprit combattant et les Jeunes’, La Vdc, 6 May 1933; F. d’Hennezel, ‘L’heure des jeunes’, La Vdc, 3 
March 1934.
747 H. Isaac, ‘A nous les jeunes!’, La Vdc, 17 November 1934.
748 P. Delore, ‘La reforme primordiale: Celle de l ’esprit public’, La Vdc, 29 July 1933.
749 P. Delore, ‘Pensees d’automne’, La Vdc, 11 November 1933.
750 G. de Cromieres, ‘Et Nos Jeunes’, La Vdc, 30 October 1937.
751 Ibid.
752 Evidence of conflict can be found in ‘Que veut la Jeunesse?’, La Vdc, 23 September 1933; A. Le Blanc, ‘Les 
Jeunes: Leur psychologie, leur tendances, leurs aspirations. Comment agir sur les jeunes’, La Vdc, 28 April 1934; J.
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veterans, the jeunes warned that they would not act as the support in old age {baton de vieillesse) 
for their fathers.753 The jeunes would not wait indefinitely for the call to action and may launch 
action independently. JUNC president Jacques Raudot condemned the anciens for liking the 
security of fine speeches while the jeunes took action. After the 1938 national congress, he 
expressed surprise that the discussion o f reports had resembled the worst squabbles of the Palais- 
Bourbon.754 He pressed the UNC’s executive committee for more support and warned that if  the 
jeunes were not with the anciens, then they would be against them.755 Raymond Marin, president 
of the JUNC’s Lagny section, described the veterans as broken men, despondent and paralysed. 
He judged as mistakes their rejection of politics and their unwillingness to combat politicians in 
the political arena. Contrary to this, the veterans believed the rejection of political intervention, 
in their terms the rejection o f the ‘bad’ politics practised by politicians, to be a defining virtue.756
Initially, the JUNC accepted that it was up to the veterans, and not their sons, to make the
ncn
necessary reforms and to take into their hands the direction of the country. This changed as 
the movement grew during 1935. The jeunes’ commitment to fight for the material rights of 
veterans was no longer a worthy raison d ’etre. According to Veysset, youth members were not 
interested in the revision of pensions. He stated somewhat bitterly that the ‘sacred rights’ o f the 
veterans, which nevertheless they recognised and defended, only concerned young men to the
nco
extent that they financed state payments as taxpayers. After the elections of 1936, Pinoteau 
judged that the jeunes now occupied a place in society as important as that of the anciens 
combattants, who were on the verge o f disappearing. The tables had turned. The young now 
held the power and, in order to remain relevant, it was the anciens who needed their 
collaboration.759 Nevertheless, until the Second World War, the JUNC continued to champion 
the esprit combattant and extol the virtues o f the veteran.
The veterans of the UNC attempted to guide French youth towards the goal o f national 
renovation. They appreciated the energetic potential of young French men yet this could only be
Burger, ‘Des moyens de propagande’, La Vdc, 2 February 1935; J. Raudot, ‘Aux anciens’, La Vdc, 16 October 
1938; A. Magnier, ‘Union Sportive Fran^aise: Notre exemple a imiter’, 12 February 1938.
753 R. Schmitt, ‘Liaison avec les Jeunes’, La Vdc, 28 April 1934.
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755 UNC/EC, 5 February 1938.
756 R. Marin, ‘Avec ceux qui en sont revenus’, La Vdc, 27 October 1934.
757 A. Guyot, ‘Haut les coeurs!’, La Vdc, 9 December 1933.
758 E. Veysset, ‘Petite correspondance’, La Vdc, 9 November 1935.
759 R. Pinoteau, ‘Et demain?’, La Vdc, 9 May 1936.
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harnessed with the aid of the veterans. JUNC members were willing to follow the veterans up to 
a point. However, the perceived inaction of the anciens frustrated some youth members. 
Consequently, the JUNC openly advocated intervention in politics. It believed political 
intervention to be the only effective means of national renovation. Its programme, influenced by 
contemporary young intellectual thought, endeavoured to express a revolutionary dynamism to 
which the movement laid claim.
The Jeunes de l’UNC
Veterans played a prominent role in the JUNC. The UNC financed two-thirds of the JUNC’s 
annual budget.760 Veteran members often founded JUNC sections and participated in each 
group’s leadership and development. Youth sections existed as sub-sections within UNC groups. 
They possessed their own committee upon which sat two anciens. Similarly, two jeunes sat on 
the local anciens committee. On a national level, in November 1934, the UNC on the initiative 
of Isaac invited 3 members of the JUNC to attend the meetings of the executive committee.761 
Contrary to the wishes of some anciens, the jeunes members did not have the right to vote in 
committee elections.762 This arrangement continued until the outbreak of the Second World War 
and illustrates the high level of co-operation between the UNC proper and the JUNC. Hubert 
Aubert vetted articles that appeared on the youth page. A series of letters attest to the fact that on
H f / l
one occasion at least an article was censored for its content. It is plausible then that published 
articles had the consent of the elders of the UNC.
It is important to stress the diversity within the JUNC, which mirrored the diversity of the 
combatants’ movement itself. Certainly some youth groups existed merely as social associations 
to provide young people with a means to pursue leisure activities and to take holidays. The basic 
activities of a youth section included participation in national commemorations, the organisation 
of fetes, regular meetings and marriage and death notices.764 Groups provided intellectual,
760 UNC/EC, 8 April 1939.
761 UNC/EC, 24 November 1934, also reported in La Vdc, 1 December 1934.
767 UNC/EC, 29 May 1936.
76j Series of letters exchanged between the leadership o f the UNC and the JUNC: Charles Galland to Jean Goy, 22 
December 1937; Jean Goy to Charles Galland, 24 December 1937; Charles Galland to Jean Goy, 29 December 
1937; Jacques Raudot to Jean Goy, 29 December 1937; Jean Goy to Charles Galland, 5 January 1938; Jean Goy to 
Jacques Raudot, 6 January 1938.
764 E. Veysset, ‘Propagande pratique: L’activite minimum d’une section de JUNC’, La Vdc, 4 July 1936.
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sporting and recreational pursuits for their members and these opportunities attracted new
V 765recruits.
Political action was the goal of some sections. Writing in July 1934, Schmitt, president 
of the JUNC until November 1936, congratulated the UNC on its actions on 6  February 1934 as 
before 1933 he could only offer sporting activities to his group. The UNC’s new political turn 
had provided a doctrine for its members and the promise of action.766 The youth movement 
explicitly encouraged collaboration between its sections and political parties and leagues with the 
aim of grouping the country’s national forces into a single front. Schmitt made no apology for 
the group’s political tactics: “Laissons dire que les Jeunes sont des revolutionnaires... cette 
action, que je ne crains pas de qualifier de politique apres Tavoir definie nettement, doit etre 
menee parallelement a une action sociale extremement forte...” .767 Veysset clarified the stance 
of the JUNC regarding political organisations. In order to preserve its autonomy, the JUNC as 
an organisation should not conclude ententes or official alliances with other groups. Rather, on 
an individual level members had a duty to engage in political action as soon as possible. A 
member of the JUNC could be a member or activist even of a ‘political party of order, a patriotic 
league or a mutual social aid association’ .768 D ’Hennezel urged readers not to forget their 
comrades in the Croix de Feu, the SF or the JP, who like the JUNC desired ordered non­
revolutionary action.769 The JUNC admitted to the presence of members and leaders of the JP, 
the VN and Centre des Republicans Nationaux within the organisation.770 The anciens were 
aware of the political action of the youth groups. In May 1938, 100 presidents of the JUNC 
Vendeen group encouraged active collaboration with and attendance at meetings of political 
parties and leagues, the only condition being that these organisations follow a national politics.
771The veterans in attendance approved.
One cannot know whether JUNC members viewed the youth groups and their activities 
as anything more than a means to make new friends. This chapter will not argue that all
765 J. Dauguet, ‘Appel aux Airies’, La Vdc, 17 March 1934. Dauguet of the Cauderan group cited social activities as 
the reason for the group’s growth from 25 to 105 members over three years.
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769 F. D’Hennezel, ‘L’action’, La Vdc, 14 April 1934.
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members were of the same political conviction whether democratic, authoritarian, fascist or 
other. Simply, one can argue that the JUNC was a political movement whose discourse and 
actions leant towards an authoritarian conception of the Republic. The JUNC denied neither its 
interest nor its intervention in politics. The JUNC’s programme was not of the Republican 
centre. It contained the potential for authoritarianism in its prioritisation of an abstract principle 
(youth) over the electoral process. The youth versus age dynamic did not respect the democratic 
legitimacy of Republican politicians. It provides further evidence that the UNC did not support 
the Republic as it was during the 1930s.
Foundation and Membership
For information on the membership and development of the JUNC, one must rely upon the 
UNC’s own publications. La Voix du combattant (which would become La Voix du combattant 
et de la jeunesse in February 1936) printed a weekly youth column from July 1933 that soon 
expanded to a whole page. It contained information and articles sent to the youth page by 
regional activists. The JUNC conducted various censuses of members and groups. One should 
be cautious regarding the reliability of such information, which is open to exaggeration. 
However, regular appeals for information about groups, the relatively modest numbers published 
(with a few exceptions) and reprimands for sections that had not replied to various appels 
suggest that the information is of some use.
Founded at the Saint-Malo congress in 1928, the youth movement only gained 
momentum after the national Lille congress in 1932. The ‘Tribune des Jeunes’ column first 
appeared on 22 July 1933 and in August the newspaper opened its columns to provincial jeunes 
activists in an appeal for articles. The Wagram meeting in October 1933 gave new impetus to 
the development of a youth movement. The JUNC took off in a practical sense after the Metz 
congress in 1934, when for the first time the jeunes had their own commission.772
In January 1934, the JUNC’s youth commission decided that membership of the 
movement should be opened to the sons and daughters of non-combatants who shared the views 
of the UNC.773 Delegates to the Metz congress in May 1934 ratified this decision. In April 
1934, Marin stated that the ultimate goal was to create a united front of youth movements. He
772 ‘Centre permanent d’action: Seance du 3 mars’, La Vdc, 10 March 1934.
773 Report from the ‘Commission des Jeunes’, La Vdc, 20 January 1934.
158
added that non-combatants’ sons had shown as much if not more zeal for action as the sons of 
veterans.774 A report by the Parisian group in 1938 demonstrates the effect of the open 
recruitment policy. This local group had 1820 members across 50 sections, 75% of whom were 
the sons or daughters of non-UNC members.775 This testifies to the success of the JUNC in 
recruiting from outside the UNC circle and demonstrates the penetration of its ideas within a 
wider milieu.
Some indication as to the rate o f expansion of the youth movement can be drawn from 
local reports on the youth page o f La Voix du combattant. The UNC de Rugles created a JUNC 
group on 19 May 1933 and held its first meeting on 19 June 1933 that attracted 60 members. 
Less than a month later this had almost doubled to 108 members and by the end o f the year the 
group claimed 330 adherents.776 Such rapid expansion is reflected in reports from other local 
groups.777 The JUNC census in mid-1934 boasted 62 sections across 22 departments, o f which 
15 were founded after the Metz congress in May 1934.778 By the first National Youth Council in 
January 1935, there were 158 sections, o f which 56 began operating in the previous 3 months.779 
In May that year, F rancis Aubert for the first time gave an approximate figure for overall 
membership: 30,000 jeunes.78° By November 1935, the movement reported the existence of 320 
sections in 54 departments.781 The following January, the JUNC founded a section in 
Luxemburg.
By April 1936, F rancis Aubert announced that the movement had successfully 
established itself. The next phase of youth action could now begin. It would involve the training 
of French youth in patriotic values.782 This next phase witnessed an explosion in membership, if  
the figures can be believed. In May 1937, Raudot reported to the executive committee that the 
JUNC had gained 20,000 more members than expected, with 265 new sections having been
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159
created since the previous November.783 By November 1937, the JUNC claimed to have 100,000 
members and in April 1939, Raudot announced the existence of 1100 sections, likely an 
exaggeration.784
The JUNC proved to be more successful than Action combattante. Though one can 
question the validity o f self-publicised membership figures -  the UNC once claimed that Action 
combattante had 1 0 0 ,0 0 0  members too -  other evidence exists for the success of the movement. 
The JUNC retained an ever-expanding youth page from 1933 to the outbreak o f the Second 
World War. The UNC’s executive did not concede the failure of the JUNC as it did in the cases 
of Action combattante and the Rassemblement fran9ais. Commissions at the national congresses 
continued to examine youth issues. Local UNC newspapers also testify to the existence of 
sections in their area. While the JUNC may not have had the 100,000 members it claimed, it was 
nevertheless successful in establishing itself within the wider UNC.
Propaganda
In March 1935, Veysset published his vision of the development of a JUNC group. Once 
members had founded a section and nurtured it into an organisation with a strong local 
implantation, there would come the time for political action. Characterised by the penetration of 
professional, proletarian, commercial and agricultural circles, the jeunes would infiltrate existing 
organisations in an effort to spread the spirit o f duty and discipline.785 Veysset claimed that this 
politique de noyautage had worked well for the JUNC’s adversaries and so the movement must 
take up this action itself. He admitted that few groups were currently at this stage and whether 
any JUNC groups reached this stage before 1940 is difficult to say.
The ultimate goal of the JUNC was to act as a reserve force for parties, movements and 
leagues until the time for intervention came. This intervention would then “... se produira 
comme se sont produits les interventions de nos Anciens”. It is unclear what was meant by this 
but it could be a reference to the direct action undertaken by the UNC in February 1934.786 
Veysset’s ultimate vision for the movement was to overtake the success of the UNC. He
783 UNC/EC, 8 May 1937.
784 J. Raudot, ‘Aux anciens’, La Vdc, 6 November 1937; ‘Conseil National’, 1 April 1939.
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predicted a future time when the jeunes would found UNC sections to complement and aid youth
787members in areas where JUNC sections were isolated.
JUNC propaganda was more active and innovative than the UNC. It sought to make the 
youth page one of ‘combat’ and ‘action’ .788 In January 1934, the JUNC founded the Centre 
permanent d’action des Jeunes to coordinate youth actions. From August 1934, the Centre met 
each month and founded technical committees concerned with press, propaganda, general action 
and feminine action.789 Two years later the JUNC initiated training courses for prospective 
orators and conference organisers.790 The youth groups embraced modem ways of spreading 
their propaganda. In November 1935, the association launched a campaign in support o f aviation
791and articles on this subject appeared regularly on the youth page. Leaders encouraged 
activists to use the radio and cinema as a means of propaganda. The Haut-Rhin group produced 
its own films on the JUNC, an example that other groups followed. In March 1935, the UNC’s 
Montmartre section advertised a ‘grande matinee cinematographique’ for the jeunes, under the 
auspices of Lebecq. Youth leaders spoke at the meeting.792 In November of that year, the 
general assembly of the JUNC asked the head of the Suresnes section Robert Gautron to take 
charge of cinematographic propaganda and establish relations with Pathe.
The JUNC valued mass demonstrations for their ability to strike and impress public 
opinion through their size and vitality.794 It believed that eventually the JUNC’s strength, 
evident through the sheer weight of numbers, would deter rivals.795 The veterans usually 
rejected military style discipline during parades. Conversely, Croix de Feu parades were 
meticulously organised. JUNC activist Michel Arnault set out guidelines for youth group 
marches:
Les defiles de Jeunes doivent etre absolument parfaits. C’est affaire aux organisateurs de 
ces manifestations de prevoir les details materiels (emplacement et parcours, formation des 
colonnes...) et de «styler» leurs commissaires, c’est affaire aux presidents de groupe et de section
787 E. Veysset, ‘Le sens profond de notre mouvement’, La Vdc, 2 November 1935.
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de faire encadrer leurs hommes de fanion a eviter tout flottement, c’est affaire a tous les Jeunes 
de se soumettre aux consignes qui leur sont imposees. Nous n ’avons pas tant d’occasions de 
presenter notre mouvement que public qu’il nous soit permis, a celles-la, de lui donner une idee 
de laisser aller et de mollesse. Tout ce que nous faisons doit etre bien fait et c’est pourquoi 
j ’insiste sur la necessite de faire, a tous nos Congres, des defiles impeccables. Le mouvement y 
gagnera a coup sur.796
Sport was a high priority in the JUNC. Its interest in sport was not unique. Sporting 
participation increased across France throughout the interwar years. By 1929, there were forty 
sporting federations with over 3.6 million members. Political movements took an interest in 
sport yet non-political groups such as the Scouts de France and the Eclaireurs organised games 
based on a ‘combative virility’ .797 These groups concerned themselves with the ‘soul, spirit and 
body’ of members through games and exercise.798 Influential at this time was the exercise 
doctrine of Lieutenant Georges Hebert. Drawn up in 1906, Hebertisme emphasised ‘natural’ 
activities, which encouraged precision, speed and form rather than useless sporting competition. 
It divided exercise into ten groups: walking, swimming, running, jumping, crawling, climbing, 
balancing, throwing, lifting and self-defence.799 Hebertisme was subsequently used in the army 
during the Great War and remained popular on the right throughout the twenties and thirties. 
Considered instrumental to the physical and moral regeneration of France, the Vichy government 
employed Hebert’s techniques in the Compagnons de France and the Chantiers de la Jeunesse.800 
The JUNC also adopted Hebert’s method .801
Political movements took an interest in sport for various reasons. Initially, the left 
dismissed physical recreation as the preserve of those wealthy enough to afford leisure time. 
However, once in government the Popular Front became concerned with improving the health of 
ordinary citizens. Blum’s government founded the Conseil superieur des sports in July 1936 to 
encourage physical recreation among the urban industrial classes. Minister of Sport and
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Leisure Leo Lagrange used public funds to improve physical education amenities.803 He 
introduced the Brevet sportif populaire in 1937, a certificate aimed at French people of various 
sporting ability. In 1937, 420,000 people obtained the Brevet.804 Lagrange reported to President 
Lebrun: “En creant le Brevet sportif populaire, c’est a un effort national de renovation physique 
que nous entendons convier tous ceux qui ont la charge de la jeunesse fran9 aise et le souci de 
l’avenir de notre pays” .805 The language o f Lagrange’s report would not have been out of place 
on the right.
Yet right-wing groups were not interested solely in raising individual levels of health to a 
national standard. The self-discipline and perfection of the body that exercise required was 
linked to a morality of spirit. The right believed that the demands o f sport would bring a 
physical and a moral renovation of French men. Appearance took on a moral and patriotic value 
and the ‘softness’ of men was cited as proof of national decline.806 A man should be muscular 
and steadfast in his convictions, a force for re-establishing virility and discipline in the nation. 
The extreme right went further in its conception of sport. Elements in the Croix de Feu/PSF 
desired the complete moral, intellectual and physical renovation of French youth. They wanted 
to create a new man. Under the leadership of Gaetan Maire and Jean Mierry, the Croix de 
Feu/PSF’s Societe de preparation et d ’education sportive (SPES) worked to this end, though it 
stopped short of eugenicist and racial theories common to Nazism .807
Regenerative in its effect, sport was comparable to the experience of war. It encouraged 
the development of masculine bodies essential for military service. Petain connected moral and 
physical health. He argued that this should be taught in schools to prepare children for the future 
defence of the patrie.m  Robert Brasil lach likened the nation to a sports team. Pierre Drieu La 
Rochelle saw a regenerative value in sport: “Guerre et sport, esprit d’equipe et ardeur 
communautaire, ascetisme et militantisme imposent 1’exploit et trempent les caracteres, bref 
stimulent les vertus civiques. Une nouvelle jeunesse sera «durcie par le sport, revirilisee par le 
sport» ” .809
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The JUNC reflected this thinking. In March 1937, the fourth general assembly of the 
JUNC founded the Union Sportive Fran9 aise (USF), under the impetus of Magnier. By the first 
USF congress in September 1937, the association claimed to have 28 affiliated sporting clubs. 
The USF aimed to improve the health of the nation’s youth and prepare them for military 
service. It was also a propaganda tool for the JUNC. To join the USF, one first had to be a 
member of the youth group. The USF would contribute to the wider project for national 
renovation. The encouragement to take up sport would combat the decadent lifestyle of France 
epitomised in dancing, the cabaret and cinema: “On se croit necessairement oblige d’etre un 
excellent danseur, un coureur de cabarets de premier ordre pour devenir un «homme». II faut 
avoir «vecu» telle est la devise avec laquelle les jeunes se gargarisent... voila le plus grand
• otn
ennemi du sport chez les jeunes”. In the JUNC, if the remaking of French minds was the 
primary goal, it was nevertheless essential to train healthy, robust and dependable bodies.811 
Each club within the USF knew its mission: “Faire des hommes, ayant acquis par une education 
physique appropriee le courage, la force, la volonte, et toutes les qualites necessaires pour
o n
affronter la vie”. Physical exercise, therefore, engendered moral qualities. The JUNC wanted 
to make and remake French men .813 The extreme right pursued the same goal.
Sport would prepare these new men for military service. In January 1937, at a time when 
the UNC believed France to be under threat from a left-wing government and a resurgent 
Germany, Raudot demanded that the jeunes be trained and educated in military preparation. This 
preparation would facilitate the return o f the notion of honour to the patrie, the cultivation of 
military virtues and the celebration o f France’s glorious and heroic past.814 An article by 
lieutenant-colonel Mercadier on the youth page advocated a national movement in favour of
oi r
shooting training, physical education and military preparation. Speaking at the departmental 
congress of the Nord group, Jean Ravau of the JUNC demanded that military preparation begin 
in school. Anciens and jeunes alike should contribute to the military preparation of French youth 
and help the school system to perfect reserve and non-commissioned officers. 816 The
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departmental congress o f the Seine-et-Mame group voted in May 1938 to support compulsory 
military service that would begin while children were still in school under the direction of 
monitors supplied by the army .817
The JUNC’s exploitation o f sport for military purposes comes as no surprise when one 
takes into account the JUNC’s admiration of military values. J.R. Moustiers, president of the 
Marne JUNC, specified that the most important quality of the anciens combattants was their 
military service: “Adherez, mais soyez les vrais «Fils d’Ancien Combattant». Souvenez-vous 
qu’ils ont combattu.” 818 In order to be true sons of veterans, one had to act like a veteran and 
live by military values.819 In addition, youth groups were sometimes referred to as escouades.82° 
In February 1938, Magnier restated the aims of the USF: “...l’Union Sportive Fran9 aise... a pour 
seul et unique but, 1’amelioration de la race et la formation physique de la Jeunesse par la 
creation de societes sportives, ayant a la base 1’education physique obligatoire ainsi que la 
preparation militaire” .821 Sport, military preparation and the moral and physical renovation of 
the nation thus became intertwined. The desire to remake French minds and bodies and to 
militarise French youth placed the JUNC close to the extreme right.
The JUNC programme
Comparable to the intellectual ideas of Esprit, Ordre Nouveau and the Jeune Droite, the jeunes 
mixed reactionary and revolutionary concepts. The JUNC claimed to have inherited its national 
spirit, its rejection of internationalism and its desire for national defence, empire and the autarkic 
organisation of the country from the leagues, right-wing parties, ‘radical patriots’ and neo­
socialists.822 It attacked liberalism as the root of the class struggle during the past century. The 
complete freedom that reigned had led to a freedom of pleasure, a reference to the decadence of 
French society. As the rate of salaries declined and quality diminished, money had become the 
master.823 The movement drew from socialism and communism an anti-capitalism directed 
against high finance, trusts, cartels and ‘irresponsible anonymous societies’. The JUNC reviled 
the excesses of the capitalist system, epitomised in monopolies, the abuse of credit, the market
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and, above all, speculation with other people’s money. This anti-capitalism nevertheless 
respected private property whether from savings or inheritance.824 After the election of the 
Popular Front, the JUNC did not ally its interests with big business against socialism. The 
organisation continued to condemn both capitalism and socialism.825
An important part o f its programme was the claim to a mystique based on the dynamism 
of youth. The JUNC qualified itself as a force for action, opposed to the established order, 
whether political, moral or social, and committed to the construction o f a new order in these 
three areas. Parties, politicians and their politics were the antithesis to youthful action. They 
symbolised paralysis, and even death .826 The JUNC decried the power of the politician in France 
that held sway over parliamentary institutions and the people. Competence was the subject of 
some attacks. Politicians spoke on a wide range of subjects, but were experts in none, a problem 
that parliamentarianism had aggravated.827 JUNC discourse denigrated politicians as, 
“...Messieurs les responsables de la decadence publique...” and a band of gangsters.828
The opposition to France’s seemingly inevitable ‘death-by-politics’ formed the basis of 
the JUNC’s challenge to the established order: “...nous refusons l’ordre etabli que nous 
qualifions de desordre: nous sommes revolutionnaires...nous refusons ce qui est sujet de 
dissolution, ce qui mene a la mort” .829 If the jeunes did not act, they would share responsibility
0 -3  A
for the death of France with the criminal politicians. At a meeting of the Lagny group in 1934, 
Franpois Aubert spoke o f the Stavisky Affair and the gangrene that it had uncovered in 
government, a symptom of a deeper sickness and the moral crisis within France.831
In contrast to politicians, the JUNC brimmed with energy, dynamism and was life itself: 
“ ...nous, les Jeunes! nous sommes la vie! Et la vie, non point figee et declinante mais hardie, 
«vivante». Nous sommes les jeunes et nous n ’echouerons point”. The JUNC had its own 
‘living esprit''. “...vivant car il est degage de tout ce qui est mort dans notre civilisation actuelle, 
des soi-disant droits de l ’homme aux conceptions politiciennes. II est vivant parce qu’il n ’est pas
824 E. Veysset, ‘La Propagande: Pas de programme ?’, La Vdc, 24 August 1935.
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separe du reel et de la vie” .833 France as a civilisation needed their revitalising blood in order to 
provide the permanent impulse necessary for continued national development.834 The jeunes’ 
very state of existence was action. To be young was to be in essence revolutionary.835 This 
revolutionary strength would be the pivot of their action. Through the identification of youth 
with action and revolution, the jeunes exclusively appropriated the ability to solve France’s 
problems.
Contemporary intellectual youth movements classified themselves as revolutionary too. 
They defined their ‘spiritual’ revolution in contrast to the ‘established’ revolutions of fascism, 
Nazism and Marxism. For them, revolution meant more than mere reform of capitalist society. 
It implied a complete transformation of human practices and values. The groups expressed 
some sympathy with the established revolutions. The young intellectuals recognised in them the 
attempts of men to transform society. However, the results were disappointing and amounted to 
little more than a simple modification of capitalist society.837 For the young intellectuals the new 
order would not be built on the basis o f present principles. Institutional reform was useless 
unless accompanied by the overthrow of modem values and a transformation in the relations 
between men and between man and himself. For Thierry Maulnier and Robert Francis of the 
Revue frangaise the ultimate goal justified all means necessary. Maulnier and Francis accepted 
that tactics and doctrine need not be concurrent and that the act of revolution should be led by an 
elite that used all available means to end the present disorder.838 This trend was small among the 
young intellectuals and differentiated radically this revue from others.
The desire for spiritual revolution is similar to the revolution proposed by the JUNC. The 
youth of the UNC would help the veterans reconstruct the world as one civilisation reached its 
end and a new one began: “Dans presque toutes les opinions de jeunes, ce qui frappe c’est la 
perception claire qu’un monde finit et qu’un autre s’ebauche. Un monde: non pas simplement 
des regimes, economiques ou politiques, mais une civilisation, un systeme de conceptions de 
vie” .839 Conscious of their presence at a historical turning point, the JUNC wanted to remake the 
French mindset {esprit). National renovation could not occur through victory at the polls. JUNC
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members were to obtain posts in professional organisations, local and regional councils, in the 
domains of social assistance, hygiene, teaching and even radio. Only in such jobs would their 
activities be useful. The JUNC claimed to be a movement for re-education, a movement for 
training, to recondition the French esprit.
What would follow the revolution? The JUNC argued that the form that the French state 
took was variable. The best one was that which adapted most easily to the needs of the nation. 
This was hardly an endorsement o f the French Republic under which the French nation had 
become incoherent, fraught with factional squabbling and weak. The democratic system dealt in 
the notions of liber te, egalite and fraternite, ‘empty’ words at the basis o f an ‘intangible’ 
formula.840 Parliamentary democracy degraded man into an abstract being, detached from
o 4 1
‘natural’ moral, familial and professional communities. Reform of Republican institutions 
would not be sufficient. Instead of the modification of the existing system, the creative impulse 
would come only after the destruction of the old institutions:
Cette mystique [celle des jeunes] sera renovatrice parce que la jeunesse qui voit la 
societe et ses institutions se dissoudre lentement, rongees... reclame des entreprises hardies.... 
parce qu’aussi renovation implique l ’idee de jeunesse... Cette mystique sera creatrice parce qu’a 
la place de ce qui sera detruit, il faudra mettre quelque chose. Les jeunes, apres avoir ete 
destructifs, devront creer les institutions, avec lesquelles ils pensent que l’ordre nouveau qu’ils 
construiront, devra fonctionner.842
Pinoteau proposed a ‘managed revolution’. One should neither wait for the structure 
(the Republic) to collapse nor attempt to shore up its weaknesses. The JUNC would begin 
reconstruction immediately through a necessary but controlled revolution. On occasion, more 
violent language entered JUNC discourse. In May 1936, F rancis Aubert warned that the 
“...coup de balai donne par des poignes vigoureuses de realisateurs...” would not be long in 
coming.844 The JUNC’s statements regarding politicians could justify a violent interpretation of 
their plans. Reviewing a book in April 1936, Merchiez wrote in Inter-Sections:
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...«les «vieillards» pervers, roues, voronoffises, du Luxembourg, camelots bourdonnants et 
pharisiens obscurs du Palais B o u r b o n . . f a u t  noter le desir sincere, qui est bien le notre aussi, 
d’insuffler une vie nouvelle dans ce vieux tronc qui n’est pas cependant encore mort. Tuons en 
les vers et l ’arbre refleurira. C ’est du moins notre avis.845
To propose the extermination of the worms (politicians) in the old trunk (the Palais Bourbon) 
was a violent verbal attack on the elected government. The JUNC attacked the French state as 
too old and claimed that France was suffering from a politics of old men, while all over Europe 
the jeunes entered government.846
Ostensibly, the JUNC’s programme offered a dynamic plan for the renovation of France. 
Its spiritual revolution would overhaul contemporary mindsets and renew human civilisation. 
Plans for reform often seemed vague and anarchic. The content of the future regime, though not 
democratic, mattered less than the fact that it would be new. However, when the JUNC did 
publish the specifics o f its vision, elements of it were close to the right. In August 1935, Veysset 
expressed the JUNC’s support for the state reform ideas of Andre Tardieu and the leagues.847 
Chapter two has looked at Tardieu’s plans for reform during 1934. In summer 1935, the deputy 
from Belfort had cut all ties to the parliamentary world short of giving up his seat. In May 1935, 
the publication of Sur la pente  (1935) showed the first signs of Tardieu’s drift to a reactionary 
politics that would be cemented in his work La Revolution a refaire. In the preface, he located 
the causes of French decadence in the centuries since the Revolution. He attacked the political 
doctrine based on the belief in human progress, social laws and the rejection of religion, which 
had undermined national unity, and declared war on the past and the Church.848 Freemasons lay 
behind the corruption in French history. It was their aim to destroy Tove for the nation, respect 
for the family and pride in the past’ .849 Tardieu recommended a complete re-education of French
O fA
people, which would give them a ‘head and a heart’. His plans for the moral renovation of 
France, state reform that would break the left and restore authority found favour with the JUNC.
Like the UNC, the JUNC was anti-communist. In June 1934, d’Hennezel used a 
Maurassian expression when he warned of the conflict between France and the Anti-France.
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Saint-Quentin, he warned, was not the only town subjected to the tyranny of the 
Internationale.851 In March 1935, the JUNC section in Angevillers vowed to combat the forces 
of socialism and communism by every means.852 Anti-communism in the UNC and JUNC will 
be discussed further in chapter five. Suffice it to say here that after the election of the Popular 
Front in May 1936, the JUNC vowed not only to fight but to destroy the ‘crime’ and ‘treason’ of 
the left.853
Other aspects of JUNC doctrine echoed the traditional themes of the right. To combat 
materialism and contemporary decadence, the JUNC advocated a return to the land. It targeted 
the paysan as vital to the nation’s rebirth. The association desired a strong rural implantation 
and urged its members to found rural sections.854 In its plans, each rural commune would possess 
a maison for the JUNC. The jeunes of the district would receive a practical education in farming 
matters and a political education in the doctrine of the UNC. Social work in the countryside 
would combat rural depopulation and encourage the urban unemployed to return to the land.855 
In its family policy, the JUNC conceived o f the nation as an organic whole, in which the family 
was the basic cell. If the family broke down then so would the ‘body’ of France.856 As we will 
see, it proposed the return of French mothers to their foyers and pro-natalism .857 Additionally, 
fathers were to play an important role in French national life. The jeunes demanded that election
OfO
to the Chambers be restricted to fathers of at least two children.
In labour relations, the jeunes followed the traditional doctrine of Social Catholicism and 
the right. The JUNC backed corporatism as the only means by which to overcome class 
struggle.859 The local organisation of professions within corporative institutions would revive a 
sense of community among the deracines o f urban settlements. Under the corporation, the 
proletariat would cease to exist as workers became property owners. The strike as a means of 
action would be obsolete once the workers were represented in the corporative council. The 
JUNC claimed that a totalitarian state was not the goal o f this idea, simply a state in which
851 F. D’Hennezel, ‘France d’abord! De Saint-Quentin a Metz’, La Vdc, 16 June 1934.
852 ‘La vie des Sections de Jeunes’, La Vdc, 9 March 1935.
853 M. Arnault, ‘Le communisme nous auront la peau’, La Vdc, 5 December 1936.
854 C. Galland, ‘Action rurale: La Section rurale’, La Vdc, 31 May 1935.
853 J. Vaujour, ‘Appel a la jeunesse des campagnes’, La Vdc, 14 December 1934.
856 A. Debevre, ‘La decadence de la famille’, 18 April 1936.
857 Rangot, ‘La main-d’oeuvre feminine’, La Vdc, 24 August 1935.
858 ‘La voie de salut’, La Vdc, 4 February 1939.
859 R. Schmitt, ‘Grandes lignes de notre action sociale’, La Vdc, 16 March 1935.
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corporations could make social laws without recourse to parliament.860 The new state would be 
based on the maxim ‘Famille, Metier, Nation’.861 It would be decentralised with a strong 
executive and a legislature that would not ‘surpass its mandate’. Corporations would run the 
economy, free from etatisme and the influence of international capitalism.862 The JUNC 
explicitly allied their corporative aims with those of other nationalist groups:
...nous sommes contre le liberalisme actuel, truque, perime, et noyaute par un etatisme et un 
socialisme que nous combattons. Avec 1’Action Franchise, avec les Jeunesses Patriotes, avec les 
catholiques sociaux, nous sommes pour un systeme corporatif redonnant aux metiers leur valeur 
et leur discipline.... laissant a des chambres professionnelles l ’initiative des mesures de 
reglementation sociale et le jugement des conflits du travail”. 863
The JUNC’s programme complemented that of the UNC. It approved of both the
O
Wagram manifesto of October 1933 and the UNC’s participation in the riots of February 1934.
It challenged the democratic legitimacy of deputies and their ability to solve the French crisis. 
Though the JUNC claimed to be neither of the right nor the left, its programme was close to the 
right. It supported corporatism, the organised profession and promoted the virtuous French 
peasant and family life; all were tenets of conservative doctrine. Youth members espoused an 
identical anti-communism to their parent organisation. By 1938, the movement based its 
programme for renovation on a return of authority to government. Members no longer called for 
an undefined spiritual revolution. The JUNC supported the veterans’ plan for a public safety 
government that Would bring order and discipline to France.
There were several differences between UNC and JUNC policies. Firstly, youth sections 
were not afraid to declare their political intent. The UNC always claimed to be apolitical, in 
spite of its apparent right-wing preference. The veterans believed that this self-imposed 
exclusion from politics added further to their ability to lead France. Conversely, the jeunes 
considered political intervention essential and endorsed the initiatives of other groups. The 
group supported the ‘Charte sociale du travail’ of the JP, the corporatist schemes of the AF and
860 ‘Role et fonctionnement de la Corporation’, La Vdc, 17 September 1938; ‘La corporation, c’est Turnon organique 
des classes’, La Vdc, 24 September 1938.
861 ‘Voix de nos groupes: Un Appel des Jeunes de la Marne’, La Vdc, 11 February 1939.
862 ‘Aux Fran?ais !’, La Vdc, 26 June 1937.
863 E. Veysset, ‘La propagande: Pas de programme ?’, La Vdc, 24 August 1935.
864 A. Le Blanc, ‘Rapport Moral’, La Vdc, 31 May 1935.
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the social doctrine o f the Democrates populaires and other catholic milieus.865 Secondly, the 
jeunes based their claim to national salvation on youth. In veteran discourse, youth was a 
secondary feature of the claim to the leadership of France. The veterans’ historical legitimacy 
rested upon the fact o f their war service. The jeunes ’ prioritisation of youth was another means 
by which to attack the politicians for their incompetence. Young Frenchmen were better 
qualified to save France than old and outdated politicians. Finally, the jeunes ’ ostensible 
amalgamation of left- and right-wing politics and their desire for spiritual revolution was similar 
to the ideas of contemporary young intellectuals. Like the UNC, the JUNC sought a spiritual 
renovation of the French people. Unlike the UNC, the JUNC initially prescribed the destruction 
rather than the revision of the old institutions as the precondition for national recovery.
Women in the JUNC 
Action feminine
Another important difference between the JUNC and the UNC was the former’s 
admittance of women members. The existence of women’s section on the right was not 
uncommon yet they did not always enjoy success. Founded in January 1926, the Faisceau 
Feminin was powerless to affect decision-making and policy within the larger movement.866 The 
Women’s Section of the Federation Republicaine was purported to have representatives in 65 
departments but the overall number of subscribers to its monthly bulletin was small.867 Far more 
successful were the women’s sections o f the Croix de Feu/PSF. Mainly concerned with social 
work, they numbered 400,000 members at their peak.868 Anti-feminist and pronatalist, the Croix 
de Feu/PSF deplored the working woman and declared parenthood a national duty for men and 
women.869 However, despite the priority given to women’s activism, they were nevertheless
870excluded from meetings and associational activities such as parades.
For the female sections of the JUNC, the anciens combattants remained the central 
inspiration and raison d’etre. As the guardians of French foyers and tradition, the future wives of
865 E. Veysset, ‘La Propagande: Pas de programme?’, La Vdc, 24 August 1935.
866 Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 119.
867 Irvine, French Conservatism, p. 31. There were 1625 subscriptions in 1936.
868 Kalman, Extreme Right, pp. 123-124. On women and the extreme right see Caroline Campbell’s forthcoming 
thesis ‘Women and Men in French Authoritarianism: Gender in the Croix de Feu/Parti Social Fran?ais, 1927-
1947’(Ph.D thesis, University of Iowa, forthcoming 2009)
869 Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 125.
870 Ibid., p. 124; Passmore, ‘Planting the tricolour’, p. 817.
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young French men claimed to represent the feminine elite. It was natural that they be driven by 
the same spirit as the jeunes and the anciens*11 Some members played an important role in the 
leadership of the youth movement both nationally and locally. This involvement contrasted 
sharply with a lack of feminine involvement in the upper echelons of the UNC proper. Of the 31 
members of the Youth National Council elected in November 1934, three were women — Yvonne 
Luzier (Les Lilas), M. A. Rocchesani (Courbevoie) and Liegeois (Sedan).872 A year later, the 
Council admitted five new members, one o f which was Yvonne Boulet who would become 
women’s propaganda delegate in the JUNC and a member of the Action feminine commission 
for the Seine group.873 Luzier was elected a vice-president of the JUNC at the general assembly 
in November 1935. Perhaps an indication o f the regard in which she was held, Luzier received 
241 votes, equal to the number received by F ran c is  Aubert and more than those received by
on  a
Pinoteau and Veysset.
In the provinces, women were involved in the youth groups as JUNC vice-presidents, 
secretaries and council members. In April 1934, the Arcachon JUNC group voted in a new 
executive committee of which seven out of the fifteen members were women.875 Upon its 
foundation in summer 1931 the Lilas group counted 5 women out of 14 members on its policy­
making committee.876 By February 1933, this group had 8 women out of 27 members of its 
executive committee. The Madelons elected by UNC sections acted as local propaganda 
activists. These women were not simply the trophy of youth sections but active participants in 
the movement. It was hoped that they would help found JUNC sections in new territory.877
While there were female vice-presidents and treasurers, women were usually responsible 
for a section’s leisure and charitable pursuits, such as soup kitchens, second-hand clothes 
collections and holiday camps, of which the UNC possessed several. Feminine sections 
organised the provision of meals for the children of the unemployed.879 Some women members
871 F. Vivie, ‘Les Jeunes’, Le Poilu basque, April 1935; Y. Boulet, ‘Notre feminisme’, La Vdc, 7 December 1935.
872 Report from the general assembly of the JUNC, La Vdc, 10 November 1934.
873 ‘Conseil National des Jeunes, 27-28 avril 1935’, La Vdc, 4 May 1935.
874‘L’Assemblee generale des Jeunes de l ’UNC’, La Vdc, 9 November 1935.
875 ‘Les Jeunes: Arcachon’, La Vdc, 21 April 1934.
876 Report from a meeting held on 17 June 1931, L ’UNC de Paris, August 1931.
87; Y. Boulet, ‘Propagande feminine. Ce que dit un ‘Madelon’ de 1935 a ses Jeunes Collegues de 1936’, La Vdc, 21 
December 1935; Y. Boulet, ‘Petite correspondance de la propagande’, 28 December 1935.
878 Referred to in La Vdc, 5 December 1936 and 17 September 1938.
879 See the report featured in La Vdc, 2 February 1935. The JUNC’s 7th section organised a meal for 80 children
whose parents were unemployed.
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did not want their role to expand beyond social work and the planning of festivities. At the 
general assembly of the departmental UNC group in the Lot-et-Garonne, Mile Magne, vice- 
president of the local JUNC, asked that female members not be encumbered with the collating of
reports. Magne stated that it would be more logical and gallant of the young men to undertake
880these tasks. However, women were not confined to these activities.
In some cases a political motive lay behind social work. Luzier, president of the 
association’s Action feminine, reminded the male members of the UNC that social work made
oo 1
for the best propaganda. Like the Croix de Feu/PSF, on occasion JUNC social work aimed to 
attract the working class from communism. In March 1935, 63 children attended a monthly meal 
organised by the Lilas JUNC group. The accompanying report on the youth page revealed the 
desired consequence:
Nous esperons que les enfants viendront toutefois plus nombreux et si comme le disait ces jours 
demiers un communiste «nos bienfaits s’airetent aux elections», eh bien, ces enfants ne 
songeront pas sans regrets a ces bienfaits de premiere necessite, et se diront lorsqu’ils auront 
Page de comprendre: «Ce ne sont pas les Communistes, qui aura offert cela, meme avec 1’argent 
de Moscou». 82
The national youth page reported the involvement of women at local meetings. Women 
spoke on political and social issues. Throughout the reports of women’s participation in JUNC 
meetings, their ability as controlled and competent speakers was reiterated. The speeches were
883noted as having been warmly applauded and appreciated. One such example was 
Rocchesani’s report at the JUNC General Assembly in November 1934. Her presentation was 
testament to “...la mesure, de la ponderation, de la clairvoyance que les femmes peuvent apporter 
dans les travaux intellectuels”.884 Furthermore, women were held as an example to follow. 
F rancis Aubert portrayed women members as more efficient and better organised than their 
male counterparts.885 Boulet wrote o f a section whose very existence depended on the incessant
880 Y. Boulet, ‘Doit-il y avoir des limites a l ’aide que nous apportions a ces “Messieurs” JUNC?’, La Vdc, 18 April
1936.
881 Y. Luzier, ‘Action feminine’, La Vdc, 26 June 1937.
882 ‘La vie des Sections de Jeunes. Region parisienne: Les Lilas’, La Vdc, 30 March 1935.
883 For example see ‘La vie des Sections de Jeunes’, La Vdc, 29 December 1934.
884 ‘L’Assemblee generale des jeunes de l ’UNC 3-4 novembre 1934 fut une belle manifestation de l ’activite’, La 
Vdc, 10 November 1934.
885 F. Aubert, ‘Le coin des secretaires’, La Vdc, 1 September 1934.
174
action of its female element, despite the presence of male members. She encouraged women 
members to found their own JUNC sections if  masculine action was lacking.886 In some cases, 
men abandoned sections that were subsequently saved and run by women.887 In March 1936, 
Mme Schmitt, wife of the JUNC national president at the time, recommended that if a woman 
could not find a man to become president o f her local group, she should act as a vice-president 
and name Raymond Schmitt as president.888 In this case, the female vice-president would 
effectively run the new section.
The Action feminine commission was successful in its action to such an extent that, at the 
JUNC’s third general assembly in November 1936, members announced that Action feminine
O O Q
was now a semi-autonomous group. This measure was intended to maximise recruitment as 
some parents did not want their daughters to join mixed sex groups.890 Raudot ordered that all 
groups must provide a delegate to the autonomous Action feminine sections.891 Some JUNC 
members were concerned with the amount o f autonomy that Action feminine demanded. Female 
members continued to encounter hostility from regional groups who refused to admit them or 
attempted to obstruct their action. As a result, at the general assembly in 1938, Action feminine 
renounced all claim to administrative and financial autonomy. Luzier blamed the attempts of 
male members to suffocate the movement. The group had achieved great success in the Somme 
and the Loire-Inferieure where local UNC presidents had encouraged its action.
Action feminine’s policy on women was conservative. Motherhood had long been a 
concern for political forces of various colours. In the late nineteenth century, groups such as the 
Alliance nationale demanded state intervention in family life. In 1916 the French state, 
concerned with the infection of women on the home front with venereal disease brought home by 
their soldier husbands, worked to construct a new national obligation: procreation. Educational 
lectures and pamphlets attempted to instill the poilu with the belief that to become a father was 
his national duty.893 Pro-natalist policies were later to be found in the programmes of diverse
Y. Boulet, ‘Petite correspondance...feminine’, La Vdc, 23 November 1935.
887 ‘L’action feminine’, La Vdc, 2 April 1938.
888 Letter from M. A. Schmitt in Y. Boulet, ‘Propagande feminine’, 7 March 1936.
889 Y. Luzier, ‘Rapport sur l ’Action Feminine’, La Vdc, 5 December 1936.
890 Y. Luzier, ‘Action feminine’, La Vdc, 26 June 1937.
891 ‘IV Assemblee Generate des JUNC, 14 mars 1937’, La Vdc, 20 March 1937.
892 ‘La reunion du Conseil National JUNC a Caen, le 25 mai 1938: Action feminine’, La Vdc, 11 June 1938.
893 Michelle Rhoades, ‘Renegotiating French masculinity: Medicine and venereal disease during the Great War’, 
French Historical Studies, 29 (2006), pp. 293-327.
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groups from the JP and the Croix de Feu to the Radical and the socialist parties.894 The pro- 
natalist campaign culminated in the Code de la Famille, drawn up by the Radicals Daladier and 
Reynaud in 1939.895
While feminists had campaigned for women’s rights since the late-nineteenth century, the 
entry of women into the workforce during the Great War did much to upset traditional gender 
norms in French society.896 After the war, the public presence of women who both continued to 
work and reject modest forms o f dress and moral behaviour antagonised conservatives.897 Faced 
with the prospect o f career-minded, sexually liberated, childless women, they feared for the 
future of the family and the falling French birth rate. In fact, groups across the political spectrum 
expressed remarkably similar concerns on the family and natalism.898 Movements on the right 
were determined to return French women to the home as wives and mothers. Confronted with 
the perceived virility of Germany and Italy and what this implied for the size o f their future 
armies, the right hoped to arrest the moral and demographic decline of the nation. Though the 
extreme right echoed these sentiments, it blamed the Republic for its failure to bring feminism to 
heel. The JUNC’s female writers such as Paulette Chailleux and vice-president of the 
Courbevoie section Rocchesani claimed to support feminism, if by feminism one meant the 
‘emancipation of the moral feminine person, her intellectual development’ and ‘her application 
to all occupations suitable to her aptitudes and duties’.899
The JUNC considered a woman’s aptitudes and duties best suited to motherhood. The 
jeunes deplored women who chose to work. It argued that the shortfall of men in the labour 
market after the war no longer existed. If a woman’s husband earned a salary sufficient for the 
family then she should be forced to give up her job.900 A working mother could not care for 
children and continue to earn.901 Women worked for selfish reasons: “ ...partir au bureau le 
matin, bien habillee, bien pomponnee, voila le reve de trop de jeunes meres”.902 These women
894 Kalman, Extreme Right, p. 135.
895 Ibid., p. 136.
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were bored with housework. Action feminine planned to combat this boredom through 
educational courses that taught housework, cookery, sewing and clothes-making. Additionally, 
hygiene and nursing courses were taught. By November 1937, the Parisian group boasted 30 
girls who had achieved the dipldmes d ’auxillaire and who then undertook work experience at a 
UNC health centre in Belleville. In this way Action feminine hoped to revive familial life and 
redress the moral situation in France.903
Youth groups were to encourage women into activities in harmony with the ‘delicateness 
of heart and morality’ that was in the ‘nature o f the woman’.904 The JUNC claimed that while 
laws granted women equal rights in the pursuit of jobs, they could not change the organic and 
physical differentiation between man and woman, which translated into a natural division of 
labour. Concomitantly, Action feminine encouraged motherhood. Woman brought life into the 
world and it was her job to care for and educate this life. If a woman aspired to the professions, 
motherhood would teach her the skills of a psychologist, a teacher and a lawyer, in the natural 
setting of the foyer.905
Like conservatives and the extreme right, the UNC perceived the family to be one of the 
basic cells of society, the cellule mere 906 UNC discourse on the family combined two 
interpretations of the family. In the main, the association considered the family as an expression 
of morality, under threat from contemporary decadence and Republican values that allegedly 
favoured materialism and individualism. This view was prevalent throughout the interwar period 
among diverse groups, even those o f the extreme right such as the Croix de Feu.
Andre Loez, who regularly examined the ‘family problem’ in the UNC’s publications, 
blamed the excesses of individualism, selfishness and free opinion, which had replaced authority 
and order. The notion o f rights was now more important than duty.907 Loez alleged that the 
death of the patrie would be the fault o f the sans-enfant.90* Action feminine accused politicians 
of ignoring the family at the expense of the next generation of French children. The group
903 Y. Luzier, ‘Action feminine: Faisons le point’, La Vdc, 27 November 1937.
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attacked ‘our demagogic politicians’ and ‘our stale democracy’ for this failure.909 Politicians 
symbolised the ills o f France and the general decline in French moral standards: “On nous a trop 
abreuves de discours pompeux et menteurs, et les mots sonores de «Devoir, Patrie, Honneur, 
probite», revenus trop souvent sur les levres de ceux qui les ignorent manifestement dans leurs 
realisations, ont perdu pour beaucoup leur signification veritable”.910 If the family could be 
‘healed’ then authority would return to France.911
Women within the JUNC demanded the right for a fair representation in State affairs.912 
Chailleux reassured male members that woman’s quest for the right to vote would not pose her 
as an enemy of the ‘sexe fort’. Rather, she would be an ally with whom to work with for just 
causes.913 The JUNC criticised the Senate for blocking the attempts of the Chamber to enfrancise 
women. Aged senators, wrote Claude Gauden, saw only two types of women: “...celles destinees 
au gynecee et celles destinees au french can-can avec dentelles et froufrous a volonte...”.914 
Gauden even suggested that if  this sexist obstruction continued then women would use the only 
weapon they had, the refusal to have children:
...nous qui assurons au pays la continuite de sa race... Que le Senat prenne garde: si la France 
voit sa natalite decroitre, si les femmes de chez nous ne veulent plus d’enfants, c’est qu’elles 
sentent obscurement qu’elles n ’ont pas d ’armes dans les mains pour se proteger, elles et leurs 
petits, contre la vie si dure, contre l ’egoi'sme si feroce des hommes.915
This was not the only time women members used their gender to underscore political 
division. Whereas the veterans denigrated politicians for their lack of war service, and the jeunes 
opposed their youth to aged deputies, Chailleux attacked the maleness of French politics:
...les hommes ont fait de la politique une science abstraite et un but plutot qu’un moyen... Les 
hommes ont permis que la politique devienne un refuge trop facile pour les arrivistes ou les 
rates... le parlementarisme s’est egare dans des dedales ou 1’eloquence verbeuse tient parfois lieu, 
a elle seule, de merite vrai, et ou dans le chapitre des realisations on ne sait plus coordonner les
909 ‘Action feminine: Sauvons l ’enfance’, La Vdc, 26 January 1935.
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efforts, les reformes, les manifestations d’autorite ni distinguer en toutes chose l’essentiel de 
l’accessoire.916
In contrast, Chailleux posed the natural qualities of women as the remedy:
Guidee par son besoin naturel de devouement, par la part intime qu’elle prend aux grandes 
souffrances, par ses elans venus du coeur -  et a cause de cela, plus puissants, plus humains que 
les idees -  elle puisera son savoir et son experience dans des faits patents, dans une faculte 
d’observation et de comprehension plus aigue que celle de l’homme.917
Nevertheless, French chefs de famille were the key to recovery. After all, the decadence 
of France had resulted from the diminishment o f patemite, patriarchat and patrimoine?x% Only 
by bringing the ‘probite ferme’ and ‘rude labeur’ of the father (and, by implication, the poilu) to 
the leadership of the nation would the chef de famille regain his rightful place and the childless 
individual be put in his.919 In October 1938, the JUNC of Beam concluded that in the event of 
war childless single and married men should be called up first and sent immediately to the 
frontline. Thoughts of family would not distract them from their duty as it would fathers. Chefs 
de famille, which the UNC believed all veterans were, would remain at home in charge of 
national defence on the home front.920
The existence of the women’s sections saw the JUNC come close to aspiring to be a 
populist movement of the extreme right. It both outlined a vision of woman’s role in a future 
France (as mothers and homemakers) and attempted to mobilise women politically in pursuit of 
this vision. Women members in the JUNC succeeded in establishing themselves within the 
wider movement. They faced opposition on the grounds of their sex yet, to some extent, they 
managed to overcome this and operate Action feminine semi-independently if only for a short 
time. Although women members encountered enmity because of their sex, they exploited the 
division between the sexes for their own ends. They blamed men for corruption in politics and 
staked their claim for the vote on the ‘natural’ qualities of woman. However, while they argued
916 P. Chailleux, ‘La Revolution feminine’, La Vdc, 6 April 1935.
917 Ibid.
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that women were essential to national recovery, not only as mothers but as political actors, the 
JUNC nevertheless promoted natalism and the return of women to the family home. The 
participation of fathers in the State would arrest the national decline. While groups on both the 
left and right championed the pronatalist cause, the JUNC placed the blame for the declining 
birth-rate on the Republic and democracy itself. In this way, it depicted the democratic regime 
as detrimental to the national interest. Combined with the UNC’s plans for state reform, Action 
feminine represented another component in the associations’ authoritarian designs.
Conclusion
One could attribute veteran discourse on age to the debate over parliamentary competence. Yet 
the UNC did not base its solution on raising the level of competence through technical and 
educational means. Its plan was to replace politicians who were ‘elderly’ in esprit and not in age 
with ‘younger’ men. Veterans would take up the reins of leadership but not as a result of an 
electoral process. The association’s politicisation of age was another factor in the UNC’s claim 
to historical legitimacy. Its attacks may have centred on the content of the regime but they also 
included the institutions o f the State too. The issue of youth allowed the UNC to define a single 
national interest and then depict elected politicians and the regime as contrary to this.
Within the UNC itself, the JUNC embodied an extreme right-wing tendency. In spite of 
the apparent entente between the more radical members of the UNC’s leadership and the extreme 
right, the association did not publicly endorse collaboration, at least until mid-1936. The JUNC 
not only encouraged its members to co-operate with the leagues but also endorsed their 
programmes too. Political intervention, it claimed, was essential. When it came to street action, 
Action combattante was not used to this end and even Lebecq admitted the failure of public 
demonstrations. Conversely, the JUNC advocated this tactic. In these ways the JUNC embodied 
an extremism that the UNC did not. That is not to say that extremist elements did not exist in the 
UNC but when it came to political activism in the main moderation won out. This was not the 
case in the JUNC.
Moreover, the plans o f the JUNC cannot be reconciled with the Republican centre. One 
can argue that the JUNC desired an end to the Third Republic as it stood in France. The 
movement derided the limited scope of the Marxist and fascist revolutions in Europe. Claiming 
that the form of the State was variable, it called for the destruction of French institutions and the
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subsequent creation o f new ones. Even if one dismisses this as hyperbole, the youth group’s 
support for the veterans’ public safety government was still incompatible with the continuation 
of the Republic. The JUNC’s authoritarianism was expressed in other ways too. Action 
feminine located the moral decline o f France and its families in the democratic system. The 
JUNC supported some form of state representation for fathers, which would not be based on the 
elective principle. Similar to the beliefs of the extreme right, sporting practice would facilitate a 
physical and moral regeneration o f France while preparing French youth for military service 
from an early age. Standing on the threshold of a new era, the anciens combattants and their 
youth groups aimed to form a new generation o f French.
The ideas of the esprit de 1930 revived with the defeat in 1940, an event that signalled to 
many the ultimate collapse o f the political system. Although eclipsed by political differences 
after 1934, the young intellectuals considered the National Revolution an opportunity to finally 
realise their programme. Eventually to be disappointed by the political reality of Petain’s 
Revolution, their ideas persisted in the Vichy regime and the resistance as both sought to 
construct a new order upon the ruins o f the old. Before the foundation of Vichy’s first official 
youth movement, the Compagnons de France, three youth groups initially operated in the
Q J  1
occupied zone, although all were soon prohibited. One of these groups was the JUNC.
921 Halls, Youth o f  Vichy France, see note, p. 267.
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Chapter Five 
The language and culture of war in UNC discourse
Viens avec les copains, bonhomme,
De Verdun, de Marne et de Somme,
Ronges de rage et de degout,
Tu n’aurais pas, jadis, pu croire,
Ce qu’on ferait de la Victoire....
C’est encore le tocsin....Debout!
Pour nous sortir de la misere,
Ce que nous ne pourrons pas faire,
Nos fils, apres nous le feront,
Fils de l’indivisible France,
Pousses par un vent d ’esperance,
Q99En avantL.Unis comme au front.
Chant pour I’UNC, by Paul Galland
The Chant pour I ’UNC is just one example of UNC discourse that made reference to the 
language and culture of the Great War. Though this tactic was not the only weapon in the 
UNC’s discursive arsenal, the culture of war appeared in a good deal of veteran rhetoric. It was 
often employed against the perceived enemies o f France, namely politicians and the left. Recent 
scholarship has investigated the culture of the Great War and its influence on millions of 
civilians and soldiers.923 For some, it continued to affect their values, ideas and language in the 
years after the Versailles peace conference, most notably in the violent politics of the European 
nations that turned to fascism or communism. In France, the lack of political violence on the 
scale of Germany and Italy has precluded historical study of the war culture in the interwar
922 P. Galland, ‘Chant pour l ’UNC, a Georges Lebecq, de Paul Galland’, Le Combattant du Centre, October 1934.
923 For a general examination o f the war culture see Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18’, Kramer, Dynamic of  
Destruction. See also John Home & Alan Kramer, ‘German ‘atrocities’ and Franco-German opinion, 1914: The 
evidence of German Soldiers’ diaries’, Journal o f  Modern History, 66 (1994), 1-33, and Becker, ‘From war to war’. 
On trench culture see Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau, Men at War 1914-1918: National Sentiment and Trench 
Journalism in France during the First World War (Oxford & Providence: Berg, 1992). For the culture amongst 
civilians see Stephane Audoin-Rouzeau, L ’enfant de I’ennemi (Paris: Aubier, 1995), Annette Becker, Oublies de la 
Grande Guerre: Humanitaire et culture de guerre 1914-1918. Populations occupies, deportes civils, prisonniers de 
guerre (Paris: Hachette litteratures, 1998) and Charles Ridel, Les embusques, (Paris: A. Colin, 2007). On the war 
culture prior to the Great War see Paul Hanebrink, ‘Transnational culture war: Christianity, nation and the Judeo- 
Bolshevik myth in Hungary, 1890-1920’, Journal o f Modern History, 80 (2008), 55-80 and David Hopkin, Yann 
Lagadec and Stephane Perreon,' ‘The experience and culture of war in the eighteenth century: The British raids on 
the Breton coast, 1758’, French Historical Studies, 31 (2008), pp. 193-229.
182
years. A notable exception is Kevin Passmore who suggests that some parts of the right 
appropriated the culture o f war and channelled it into anti-communism. Most prominent in its 
opposition of Western and Christian civilisation to Eastern or Asian barbarism, the culture of war 
remained a sub-current on the right during the twenties that waxed as the perceived threat of 
communism grew at home and abroad.924
During the years 1936-38, the influence of the war culture was particularly evident in the 
UNC’s anti-communism. On the one hand, just as the culture provided trench soldiers with a 
synthesis of contemporary scientific, religious and racial thinking, it also provided the veterans 
with new frames o f reference. They assimilated a lexicon of terminology and a system of values 
to which they sometimes reverted in their discourse. Indeed, in some ways recourse to the 
culture of war was an involuntary response at a time of real or perceived trauma. On the other 
hand, the veterans chose purposely to reference the war experience, a fact that suggests use of the 
war culture in their discourse was to some extent intentional. Frequently eulogising the 
fraternity of the trenches and its perceived nobility, the veterans contrasted the sacrifice of this 
community with the self-interest o f parliamentary political culture. The veterans deliberately 
reconstructed a tenet of the culture o f war (the trench fraternity) in order to legitimise their own 
experience and claims.925 They applied wartime language to the political arena. In doing so they 
identified parties and parliament with the enemies of France. This was not supportive of the 
Republic and its institutions. Consequently, as we will see, the UNC came to question whether 
the Republic still existed when, in reality, only the ephemeral political content of the regime had 
changed.
After the Popular Front victory, the right launched attacks on left-wing personalities that 
were unprecedented in their maliciousness.926 The UNC was no different. According to the 
association, Socialists and communists were the enemies of France and they had no place in a 
future France. Hubert Aubert implied this when he wrote in July 1937 that the UNC sought 
reconciliation “...[a]vec tous ceux qui veulent construire en eliminant ceux qui veulent
924 Passmore, The Right in the French Third Republic.
925 Historians have argued that nostalgia for the trench fraternity was largely constructed after the war. See Bessel, 
‘The ‘front generation” . Contrarily, in ‘The psychology o f killing: The combat experience of British soldiers during 
the First World War’, Journal o f  Contemporary History, 41 (2006), pp. 229-246, Edgar Jones argues that the bonds 
formed in war were too strong to be broken and so continued into peacetime.
926 Jackson, The Popular Front in France, p. 251.
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r • 927 •demolir”. Goy claimed that the UNC did not seek to exclude anyone from the national 
community yet communists would ‘have no say in the matter’ .928 The UNC named and criticised 
the deputies and policies o f the Radical party, the SFIO and the communists. A column in La 
Voix du combattant commented upon the political machinations of the past week. More often 
than not solely concerned with the disparagement of left-wing politicians and activists, the 
column vilified the ‘homme diabolique’ Leon Blum, communist chief Maurice Thorez (the ‘true’ 
leader of the CGT) and condemned Popular Front deputies as Stalin’s lieutenants and lackeys.929 
Even Blum’s wife did not escape attack: “...le plus beau jour de sa vie fut celui ou, un flacon de 
benzine a la main, elle put se depenser aupres des militants venus assister au Congres 
d’Avignon. . .” .930 The national and local editions of the UNC’s press occasionally reproduced 
anti-communist articles from political sources. For example, Le Combattant du Centre reprinted 
a speech by Doriot that originally appeared in I ’Emancipation Nationale, the weekly publication 
of the PPF.931
This chapter will investigate the culture of war in UNC discourse. It is organised 
thematically but in the later sections the period of the Popular Front government is the focal 
point around which the themes are explored. Firstly, the chapter will show that the UNC 
transposed the culture o f war from Germany to communism when the threat from the latter 
appeared greater. It is difficult to say whether this was intentional or an involuntary reaction. 
What one can say is that though the UNC feared an imminent communist revolution in France, 
the threat from Germany did not recede. Hitler continued to undermine the Versailles treaty yet 
for the UNC the threat from communism appeared greater. Secondly, the chapter concerns the 
context of the UNC’s anti-communism, which largely depended on its Rassemblement fran9 ais 
campaign (hereafter referred to as the Rassemblement). The third and fourth sections examine 
the tactics of the UNC’s anti-communism which, though most prominent in the Rassemblement, 
were used prior to 1936. In its anti-communism, the association drew on the wartime opposition 
of civilisation and barbarity. It depicted the left-wing government as un-French and un- 
Christian. In doing so, it placed the government in opposition to the UNC’s conception of the
927 H. Aubert, ‘Les yeux qui s ’ouvrent’, La Vdc, 31 July 1937.
928 ‘Reunis a la salle Wagram les anciens combattants reclament un gouvemement de salut public’, Le Figaro, 27 
March 1938.
929 ‘L’Affut’, La Vdc, 4 July 1936; J. Goy, ‘Sommes-nous encore en republique?’, La Vdc, 11 July 1936; P.
Galland, ‘Le Temps des Paradoxes: Revolutionnaires en peau de Scapin’ and ‘L’Affut’, La Vdc, 12 September 1936.
930 ‘L’Affut’, La Vdc, 6 June 1936.
931 ‘L’Assaut contre notre civilisation: Le complot communiste’, Le Combattant du Centre, June 1937.
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national interest. The association used the experience of the Spanish civil war to further 
emphasise the menace of domestic communism. The final section considers the UNC’s claim 
that the Popular Front regime was not the Republic. While it is difficult to judge the effect of 
UNC discourse on the French public, the variety of ways in which it attacked the state and its 
politicians testifies to a wider extremism that historians have underestimated in the veterans’ 
movement.
The UNC and Germany
The original target of the culture of war was Germany. During the Great War, the culture of war 
constructed the war as one fought in defence of the French race, Western civilisation and for God 
Himself.932 Internalised by civilians and soldiers alike, for some French, Germany was the 
incarnation of atavistic barbarity and evil. Hostility to Germany characterised the UNC’s foreign 
policy during the 1920s. Viewing Germany as the hereditary enemy, UNC leaders and members 
alike rejected any notion of contact with the wartime adversary from the end of the Great War 
until 1934. Instrumental to the foundation of FIDAC in November 1920, the UNC rejected 
Wilsonian ideas on peacemaking and regarded the League of Nations with suspicion. Instead, it 
sought to maintain wartime alliances. In 1925, when the UF pursued co-operation with German 
veterans’ associations, French right-wing associations including the AGMG and the UNC (and 
Goy in particular) expressed a continued hostility to Franco-German rapprochement. 
Unreceptive to Briandism throughout the twenties, the UNC eventually accepted this approach to 
foreign policy in the Confederation’s motion of June 1931, which called for the international 
organisation of world and European financial affairs.
Hitler’s gains in the elections of 1930 and the growing revanchisme in Germany appear 
to have motivated the UNC’s change of heart.933 The association was aware of Hitler’s 
aggressive pronouncements on France contained within Mein Kampf. Soon after Hitler’s 
accession to the chancellery, Galland advised members to be wary of Germany’s apparent 
pacifism. Early acts of persecution against the German Jewish population had revealed once 
again Germany’s ‘natural brutality’. Such violence, met with mute passivity from the
932 Audoin-Rouzeau and Becker, 14-18, pp. 119-120: Kramer, Dynamic o f Destruction, pp. 177-179; Smith, The 
Embattled Self, p. 18.
933 Prost, I, p. 139.
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population, underscored the continued predilection for force of France’s eastern neighbour.934 
Whipped up into a frenzy, Germans had rediscovered their ‘insolent atavism and contempt’ for
Q I C
perceived inferiors. Jean Hap of the UNC alleged that Nazis made regular incursions into the 
Saar and manhandled French inhabitants.936 Perhaps Hap wanted the reader to recall German 
mistreatment of French people in occupied territories during the war. Throughout 1933 and
1934, UNC foreign policy demanded that France remain strong in the face of German demands. 
It alleged that Germany considered France the largest obstacle to regaining her former strength. 
Persistent German declarations on Germany’s pacifist intentions, such as Hitler’s interview with 
Le Matin in 1933, did not appear to fool the association. This outward appearance of pacifism 
could not be reconciled with the chancellor’s policy of rearmament and the war footing o f
0^7twenty-one German divisions.
In spite of the caution expressed in the pages of La Voix du combattant, some veterans 
sought to open a dialogue with Hitler. On 2 November 1934, the previously staunch anti- 
German Goy and veteran luminary Robert Monnier met the German chancellor in Berlin. Otto 
Abetz had set up the conference, an invitation to which Pichot declined. He was irritated that the 
UNC was now posing as the pioneer of Franco-German rapprochement when the UF had been 
pursuing this since mid-1934. The subsequent publication of the interview in Le Matin later that 
month, in which Hitler vowed that Germany did not want war with France, caused a sensation in 
France and the combatant world. Deputy Franklin-Bouillon berated Goy in the corridors of the 
Chamber for having sold his story to the newspapers rather than discussing the meeting solely 
with the foreign minister.
In spite of an apparent softening of the UNC’s attitude, continued German infringements 
upon the Treaty of Versailles appeared to have ended any hope of rapprochement by March
1935. Aubert announced the end of the Versailles treaty and even questioned Germany’s 
justification for the expansion of its armed forces. Given the UNC’s later anti-communism, 
Aubert’s statement proved ironic:
Pour les besoins de sa cause...elle feint de croire a un peril asiatique.... Quel motif le Reich a-t-il 
de la (l’URSS) redouter? Regardez une carte et vous vous rendrez compte que l’URSS ne horde
934 P. Galland, ‘Ou sont les pacifiques ?’, La Vdc, 8 April 1933.
935 P. Galland, ‘Jeux de vilains’, La Vdc, 22 April 1933.
936 J. Hap, ‘La situation dans la Sarre: Nos nationaux sont-ils en securite ?’, La Vdc, 13 May 1933.
937 W. d’Ormedsson, ‘Grandes manoeuvres ou Congres ?’, La Vdc, 15 September 1934.
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l’Allemagne sur aucune de ses frontieres... Mais, pourquoi raisonner avec un peuple qui ne 
raisonne pas et est rompu a l’obeissance passive, qu’il a au reste dans le sang.938
In specifying a fundamental difference between the French and the Germans, the article 
revived the pseudo-biology of the culture of war: “Nos cerveaux, ni nos nerfs ne sont pas fait de 
la meme pate et c’est pourquoi nous ne comprenons pas, pourquoi nous ne pouvons pas nous 
comprendre. Et c’est bien la qu’est le peril” .939
With the victory of the Popular Front, the campaign for rapprochement with Germany 
gained new impetus. Despite the growing threat from Germany following the remilitarisation of 
the Rhineland and the agreement of the Rome-Berlin axis, the UNC came to perceive 
communism as the greater danger. Germany’s actions, in direct contradiction to Hitler’s pacifist 
assurances to French veterans, no longer incited reproving remarks. France and the Soviet Union 
were on friendly terms yet Stalin’s meddling in French domestic politics was the action o f an 
enemy.940 At this time, the UNC deployed the culture of war against communism and came to 
view German plans in the East with indifference, if  not approval. Raudot argued that if  France 
could appear militarily strong Hitler would no longer look to the West: “Une France forte et 
l’Allemagne cherchera ailleurs, vers l’Est, peut-etre, une solution a ses reves d’expansion” .941 
Aubert saw the positive side of Germany’s designs on Eastern Europe: “L’Allemagne est en 
marche vers l’Est. Et l’on repond: qu’on la fasse faire. Tant qu’elle sera occupee la, elle nous 
laissera en paix a l’Ouest” .942 The target of the war culture had now changed.
The association opposed sending Frenchmen to war in Spain. It opposed the imposition 
of sanctions on Italy over the Abyssinian crisis. It claimed that both courses of action would 
result in the loss of French lives. Regarding German intervention in the Spanish civil war, 
Galland condemned a Republican attack upon the German ship Deutschland. His view of the 
‘brutal but short’ German response was less reproachful.943 In 1937, La Voix du combattant 
featured a series of interviews on the subject of Franco-German rapprochement with Drieu La 
Rochelle, senator Henry-Hae and deputy Victor Bataille, all of whom endorsed closer co­
938 H. Aubert, ‘Nous ne pouvons pas nous comprendre’, La Vdc, 23 March 1935.
939 Ibid.
940 ‘Le XVIII Congres Nationale de l ’UNC fut une imposante manifestation de force et d’union. 2e Assemblee 
pleniere: Relations intemationales: Relations avec la Russie’, La Vdc, 26 June 1937.
941 J. Raudot, ‘L’Allemagne en Armes’, La Vdc, 23 January 1937.
942 H. Aubert, ‘La guerre est evitee, mais la paix...’, La Vdc, 24 September 1938.
943 P. Galland, ‘Coups de canon’, La Vdc, 5 June 1937.
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operation with Germany.944 At a meeting of the heads of German youth organisations and the 
JUNC in Paris in August 1937, Charles Galland stated that the biggest guarantee of peace in 
Europe would be peaceful relations between France and Germany.945 In early 1938, 25 JUNC 
members visited Munich in response to an invitation by the Hitler Youth.
As the Popular Front entered its final months, the perceived threat of communism 
receded. While Daladier dismantled labour legislation, suspicion of Germany as a threat 
returned to UNC discourse. The culture of war was used once again against Germany, the 
‘hereditary enemy’. Aubert described Germany in similar terms to the communist threat: “Le 
chef de l’Allemagne est lui-meme d’autant plus inquietant qu’il s’est fait l’apotre d ’une religion 
nouvelle ayant pour idole: l’Allemagne et pour credo: la force” .946 Issac denounced Germany 
who had shown herself to be “...comme toujours, fourbe, dominateur, cruel” .947
The association’s application of the culture of war to anti-communism may appear to 
have been an inherent reaction to the trauma of a left-wing victory and all that this would imply. 
However, the UNC deliberately detached the culture of war from Germany. Once communist 
‘barbarity’ appeared to be the greater threat, the UNC did not continue to warn against German 
inhumanity. Rather the association would accept German action in the fight against 
communism. The UNC’s willingness to let Hitler have what he wanted in the East does not 
point to an inherent fear of Germany. It suggests that the language, ideas and concepts of the 
war culture could be transposed from one foe to another.
The Rassemblement fran^ais: A civic crusade
Since the nationalist riots of 6  February 1934 and the left’s response several days later, political 
activists on the left and right had taken to the streets of France. Violent clashes resulted in injury 
and sometimes death.948 Over a thousand public ceremonies, gatherings and processions took 
place from February 1934 and May 1936. Nationalists in the Front national and the Croix de Feu 
publicly confronted the Front commun, later to become the Front populaire. To have one’s
944 ‘Le rapprochement Franco-Allemand, interview de M. Drieu-La Rochelle’, La Vdc, 3 April 1937; ‘Le 
rapprochement Franco-Allemand, interview de Henry-Hae, Senateur de Seine-et-Oise, Maire de Versailles’, La Vdc,
1 May 1937; ‘Le rapprochement Franco-Allemand, interview de Victor Bataille’, La Vdc, 15 May 1937.
945 ‘Les chefs des organisations allemandes de la Jeunesse en visite a Paris sont regus par les Jeunes de l ’UNC, 25- 
27 aout 1937’, La Vdc, 4 September 1937.
946 H. Aubert, ‘Hitler apotre de la revolution’, La Vdc, 17 September 1938.
947 H. Isaac, ‘Haut les coeurs!’, Le Combattant du Sud-Est, March 1939.
948 Tartakowsky, ‘Strategies de la rue’, p. 32.
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members in the street became more about a show of presence and strength than a protest over 
any particular policy.949 As we have seen, the UNC joined nationalist associations in this 
practice. Accepting the failure of Action combattante, the UNC turned once again to the extreme 
right as it attempted to establish an anti-communist alliance. The UNC had long opposed 
communism. During the strike of 1920, UNC leaders organised union civiques against the 
strikes.950 In 1936, opposition to strikes and factory occupations recurred in the UNC’s initial 
reaction to the Popular Front when Galland recommended a ‘good [police] raid’ on strikers as a 
solution.951 The unprecedented ferocity of UNC discourse after May 1936 distinguished its anti- 
government attacks from those of a previous period. The UNC accused the left-wing coalition of 
being in the hands of the communists. The association criticised Blum for having lost control of 
the movement, to the profit of the CGT, its president Jouhaux, and the ‘agents of Moscow’.
The UNC’s executive committee met at the end of May 1936 to discuss the new political 
situation. It decided that the French public had rejected the combatants’ programme o f civic 
action. Rival groups had hijacked the UNC’s ideas and presented them as their own. Action 
combattante had not taken root. Provincial members had failed to act on the civic action 
programme launched in the much vaunted Wagram manifesto of October 1933. Executive 
committee members decided to launch a new initiative open to all Frenchmen not just the
952anciens combattants. Unlike Action combattante, no new group would be created. The 
national congress in Pau took the decision that the new initiative would form the centre o f an 
alliance to attract all groups with French interests at heart. Ostensibly, this action was intended 
to encourage national reconciliation at a time of conflict and division in France. Yet the 
authoritarianism of the plan is revealed in its exclusion of those groups deemed to be working 
contrary to the national interest, namely the left: “...s’excluent de la famille fran9 aise ceux qui 
vont chercher leur mot d’ordre a l’etranger et preparent la ruine de la societe par l ’anarchie 
economique et la guerre civile”. While the UNC’s new programme contained policies familiar 
to the UNC’s past civic action projects, such as the protection of veterans’ material rights, 
benefits and demands for state reform, anti-communism came to dominate not only the agenda of 
the conference but the UNC’s action throughout the following two years.
949 Ibid., p. 55.
950 Prost, I, p. 74.
951 P. Galland, ‘L’epuration necessaire’, La Vdc, 4 July 1936.
952 UNC/EC, 28 May 1936.
953 Notice, ‘L’Union Nationale des Combattants opere le Rassemblement fran?ais’, La Vdc, 24 October 1936.
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The Rassemblement would provide a platform from which the UNC could launch its 
action to ‘prevent the triumph of Asian barbarism’ .954 In July 1936, 6000 veterans attended a 
meeting in the Salle Wagram that officially launched the anti-communist campaign. The orators 
at this meeting - Goy, Lebecq and vice-president Alexis Thomas -  left attendees under no 
illusion that the Rassemblement was an anti-communist initiative. Lebecq warned that many 
French organisations and newspapers were in the pay of the Comintern. Goy stated that the 
executive committee, the policy-making committee and the national congress had all decided it 
was time to take action beyond the scope of veterans’ rights. The UNC would no longer 
languish in political neutrality.955
Like Action combattante, the UNC held meetings across France to promote the 
Rassemblement. As well as small-scale political meetings, Lebecq urged members to spread 
anti-revolutionary propaganda through large manifestations.956 His opinion that street action was 
an ineffective exercise had apparently changed. On one occasion a meeting of the 
Rassemblement closely resembled the organisation and logistical arrangements of La Rocque’s 
movement. The meeting took place in the Drome in September 1936. La Voix du combattant 
claimed that the Popular Front had tried to ban the gathering. As a result, a field was found at 
short notice near Malissart, four kilometres from Valence. The decision to hold the meeting 
there was kept secret until midday. At this time, members of the UNC and associated groups 
were notified. One thousand vehicles were reported to have descended upon Malissart so 
quickly that the meeting was able to begin at 3.30pm. Goy and Isaac both addressed the crowd. 
In response to vociferous demands from the crowd, Vallat gave an impromptu speech against the
q cn
‘Muscovite extremists’ who had attempted to ban the meeting.
Upon the devaluation of the Franc in September 1936, the UNC expanded its attacks on 
communism to include the Popular Front as a whole. Goy warned that the Popular Front stood 
for ‘revolution, bankruptcy and war’ .958 He instructed all departmental sections to establish
954 A. Albaret, ‘L’Espagne ruinee: Ruines materielles et mines spirituelles’, La Vdc, 6 February 1937.
955 ‘Au Meeting de Wagram organise par l ’UNC, le rassemblement des Fran9ais est reclame par tous: Discours de 
Jean Goy’, La Vdc, 25 July 1936.
956 ‘Au Meeting de Wagram organise par l ’UNC, le rassemblement des Fran9ais est reclame par tous: Discours de 
Georges Lebecq’, La Vdc, 25 July 1936.
957 Meeting report, ‘Le Rassemblement fran9ais: Le triomphal meeting de la Drome’, La Vdc, 12 September 1936. 
Compare this to the tactics of the Croix de Feu as described in Passmore, From Liberalism, p. 232 and Tartakowsky, 
‘Strategies de la me’, p. 40.
958 J. Goy, ‘Le Front populaire vient de commettre sa premiere escroquerie!’, La Vdc, 3 October 1936.
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relations with groups on the left and right in the offensive against Moscow. For the first time, 
formal links with political groups, namely the Radical party, the PSF, the JP and the PPF, were 
openly encouraged rather than merely tacitly endorsed.959 This message was understood 
throughout the movement. As we saw in chapter three, certain anciens and jeunes sections 
looked for co-operation with the extreme right. This continued under the Rassemblement, 
whether with ex-leaguers or the Front de la Liberte.960 In July 1936, Colonel Sarrochi, president 
of the UNC’s Nimes section, expressed his approval of the alliance against communism even if 
this meant having allies in political groups:
...la France... repousse la tutelle des meteques et des mauvais prophetes....Il m ’est infmiment 
agreables de voir autour de nous de nombreux patriotes, de bons Fran9 ais qui, quelles que soient 
leurs aspirations politiques, quelles que soient leurs convictions religieuses, sont aujourd’hui unis 
dans un meme et noble sentiment: le culte de la Patrie.961
Rassemblement meetings united groups on the right and the extreme right. In February 
1937, under the auspices of the UNC section of the ninth arrondissement, representatives o f the 
Rassemblement Populaire Fran9 ais, the AF, the PSF, the Ligue des Chefs de Sections, the PRNS 
and the Association Catholique des peres de famille met. Anti-communist diatribes tinged with 
anti-Semitism were delivered. Lebecq drew on the themes of the war culture in his speech: “La 
doctrine du Parti Communiste est la negation de tout ce qui nous est cher. Nous n ’avons pas 
besoin de la civilisation communiste qui est plutot une barbarie... Le communisme est la 
negation de toute patrie... Les communistes s’arment” .962 The UNC continued to co-operate with 
La Rocque’s movement, although both groups maintained their independence. The UNC and 
PSF agreed to promote local ententes whose mission it would be to denounce the action of
959 The following groups expressed their support for the Rassemblement fran?ais: the Parti Nationale, the PSF, the 
FR, the Parti democrate populaire, the Parti populaire, the Parti socialiste de France, the Groupement des radicaux 
independants, the Parti republicain radical et radical-socialiste, the AGMG Paris, the Association des officiers 
combattants, Taittinger’s Parti republicain national et social, the Ligue des Patriotes and the Comite d’entente des 
grandes Associations pour l’Essor National. The following newspapers also expressed their support: La Republique, 
Le Jour, L ’Ami du Peuple, L ’Echo de Paris, Le Petit Parisien, Le Temps, L ’Action Frangaise, L ’Intransigeant, Le 
Matin, Le Figaro, Le Journal, Paris-Soir, L ’Ere Nouvelle, and Les Debats. This list was published in L ’Action 
Combattante: Organe de la Section de I’UNC de Bures-sur-Yvette, Gometz-le-Chatel et Gometz-la-Ville et de la 
Societe de Secours Mutuels de I’UNC, (Seine-et-Oise), January 1937.
960 Gyde, ‘Rassemblement de toutes les bonnes volontes !’, EntreNous, December 1936.; FM, 19 940 500: 229, 
document dated 20 June 1937.
961 ‘Pour protester contre le drapeau rouge: Un meeting a Nimes’, La Vdc, 11 July 1936.
962 AN F7 12966, ‘Reunion dite de “Rassemblement ffanfais” organisee par les groupements nationaux du Ixe 
arrondissement, Salle du Petit Journal, 21 rue Cadet, le 25 fevrier’, 26 February 1937.
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Moscow’s agents. They would also ‘disarm’ insurgents in order to prevent bolshevisation. Le 
Flambeau reported that the agreement established the principle of co-operation in the groups’ 
relations, a course of action long recommended by La Rocque.963 Co-operation stretched as far as 
electoral agreements. In 1937, Goy ran for election in Falaise. Faced with competition from a 
PSF candidate, La Rocque agreed to withdraw his party’s nominee. PSF members were asked to 
vote in favour of Goy .964
Led from Paris, the Rassemblement found support among provincial veterans. As early 
as February 1936, Emile Lacquieze, a member of the UNC’s executive committee and secretary 
general of the south western group, reported on the provincial desire for action. He indicated 
that the members with whom he had regular contact wanted the UNC to go further than the 
decisions taken at the Metz congress in May 1934.965 While one must rely on La Voix du 
combattant for instances o f support for the Rassemblement, one should not dismiss them as 
fabrications. The newspaper reported that several provincial groups were reluctant to support the 
campaign. It did not claim that enthusiasm was widespread among provincial sections. This 
apparent transparency surrounding issues of consent lends weight to the argument that reports 
supportive of the central UNC’s plans were authentic.
A meeting of the Poitevin group attended by 1500 members issued an ordre du jour  that 
approved the plan .966 A meeting in Lyon o f 2500 members who represented 70 sections agreed 
that the UNC should aid all groups in favour o f order against bolshevism.967 In December 1936, 
the Vaucluse group also lent its support to the national leadership. Even where groups 
expressed reservations, these concerned the lack of consultation with provincial groups rather 
than the principle of the programme itself. A meeting of 28 section presidents and one youth 
section in the Calais region chastised the Parisian leadership for its lack of clarity in the launch 
of the Rassemblement. Nevertheless, a vote of confidence was passed unanimously.969 The 
groups of the Bas- and Haut-Rhin approved the initiative but those of the Marne, Saone-et-Loire,
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964 ‘Precisions’, La Vdc, 24 April 1937.
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Indre-et-Loire and Berry did not.970 Dissenters in this region did not challenge the purpose of the 
Rassemblement. The president o f the Berry group and four others were reported to have simply 
preferred to follow an action independent of the UNC .971 Expressions o f support came from the 
general assembly o f the Ille-et-Vilaine group, the departmental group o f the Sarthe, a meeting of 
2500 members in Nancy, the Ardeche group, the Limoges group and the 17th departmental 
congress of the Maine-et-Loire which spoke for 282 sections and 30 JUNC groups.972
Goy intended the JUNC to be the ‘apostles’ of the new Rassemblement.973 Like its parent 
organisation, the JUNC was unequivocal in its opposition to communism .974 Even before the 
election of the Popular Front, the youth movement confronted communism on a local level. At a 
meeting on 6  January 1935, the Angevillers youth section decided to fight the Front commun by 
‘all means available’ .975 The national JUNC threw its weight behind the ‘rassemblement 
antirevolutionnaire’. The Jeunes du Nord linked the success of the Rassemblement to the very 
success of the JUNC itself.976
Though some members were willing to back the Rassemblement, the new campaign once 
again revealed the diversity o f opinion in the UNC’s leadership and membership. Goudaert 
expressed concern that in the Nord any campaign against the Popular Front would alienate the 
10, 000 socialists and communists in his group. He feared that the association may lose a third 
of its members.977 Conversely, UNC section president Morizot wholly backed a political 
campaign against communism. He was prepared to accept a ‘thinning out’ of the UNC’s ranks
O70
as long as those who were ‘to march’ remained committed to the cause. In January 1937, the 
executive committee met for the first time since the launch of the Rassemblement. Though Goy 
stated that each day the initiative was making progress this was not without difficulties. In some
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departments there had been strong reactions against the idea. Some members of the committee 
were not pleased with the PSF’s role in the alliance.979 In May, the leadership decided that the 
Rassemblement would become a ‘campaign of ideas’ rather than a political action. Maillard 
demanded that the UNC renounce all politics and concentrate solely on the veterans’ material 
demands. He said that the Rassemblement had failed because it had divided provincial groups. 
Rossignol disagreed. The former UNC president alleged that certain members had undermined 
the campaign from the start.980 As in the past, the moderates and activists came into conflict over 
the meaning of the UNC’s civic action.
In spite of opposition, the Rassemblement demonstrates that the UNC continued to 
pursue political intervention. It was not an association like Action combattante and so did not 
compete with other nationalist forces. The Rassemblement was intended to be an anti­
communist alliance o f national groups against the left. However, the UNC’s rejection of 
political participation meant that it could not be an electoral alliance. It aimed to form local 
ententes against communist action that would attract support from the veterans’ movement and 
beyond. One may speculate that come election time these ententes would work for the good of 
‘national parties’. Yet, as we will see, the UNC’s fear of communist revolution suggested that 
these groups would perhaps have a violent function in the event of a communist coup.
Undeclared war, covert occupation
By October 1936, the UNC claimed that its members were more anxious about the future of 
France than at Verdun in 1916.981 To some extent the battle was already lost. The election of the 
left was tantamount to revolution or ‘something that closely resemble[d] it’ .982 The association 
had previously warned o f the soviet threat. In February 1935, La Voix du combattant reported 
that a preliminary invasion had already been set in place. Spanish revolutionaries had infiltrated 
southern France while German insurgents were scattered throughout the north and centre of the 
country. When the call o f the left finally came to machine-gun French patriots, these forces
983would take to the urban boulevards.
979 UNC/EC, 16 January 1937.
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The UNC depicted the campaign against communism as a conflict between civilisation 
and barbarity. Yet while the veterans sought to exclude communists from humanity, they were 
also concerned with denying them membership of the national community. The veterans 
considered themselves the ultimate expression of the French national interest and they denied the 
left this quality. Indeed, the UNC drew on the war experience to frame the Popular Front as 
contrary to the national interest. It levelled the charge of embusquage at left-wing deputies in 
order to compare the left with wartime shirkers and confirm their anti-national sentiment. In 
August 1936, La Voix du combattant published a cartoon that pictured a physically disabled 
veteran opposite the communists Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. In response to the latter’s 
pronouncement on the need for a ‘French front’ to bring liberty to France, the veteran replies: 
“Et vous n’etiez pas la, en 1914, pour nous l ’apprendre!” .984 In December 1938, in reference to 
Jouhaux’s decision to call a strike, Galland compared the CGT chiefs actions to that o f an army 
commander who was willing to give the order to advance into battle but who was himself 
unwilling to join in the attack . 985 In November 1938, Galland congratulated the Daladier 
government for its firm stance in the face o f a failed general strike. He compared the premier’s 
action to tossing grenades back into the enemy trench.986 During the war, the right had 
condemned factory workers and ‘CGT shirkers’ who were allegedly sheltered from the danger of 
the front and paid handsomely for the privilege.987 Embuscomanie appeared again when in 
January 1938, Raudot raised the issue o f industrial wages. Comparing the low wage of a soldier 
to that of a factory worker who worked only forty hours per week, Raudot condemned the CGT 
and the government for this abusive discrepancy.988 Worse still, the UNC reported that some 
veterans were refused work because they were not members of the CGT.989
Another component o f the UNC’s campaign was its portrayal of the government as a 
foreign power in occupation. In evermore alarmist tones, the UNC continually stated that France 
was on the verge of, or had already undergone, sovietisation. In July 1936, the UNC declared 
that the French Republic was ceding ground little by little to a Republic of Soviets.990 Three
984 Cartoon on page one, ‘La le9on de patriotisme’, La Vdc, 22 August 1936.
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months later, the association depicted the new government as a de facto  soviet regime: “La 
France n’est plus la France. C ’est un pays sovietise” .991 The UNC made reference to the fact that 
the communists under the orders o f Stalin in Moscow were the ones really running the 
government: “Le parti communiste «fran9 ais» ne fait pas appel a l ’etranger, il est l’etranger lui- 
meme, installe en France. Cree par Moscou, sa seule raison d’etre est de bien servir Moscou” .992 
Communist party members were instruments in the hands of the enemies of the patrie. The 
Popular Front had duped the workers into wasting their votes.993 The ‘occupation’ sprang from a 
covert ‘invasion’ that had been threatened for years. This invasion, although less brutal than the 
German one over twenty years ago, was just as serious.994 Moscow thus controlled every action 
of the government.995 The provincial Le Combattant du Centre expressed the same opinion:
C’est justement de cette Russie releguee au banc des nations civilisees, que la France trahie et 
vendue par ses dirigeants, subit elle-meme l’Esclavage... a l’heure actuelle, c’est Moscou qui 
regne a Paris. La France des ancetres, celle de 1914, cette France heritiere de toutes les vertus 
civiques et nationales n ’existe plus. La defense de nos ffontieres est une leurre. La ligne 
Maginot ne peut arreter notre ennemi le plus achame et le plus cruel. II est deja chez nous. C’est 
lui qui gouveme, commande, execute. La haute finance juive intemationale et bolchevique a 
conquis le peuple de France par le mensonge et le poison moral.996
A symptom of the alleged soviet occupation was the perceived communist usurpation of 
French culture and its national symbols, especially the tricolore and the Marseillaise. At this 
time, both left and right fought for the right to claim national rhetoric and symbols for 
themselves. With the inclusion of the Radical party in July 1935, the Popular Front moved from 
being a worker’s movement to become one of republican defence. To this end, the left sought to 
re-appropriate French national symbols from the right. The right reacted to this challenge and 
ridiculed the left’s new-found patriotism. It alleged that the number of foreigners and Jews in 
government meant that the Popular Front was a threat to French security. The PSF and PPF
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argued that the government o f France would only be truly national once these foreign elements 
were removed.997
The veterans dearly prized national icons. Patay, for example, declared his ‘quasi­
religious’ respect for the national anthem .998 The tricolore was of especial importance. It 
represented the interest o f the national elements against those of perceived anti-national forces. 
After the riots of February 1934, Lebecq demanded that Frot make the only gesture of contrition 
worthy of his crime: to kneel before the national flag on the Place de la Concorde.999 Three years 
later, Lebecq urged UNC members and French citizens to fly proudly the French flag and never 
to accept the ‘red rag o f the International’ as the national emblem. The UNC had long expressed 
outrage at communist attempts to replace French national symbols and ceremonies. In December 
1933, Lebecq condemned the communist commemoration of the armistice the previous month. 
He claimed that under the protection o f the municipal police, men, women and children sang the 
Internationale and shouted ‘A bas la guerre!’ and ‘A bas l’armee!’. Police allegedly beat two 
youths who dared to protest. To Lebecq, it appeared that the cry of ‘Vive la France!’ had 
become seditious. 1000 On the occasion o f the inauguration of a war memorial in June 1934, the 
UNC decried the government’s decision to allow two ceremonies to take place. The official 
ceremony comprised the songs and symbols of France: patriotic speeches, the Marseillaise and 
the tricolore. The alternative ceremony, attended by the veterans of ARAC, witnessed 
incendiary speeches, the singing o f the Internationale and took place under the flag of the Soviet 
Union. 1001
Once the Popular Front entered government, the perceived affront to French national 
symbols intensified. The veterans were outraged that the forces of order allowed communist 
offences to go unpunished while the right was hounded and the members of the leagues arrested. 
In July 1936, Aubert reported an incident in which three coal deliverymen attacked a veteran for 
wearing a tricolore cockade. When the veteran in question reported the incident, police 
responded that they could take no action. Aubert cited this incident as proof of the subversion of
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the police force. 1002 UNC activist Henri Roure decried the ‘red flags, sickles, hammers, three 
arrows and revolutionary songs’ o f the left. 1003 On Armistice Day 1938, Gaston Maillefert, 
president of the cantonal UNC group at Chalindrey paraded with his comrades through the 
streets of the town. Upon seeing a red flag flying from the salle de fe tes , a municipal building, 
he climbed up, tore the flag down and burned it with his fellow veterans. He was duly 
arrested. 1004 The police reportedly treated French ‘patriots’ who dared to display any symbols of 
nationalism as criminals and punished such offences with arrest or a beating. 1005 La Voix du 
combattant recounted an incident in Paris that led it to question the motives of the police:
...nous avons particulierement souffert moralement de voir se derouler dans les rues de la 
capitale des corteges precedes du drapeau rouge ome de la faucille et du marteau. Dimanche 
dernier, la police parisienne faisait la guerre aux automobilistes, qui sur le cote de leur voiture, 
avait pose un petit drapeau tricolore. Est-ce done un crime d’arborer les couleurs nationales? 1006
In keeping with the UNC’s depiction o f the anti-national nature of the Popular Front, 
diatribes against the government usually made reference to the influence of foreign elements in 
France. During the 1920s, though some extremists practised an intransigent racism, the relative 
prosperity of France and the shortfall in male labour encouraged tolerance toward the etranger. 
Foreigners became the target o f violent xenophobic campaigns in the thirties. Xenophobia was 
by no means unique to the UNC . 1007 Concern for French jobs after the onset of the Depression 
and an increase in immigration from Germany fed fear of ‘foreign’ invaders who would take 
French jobs and subvert traditional French values. Scare stories abounded about the 
disappearance of the French race and the pollution of national blood by freeloading etrangers. 
This sentiment suffused diverse sections o f the political establishment. The extreme right was 
most virulent but parties o f the left and centre also succumbed. In May 1938, the Radical 
government introduced legislation that compelled foreigners to obtain identity cards, restricted
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their right to work and withdrew their right to vote. 1008 In November, a decree increased the 
number of offences for which foreigners could be deported. 1009
In some measure, the UNC’s xenophobia stemmed from the economic crisis. UNC 
polemics accused foreigners o f taking French jobs while millions of Frenchmen, many of them 
veterans, remained unemployed. Concern at foreign workers in French industry stretched back 
at least as far as the war, when Russians and Poles were singled out as foreign embusques.101° 
Veteran Georges Heldet argued that the poilus had not fought for four years to lose their jobs to 
foreigners. 1011 The association supported a bill to exclude foreign labour from public works. 
When this bill was defeated, the newspaper printed the names of all 328 deputies who had voted 
against the proposal. 1012 Moreover, immigration was nurturing corruption in communist 
controlled suburbs: “...des «indesirables» que l ’on retrouve trop souvent meles a certaines 
affaires louches, a tels ou tels coups durs dans la banlieue rouge, a telles ou telles campagnes 
d’agitation politique ou syndicaliste . . . ” . 1013
Xenophobia also drew on the culture o f war. Anxiety revived over the threat that 
foreigners posed to the physical and metaphorical health of the French race. In 1938, Loez 
expressed concern for the effects o f unrestricted immigration: “L’invasion etrangere -  brutale ou 
pacifique -  aura beau jeu. II n ’y aura plus de France parce qu’il n’y aura plus de Fran9 ais” . 1014 
In August 1936, Berthau combined the fear o f the invasion of the workplace with that o f the 
body. He compared French reliance on foreign labour to a blood transfusion. Berthau demanded 
that undesirable immigrants be denied the right to naturalisation. ‘Healthy’ immigrants were 
fathers with families abroad or foreign women who married Frenchmen. 1015 His exclusion of 
single men reveals a deeper concern that male immigrants should not have access to 
Frenchwomen. The UNC considered the foetus of a Frenchman and his foreign wife to be 
French while the foetus o f a Frenchwoman and her foreign husband was not. During wartime, 
arguments for the right to abort these illegitimate foetuses played on the fear that the ‘children of
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the barbarian’ would become the ‘enemy within’, a fear that continued into peacetime. 1016 The 
situation would be dire indeed if, in women, foreign foetuses developed in French wombs, while 
in men foreign cancers ate away French bodies. 1017 Laferriere, president of the Limoges group, 
supported Berthau. Limitations alone would preserve the national and ethnic substance of the 
French race . 1018 Activists urged youth members to have children soon and thus banish the 
meteques from France. 1019 D ’Hennezel described the communists as part of the Anti-France. His 
town, he claimed, like many others in France, suffered under the tyranny of the Internationale. 
This situation led him to conclude that the primary aim was to defend the homeland that was 
under threat from France’s interior enemies. 1020 In 1939, the JUNC released a statement outlining 
the four steps to a ‘France fran9 aise’. Among its points, it detailed the need for the dissolution of 
the communist party and the expulsion o f all undesirable foreigners and meteques.1021
The UNC employed the vocabulary of pathology to describe the threat from both 
foreigners and communism. France’s poor health was attributed to a foreign threat: “Des 
microbes sans nombre travaillent notre corps national et social. Les plus virulents ont ete
1099importes de l’exterieur”. Isaac warned against the perils of allowing the ‘Bolshevik virus’ to 
survive in France while Galland demanded that the police prevent Bolshevik meteques from 
spreading their ‘cholera’ . 1023 Andre Vital, writing in L ’UNC de Paris, laid the blame for the 
crisis squarely at the feet o f foreigners in France. Despite the fact that foreigners allegedly 
insulted French traditions and spat on the French flag, the government continued to allow the 
carriers of ‘physically and morally morbid germs’ to poison the French race. French hospitals, 
‘cluttered with the dregs o f humanity’, proved this fact. 1024
At the time, xenophobic attacks on the Popular Front often went hand-in-hand with anti- 
Semitism. Since the 1880s, extreme right-wing groups, authors and intellectuals such as 
Edouard Drumont had denounced the deleterious presence of Jews in France. The flawed
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conviction of Jewish army captain Alfred Dreyfus deeply divided France. Dreyfusards furiously 
criticised the establishment and the army’s cover-up. Anti-dreyfusards argued that nothing, least 
of all an inconvenient truth, should be allowed to compromise the standing of the army. The 
Dreyfus Affair convinced the anti-dreyfusard right at least of a Jewish plot against the nation. 
Right-wing thinkers such as La Tour du Pin and Barres denied Jews the right to be French. From 
the turn of the century, the AF and the Ligue des Patriotes regularly protested against the 
residence of Jews and foreigners in France.
In the first decade after the war, the AF and the Faisceau kept the torch o f anti-Semitism 
burning. During the 1930s anti-Semitism spanned the whole political spectrum. Various 
nationalist leagues took up the crusade to save France from Jewish influence. Extreme right- 
wing personalities and newspapers enjoyed great success with little censure from 
contemporaries. 1025 On the left, the CGT protested against the influx of German Jewish refugees 
and the effect this would have on the French job market. Faure of the socialist party complained 
that Jews wanted war with Hitler to protect their families in Germany. 1026 The victory of 
France’s first Jewish prime minister in May 1936 reignited anti-Semitism as never before. Jews 
had long been associated with Marxism and the left in anti-Semitic propaganda. 1027 They had 
founded communism and sought to bring the entire world under their authority.
Anti-Semitism was not widespread in UNC publications. It was most prominent in the 
provincial newspaper Le Combattant du Centre, due in large measure to the consistently 
venomous editorials o f group president de Cromieres. De Cromieres saw the hands of many 
anti-French conspirators in the crisis o f the thirties. Though the Jew was by far the greatest 
threat to France, Russian communists and even the co-founder of the UNC, Clemenceau, were 
not spared his vitriol. He accused Pere la victoire of aiding England’s international designs at 
the Versailles conference. 1028 His anti-Semitism was based on race. A Jew’s physical 
appearance marked him out as a barbarian: “Leurs peaux huileuses, la forme de leurs nez et de 
leurs machoires, leur regard, leur odeur, le profil de leurs epaules, les font reconnaitre comme
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Barbaras. . . ” . 1029 Consequently, he rejected the notion of assimilation. Whether M. Blum 
changed his name to M. Fleur, or M. Levy became M. Lefevre, he would remain a Jew . 1030 De 
Cromieres contended that the Popular Front ‘Government of Jews’ was conspiring with the 
embusques o f the last war and the organisers of the next to bring about the destruction of 
France. 1031 The men o f the ‘Jewish Front’ in alliance with bolshevism would feed on the blood 
of Frenchmen. 1032 The communist takeover o f France was a fine victory for the Jew: “Cette 
methode de conquete et d ’absorption d ’un pays, sans aucun risque ni peril, par la seule action du 
Marxisme, est un beau triomphe pour le Semite.... il vise, par ses esclaves bolchevistes, tous les 
biens mobiliers et immobiliers. . . ” . 1033
Anti-Semitism in the UNC was not confined to Le Combattant du Centre. The JUNC in 
Somain denounced the Popular Front government as being in the pay of Jews. 1034 In March 1938, 
in his editorial for La Voix du combattant, Aubert questioned the proportion of Jews in 
government:
Je n’ai jamais ete et ne suis pas antisemite. J ’appartiens, en effet, a une race qui ne redoute pas 
les Juifs et fait, au contraire, bon commerce avec eux. Mais lorsque, dans un gouvemement de 
36 membres, je  vois six israelites en place, j ’estime qu’il y a une exaggeration. 1035
In May 1939, L ’UNC de Normandie published a report from a local congress at which Jean Goy, 
then UNC national president, attended. The congress demanded a public safety administration to 
put an end to the governmental merry-go-round behind which hid the forces of Freemasonry and 
international Jewry . 1036
Family policy provided another means by which to attack communism. The association 
accused the extreme left o f prising women away from the family home and into the workforce. 
This made women too physically and mentally exhausted to attend to children or housework. 
The labour legislation in the Matignon accords and the CGT further degraded the position of the 
family: “Ainsi, peu a peu, a travail egal, les niveaux de vie s’egaliseraient entre la famille
1029 G. de Cromieres, ‘On va voler nos noms’, Le Combattant du Centre, December 1937.
1030 Ibid.
1031 G. de Cromieres, ‘Le vrai complot’, Le Combattant du Centre, April 1938.
1032 G. de Cromieres, ‘Et la France !’, Le Combattant du Centre, July 1938.
1033 G. de Cromieres, ‘La France juive’, Le Combattant du Centre, September 1938.
1034 ‘La juiverie intemationale declare...’, Entre Nous, May 1937.
1035 H. Aubert, ‘Dedans et Dehors’, La Vdc, 19 March 1938.
1036 ‘Textes des Rapports et des Voeux, Elbeuf-sur-Seine, 11 juin 1939’, L ’UNC de Normandie, May 1939.
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nombreuse et le celibataire” . 1037 Loez offered the family as the only remedy to the communism 
in charge of France. 1038 He accused Thorez of encouraging pro-natalism in order to provide 
cannon fodder for the Soviet Union. In 1937, La Voix du combattant declared that the Marxist 
danger aimed to destroy the family and draw even more women from the foyer and into the 
workforce. 1039 Communists and socialists craved feminine liberation and sexual equality “...pour 
pouvoir les immatriculer (les deux sexes) sans distinction de valeur ou de sexe” . 1040
The UNC attacked the left-wing government on several fronts. Blum’s administration 
was compared to the German wartime adversary. It was a foreign power, under the influence of 
subversive foreign elements, Jews and directed from Moscow. The ‘evidence’ for this lay in the 
replacement of French national symbols, the presence of foreigners and Jews in the country and 
the destruction of the French family. The association’s discourse at this time revealed an 
authoritarianism that pitted a single national interest, embodied in the veterans and the right, 
against the anti-national forces o f the left, expressly communists, socialists, foreigners and Jews. 
Yet the association’s attacks went deeper than a critique of the government. The UNC 
associated the change o f government in May 1936 with a change of regime. The ‘Republic of 
Soviets’ had replaced the Third Republic. It had come to power illegally, either through foreign 
influence, ‘invasion’ or electoral dupery. O f course, this was not the case. The fact that the 
association no longer recognised the true French Republic in a France governed by the left would 
see the UNC cast doubt upon the legitimacy o f the regime itself.
The anti-communist crusade
As shown above, the UNC used a variety o f tactics to undermine the French identity of 
the communist foe. The association also denied the human quality o f the left. It linked France 
with Western and human civilisation. Similarly, the culture of war mobilised local and national 
energies to foster the belief that the Great War was a struggle between civilisation and barbarity. 
The war effort thus became a moral crusade to ‘exterminate’ the uncivilised enemy, believed to 
be inhuman and a bestial monster incapable of civilisation. 1041 Soldiers believed that they were
1037 Langlois, ‘Allocations familiales’, La Vdc, 26 June 1937.
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fighting for God in a holy war. 1042 The enemy was thus a godless barbarian. Atrocities against 
religious symbols, such as the clergy or churches, reinforced this belief. 1043
In February 1938, for example, the jeunes and anciens sections o f the UNC met to 
discuss ‘La Civilisation en Peril’. Charles Galland summed up French superiority: “Defendre la 
civilisation, pour nous cela revient a defendre la France: c’est la meme chose.” He noted “...que 
la civilisation fran9 aise, heritiere privilegiee de la double tradition antique et chretienne, est la 
civilisation par excellence... l ’histoire de France, c’est un magnifique raccourci du progres de 
l’Humanite.” 1044 Conversely, the association attempted to deny the communists any claim to 
humanity, much as the German soldier had been denied this quality during the Great War. De 
Cromieres alleged that the forces o f international Jewish finance were attempting to impose vile 
Russian bestiality upon France . 1045
The war culture connected civilisation and spirituality. It made use of religious language 
and themes to emphasise further the humanity (or inhumanity) of protagonists and thus help to 
define the threat to both the nation and the West. 1046 This tactic was common in UNC discourse. 
Doubtless the threat to Christian civilisation seemed real for the numerous Catholics in the 
leadership of the UNC. For more pragmatic members, religious rhetoric was an expedient 
medium. In July 1935, for example, Goy, a man who ‘owed nothing to the Catholic tradition’, 
emphasised the fundamental difference between the ‘Christian and Latin soul’ of the French and 
that of the Germans. 1047 Furthermore, in January 1937, he presided over a conference that united 
Catholics, Protestants and Jews to discuss Bolshevism’s attack on spirituality. 1048 For men such 
as Goy, the appeal to a common spiritual identity facilitated the construction of a unifying moral 
and national interest for France.
The threat to French spirituality was not confined to Catholicism. In January 1937, the 
UNC and the Union Patriotique des Fran9 ais israelites, convened a conference, attended by 8000 
people, entitled “La civilisation fran9 aise: Le materialisme bolchevique contre la spiritualite” . 1049
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The meeting aimed to form a spiritual union of Frenchmen against communism. Speakers linked 
the struggle for the survival o f French civilisation with the anti-religious tactics of the extreme 
left, which included: “...perfection de la propagande des sans-Dieu qui s’emploie a capter 
l’homme depuis le bapteme rouge jusqu’a l’incineration...Le but reste le meme: attirer les 
travailleurs d’abord; les dechristianiser ensuite” . 1050 Pastor Wautier d’Aygallier claimed that 
there was an absolute opposition between Christianity and Bolshevism that allied ‘the barbarism 
of the Asian mind to the troubled soul of the Tartar’ . 1051 The ordre du jour  of the meeting 
warned of the anti-religious activity o f communist agents. It called on France’s ‘great spiritual 
families’ to combat the ‘rising forces of this barbarism’ .1052 Furthermore, a speaker at the 
meeting, Father Ferrand, linked the wartime experience to the present battle. Recalling the union 
of the trenches, he called for a new union: “...le RP Ferrand fait appel a l’union realisee dans la 
tranchee pour cette nouvelle bataille contre la barbarie qui nous menace” . 1053 Veteran Edmond 
Bloch expressed the same opinion: “Nous menons ici... la meme bataille qu’en 1914-1918. 
Combien d’entre nous partis mecreants, ont rencontre Dieu sur le champs de bataille!” . 1054 The 
communist, as a godless barbarian, replaced the Boche in his opposition to French civilisation. 
While the UNC denied communists the claim to spirituality, the association also depicted 
communism as a false religion. Galland denounced those Frenchmen for whom Stalin was a 
god, Cachin his prophet, Thorez an apostle and L ’Humanite a theology. Followers of 
communism read the holy texts o f Moscow with their morning coffee and dreamt each night of a 
red heaven.1055 Aubert described Stalin as the supreme leader of a new religion. His acolytes 
were Russian before being French . 1056
The campaign to deny the enemy a place in human civilisation demanded proof of 
depravity. Within the culture o f war, atrocity propaganda served a dual purpose. It presented 
further evidence of the enemy’s inhumanity as the victims of alleged atrocities were usually the 
most vulnerable: women, children and the infirm. Stories of atrocities consequently provided a 
means by which to re-legitimise the crusade. The UNC reported communist violence against its 
members and these acts served the same function as wartime atrocities. Reports depicted
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communists as uncivilised brutes who attacked women and war invalids. In July 1936, for 
example, the UNC reported the assault of the ‘grand mutile’ Joseph Magne, founder of the 
association’s Nimes section and holder of the legion d ’honneur and the croix de guerre. 
Assailed by communists upon his exit from a section assembly, his crime was to display a 
tricolore on a medal awarded in recognition of his 32 years’ service as a miner. 1057 At a meeting 
in the Drome in 1936, La Voix du combattant reported:
Les admirateurs Valentinois et Romanais de Staline, n ’ont pas voulu rompre avec la 
tradition... Au moment ou la longue file des autos passait place Madier Montjan au coeur de la 
ville et sous le regard bienveillant de la police et des gendarmes, une centaine de voyous, dont le 
plus age n’avait pas 25 ans et parmi lesquel on a reconnu des repris de justice, des Armeniens, 
des Arabes et des Espagnoles, se livrerent a une serie de voie de fait contre les occupants des 
automobiles. 1058
This incident resembled wartime reports o f atrocities in two ways. Firstly, the perpetrators were 
said to be foreigners and so, following previous arguments, uncivilised. Secondly, the attack 
targeted the most vulnerable people at the meeting. The article reported women being spat upon, 
old people being insulted and mutiles and aveugles being punched and beaten with 
truncheons. 1059 After the last car passed, the crowd, reportedly under the orders of a CGT 
member, marched down the street. With their fists in the air, they sang the Internationale and 
broke windows with impunity from the police. The JUNC had evidence of further communist 
atrocities. At the fourth JUNC general assembly in March 1937, Raudot announced the death of 
the vice-president of a provincial group and the injury of the president of the Ardennes section, 
both alleged victims of communist activists as they left a PSF meeting. 1060
Atrocity propaganda, especially alleged crimes against religion, figured prominently in 
the UNC’s reports on the Spanish civil war. From the beginning of hostilities in Spain, the 
French right-wing press argued for non-intervention. Its campaign was so fierce that Blum’s 
government adopted this policy, a testament to the atmosphere created by newspapers on the 
right. 1061 The UNC’s experience o f the French Popular Front informed its stance on the Spanish
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civil war. Advocating a firm and absolute neutrality in matters, the Parisian leadership criticised 
the French Popular Front government for not presenting a unified policy, wavering as it did 
between the non-interventionism of Blum and the ‘bellicose’ Jouhaux who had ‘forgotten’ to do 
his duty in the last war. 1062 As August 1936 progressed, UNC policy on Spain became 
concerned with Moscow’s design on France. Any French participation in the war would lead to 
a revolution within France and civil war. 1063 A French civil war would benefit only one nation, 
Germany, ready to invade France to prevent the spread of communism. The UNC reported that 
the people who supported intervention had doubled their efforts, to the profit of Germany and 
Moscow. 1064 The association cautioned youths against being press ganged into fighting in 
Spain. 1065
The UNC sought to demonstrate Spanish communism’s incompatibility with Western 
civilisation through reported atrocities and accusations of anti-religious violence. Stories of 
atrocities committed by the ‘Reds’ in Spain concentrated on crimes against religion in order to 
highlight the barbarity o f the left-wing government. Moscow, foreign communists, Jouhaux and 
the CGT supported the men who slit the throats of nuns and burned down churches. 1066 Le 
Combattant du Centre refused to allow France to slip into the ‘primitive barbarity’ practised by 
the Popular Front in Spain. 1067 Desroches underlined the atrocities ‘worthy of the worst Asian 
torture’ committed against women and children in Spain in his argument for the 
Rassemblement. 1068 The material damages to Spain were nothing compared to the spiritual ones. 
Comparable only to the brutality o f the Turks under Suliman or the Roman emperors against 
early Christians, Spanish communists tortured bishops and priests, raped and molested nuns, 
destroyed churches, displayed profane images and prevented citizens from practising their 
religion. If Moscow continued to govern France, then the French could expect the same. 1069
The association interpreted the Spanish conflict as a theatre in the war between 
civilisation and barbarity:
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La guerre civile qui ensanglante l’Espagne... n ’est en realite, que la choc de la doctrine nationale 
de l’ordre et de la doctrine intemationale du chambardement et du desordre propagees par les 
Soviets moscovites. C ’est un episode localise de la lutte mondiale entre la civilisation et la 
barbarite. 1070
September 1936 saw the UNC come out firmly in favour of Franco and his Spanish ‘patriots’. 
Two months later, the UNC was unequivocal in its condemnation of the Spanish Popular Front: 
“La guerre civile a eclate en Espagne parce que la dictature du Front Populaire (Frente Popular),
menee par les Soviets, etait devenue intolerable au pays Communisme = Tyrannie +
Assassinat.... Les responsabilites de la guerre civile sont toute entiere du cote du Front 
Populaire” . 1071 The UNC linked the revolutionary actions and laws of the Spanish Popular Front 
with the ‘crimes’ of the French incarnation, such as the dissolution of the right-wing leagues. 
Communist savages and brutes recruited among the purported defenders of liberty while Franco 
only allowed indigenous and strictly disciplined men to join his cause. 1072
“Et l’on pretend que nous sommes en Republique!”
The UNC’s belief, influenced by the culture o f war, that the Popular Front was a foreign power 
in occupation akin to the German enemy o f times past led it to question the continued existence 
of the Republic. During 1937, two incidents led the UNC to this position. In March 1937, 
violence between Popular Front supporters and the police heightened tensions in France. 
Bloodshed followed the PSF’s screening of a family film in the working-class area of Clichy. 
The left saw this as a provocation. and organised a demonstration. After PSF members were 
evacuated from the cinema, police clashed with marchers. Five people were killed and hundreds 
more injured. The Popular Front came in for intense criticism from the right because the 
Socialist mayor, the communist deputy for Clichy and a communist councillor had sanctioned 
the protest. 1073 The UNC accused the ‘elected Muscovites’ of fomenting trouble. Aubert 
questioned whether freedom of expression in France still existed if one could not criticise the left 
without the fear of an officially licensed counter-demonstration. 1074 The violence at Clichy
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208
provided the Jeunes de Limoges with evidence of the current democratic regime’s status as a 
camouflaged dictatorship . 1075
The Cagoule plot, in which right-wing conspirators conspired to overthrow the regime, 
supplied further grist to the mill. In certain sections of the press the UNC stood accused of 
involvement in the planned coup. Goudaert claimed that the association was under attack from 
all sides. Radicals, socialists, and members of the FOP and FNCR were now adversaries of the 
association. 1076 Among the more radical elements of the UNC’s provincial press, the Cagoule 
affair aroused anger and racism. Published in the JUNC’s Entre Nous, the article Le Cagoulard 
left the reader in little doubt about the cagoulard’s non-French origin: “Si on parvient a lui 
arracher sa cagoule on lui trouverait sans doute les yeux brides de l’Asiatique, le nez busque 
d’un du ‘Ghetto’, les levres epaisses d’un rastaquouere, et dans ses poches de l ’argent venant un 
peu de tous les pays....Pouah! . . . .” . 1077 De Cromieres alleged that the ‘vampires’ o f the Jewish 
Front had framed the veterans in question for the crime of terrorism. 1078
In the eyes o f the UNC, the events o f late 1937 were proof positive of the Popular Front’s 
sinister plans. La Voix du combattant concluded: “Decidement, ce pays est mur pour la 
dictature... Ce sont des methodes bolchevistes qui sont ainsi instaurees en France... Et l’on 
pretend que nous sommes en Republique!” . 1079 In Paris, the policy making committee of the 
JUNC condemned the harassment o f veterans while the police turned a blind eye to communist 
arms dumps. The jeunes compared the current situation to that of living under a totalitarian 
regime:
Des lors, il est inadmissible que soient plus longtemps maintenus en prison des inculpes 
qui ignorent encore ce qui leur est veritablement reproche; ou alors, avouons tout de suite que 
nous sommes comme en Russie ou en Allemagne, ou les citoyens ne sont libres que dans la 
mesure ou le Gouvemement les y autorise. 1080
1075 J. Redondin, ‘Reflexions d’un Jeune’, Le Combattant du Centre, May 1937.
1076 UNC/EC, 5 February 1938.
1077 ‘Le Cagoulard’, Entre Nous, April 1938.
1078 G. de Cromieres, ‘Et la France ! ’, Le Combattant du Centre, July 1938.
1079 ‘La dictature de la CGT’, La Vdc, 18 December 1937.
1080 Le Bureau National des Jeunes de l ’UNC, ‘La justice et la liberte: Mauvais exemple’, La Vdc, 25 December 
1937.
209
This injustice led the JUNC to question the true nature of the government and whether 
France was now a police state.1081 In May 1937, Jean Redondin of the Limoges JUNC section 
voiced the widely held concern that the government was now a dictatorship.1082 In December 
1937, the JUNC’s policy-making committee expressed similar concerns.1083 If the government 
was prepared to arrest and imprison citizens arbitrarily then it would soon execute them without 
trial. Frenchmen were faced with a choice: react now or suffer revolution, dictatorship, civil and 
foreign war.1084
This belligerence was not new. From the start, the UNC reacted to the perceived 
communist threat with aggression. Members of the Rassemblement were united by one aim: 
“Que le Communisme soit combattu et pourchasse”.1085 Galland placed the French flag in 
juxtaposition to the standard o f the Soviet Union in order to express the battle between the two: 
“Nous avons oppose le drapeau tricolore au drapeau rouge.... Nous ne desirons pas la bataille. 
Ah! certes non! Mais s’il faut se battre, on se battra. Et toute attaque aura sa riposte; et la verite 
sera opposee a toute calomnie”.1086 Underlining the need to destroy rather than merely wound 
communism, Arnault of the JUNC vowed that the veterans would ‘have its skin’. The anciens 
and the jeunes would fight ‘ferociously’ against the ‘crime’ and ‘treason’ of communism.1087 As 
we have seen, some provincial sections such as the one in Antibes advocated a potentially violent 
action to rid France once and for all o f the Popular Front.
In October 1936, Georges Merchiez called on members to be vigilant, as, in the event that 
the Popular Front failed, the ‘scum’ on the left would continue the battle in the streets. Murder 
and rape would follow and blood would flow.1089 After the violence at Clichy, Lagree, president 
of the Ille-et-Vilaine youth section, reminded his readers that in the face of oppression, 
insurrection was not only a right but also a duty.1090 Still, would the UNC have undertaken armed 
action? Lebecq warned that communist insurgents were planning for an armed struggle. In this
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event the UNC would combat communism in the street. Though the former president stated that 
the UNC would not provoke such a confrontation, his appeal to members to ‘use the same means 
as them’ is unclear. Perhaps this meant that in the case of a revolution the veterans would 
respond with armed force. It is possible that he was advocating the stockpiling of arms, an 
action he claimed the communists were already undertaking:
Us ont des depots d’armes et on a fabrique des grenades pour l’Espagne, mais toutes ne sont pas 
parties la-bas. II faut que vous ayez la volonte de barrer la route au communisme... Vos 
dirigeants sont la pour vous aider, mais il faut que vous soyez prets a la lutte. Le travail que vous 
aurez a faire sera personnel et il ne faut pas compter sur le voisin. Nous donnerons notre peau 
pour des hommes qui en valent la peine et non pour des pleutres ou des laches.... Nous subirons 
la lutte de rue si elle se presente, mais nous ne provoquerons pas.... II faut combattre et abattre le 
communisme et pour cela, employer les memes moyens qu’eux. Quand vous aurez mis le 
communisme a bas, nous pourrons reconstruire une France aussi belle que dans le passe.1091
In March 1938, Lebecq repeated his warning to Le Figaro. In the name of French 
civilisation against soviet barbarity, the veterans were resolved, if necessaiy, to ‘once again take 
up their arms’.1092 Speaking before 450 members at Saint-Malo, Alexis Thomas of the Lorraine 
group denounced Stalin’s control o f French domestic policy by means of the CGT. Thomas 
warned provincial members: “...le moment est venu d’opposer un barrage au communisme 
envahisseur”.1093 Le Combattant d ’Ille-et-Vilaine reported that attendees ‘literally drank his 
words’. Thomas’ call to stand-up to the communist invader received an ovation.1094
By March 1938, when the UNC joined the UF’s call for a government of public safety, 
the association despaired o f the situation in France. In the eyes of the UNC, the Popular Front 
victory was indistinguishable from communist revolution. The government’s allegedly 
draconian actions over Clichy and the Cagoule plot saw the UNC claim that the Republic was 
either threatened or had been supplanted by dictatorship. The threat to the French nation raised 
the prospect of armed action in return. After all, electoral action to remove the Popular Front 
was anathema to the veterans. The violent removal of those believed to be enemies of the
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national interest remained an option. The direct action against the government that the UNC 
implied was neither Republican nor democratic.
The UNC’s ultimate response to the Popular Front would be the campaign for a 
government of public safety. It is worth noting that the suspension of the democratic process and 
the eviction from power o f democratically elected representatives was not a desire confined to 
the Parisian leadership. On 20 March 1938, a meeting of the Seine-Inferieure group in Rouen, 
representing 28,000 veterans and 270 sections, adopted an ordre du jour  specifying that a 
government be formed of men from outside the parties and parliament.1095 L 'UNC de Normandie 
reported that a meeting of section presidents had endorsed the plan and that the Rouen section 
had begun to collect signatures to a petition.1096 On 27 March, 100 youth section delegates 
attended a meeting of section presidents of the Yonne Groupe at the congress o f Villneuve- 
Archeveque. The jeunes approved a motion in favour of the constitution of an extra- 
parliamentary government and the suspension o f parliament.1097 This motion was published in all 
the newspapers o f the department. Support was also expressed at the departmental congress of 
the Rhone group.1098 Sections of the UNC and UF began to work more closely with each other. 
The Ardeche groups suggested a joint national congress, under the presidency of Jean Goy and 
Pichot. Representatives o f the UF and UNC addressed united audiences across France: Pichot 
and Jean Goy at Lyon, Pichot and Berthier at Bordeaux. From October 1938 to July 1939, most 
UNC meetings included the UF, under the banner of the campaign for public safety.
Conclusion
Prost assigns little value to veteran discourse. He claims that it was a religious or laicised 
sermon in which the veterans invited the French to emulate the veterans’ civic virtue. The key to 
this interpretation is the alleged disjunction between veteran discourse and political reality. 
Politicians were reduced to stereotypes and allegories.1099 The veterans alleged that all parties
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and politicians worked for interest groups, were divided by narrow dogmas inadaptable to 
modem problems, and simply too old.1100 The veterans avoided the discussion of ‘real’ daily 
politics. They presented France as a simple dichotomy between the ‘good’ politics of the 
veterans and the ‘bad’ politics o f the parties.1101 Bombastic rhetoric was designed to reinforce the 
enthusiasm of members but little else. In spite of the veteran’s anti-parliamentarianism, 
therefore, the incantatory nature o f their discourse set them apart fundamentally from the 
extreme right. Although one can read their discourse as fascist, the veterans’ refusal to treat a 
section of their fellow citizens as enemies meant that they could not have launched such an 
action themselves.1102
However, the veterans did treat an important group of their compatriots as adversaries. 
Their discourse intensified throughout the Popular Front’s tenure in power and sought to deny 
communists and socialists a place in French and Western civilisation. Whether the UNC used 
the language of the culture o f war consciously or not, it is nevertheless present in the 
association’s discourse. The association used the language of a conflict between civilisation and 
barbarity against whomever it designated as enemies of France, in this case the communists, as it 
had been used against the German foe. It preached a form of reconciliation but this entailed the 
union of forces deemed ‘national’ against those considered to be ‘anti-national’. In essence this 
would pit the forces of the right against the left.
As political leagues and extremist groups took to the streets, an atmosphere of civil war 
developed. The public discourse o f the UNC was not moderate. After 1936, the UNC 
undermined the Republic in a variety o f ways. It depicted the democratically elected 
government as traitorous to France, contrary to a (UNC-defined) national interest and an 
illegitimate regime that would be removed by force if necessary. In this context, the radical 
elements of the UNC, and the extremist potential o f the movement have been underestimated. 
Though the government was elected democratically and the Republic continued to function, the 
veterans denied this fact. The Republic no longer existed. France was simultaneously an 
occupied nation and a dictatorship. The association discredited both the legal government of 
France and the elective principle. Furthermore, the government was incompatible with French 
and Western civilisation. Like the wartime German adversary, the left threatened both. In
1,00 Ibid., p. 130.
1101 Ibid., p. 145.
1102 t u ; j  «  n o
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response then, the UNC attempted to form an alliance of national forces, but to what end? The 
association was not a political party and so an electoral alliance was out of the question. Instead, 
the Rassemblement would be a coalition that was ready to act when the perceived communist 
threat became too great to tolerate. In sum, these were not the practices of a democratic group.
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Conclusion
Sur de 1 affection de notre admirable armee, qui lutte avec un heroisme admirable contre un 
ennemi superieur en nombre et en armes.... Sur de l ’appui des Anciens Combattants que j ’ai eu la 
fierte de commander.... je  fais a la France le don de ma personne pour attenuer son malheur.1103
Marshal Petain, 17 June 1940
Aux problemes poses, qu’ils fussent moraux, politiques, sociaux ou economiques, nous avons 
cherche et trouve des solutions, celles memes qui sont, depuis le 10 juillet 1940, la substance de 
la «RevolutionNationale».1104
Henri Pichot
The UNC’s desire for rapprochement with Germany, inspired by its anti-communism, declined 
after Munich.1105 The Munich conference in September 1938 was the high-water mark of French 
pacifism. As 1938 turned to 1939, among the veterans’ associations and the population at large 
the resolve to resist Hitler’s demands largely strengthened as pacifism diminished.1106 Despite 
Pichot’s presence at Munich, pessimism within the UF grew. The following year the UF, 
although not resigned to the inevitability of conflict, advocated preparation for war. Nationalism 
and imperialism marked its national congress in 1939. In March 1939, in response to German 
actions in central Europe, Pichot and Goy decided to suspend the Comite France-Allemagne, the 
body through which French and German veterans had met regularly.1107 As war seemed likely, 
both associations called on Daladier to maximise arms production. The veterans’ committee in 
charge of the 20th Armistice celebrations decided to donate the 700,000 F left over to the Caisse 
autonome de la Defense Nationale with the intention of ‘[stimulating] the zeal of the French’.1108
On 3 September 1939, France declared war on Germany. The drole de guerre that 
followed witnessed increasing anti-communism in France after the Soviet Union’s pact with
1103 Cointet, La Legion frangaise des combattants, p. 17.
1104 AN 43 AS 8: taken from Pichot’s preface to Les Combattants avaient raison...., (Paris?, 1940).
1105 Gorman, ‘The anciens combattants’, pp. 81-83.
1106 Julian Jackson, The Fall o f  France: The Nazi Invasion o f 1940 (Oxford: OUP, 2003), p. 150.
1107 ‘La dissolution du Comite France-Allemagne’, La Vdc, 1 April 1939.
n°8 ‘R£ijqUat 20e anniversaire de l ’Armistice: Les anciens combattants remettent 700, 000 fr a la Caisse 
Autonome de la Defense Nationale’, La Vdc, 21 January 1939.
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Germany in August. Months of inaction saw growing cafard among troops. Rumours abounded 
about France’s unpreparedness for war and Britain’s cynical use of French troops. The Daladier 
government proved unable to combat defeatist sentiment. These factors combined to bring down 
Daladier in March 1940. He was replaced by Paul Reynaud.1109
On 10 May, Germany invaded France through the Ardennes and not via Belgium, as the 
French believed they would. The Battle of France was short. Six days later the Germans faced 
an unhindered advance to Paris. On 14 June, German troops entered Paris. Two days later 
Petain succeeded Reynaud as head of government and an armistice was signed on 22 June. It 
divided France into a northern Occupied Zone and a southern Unoccupied Zone, demobilised all 
but 100,000 men of the French army, disarmed the naval fleet and landed the French government 
with the cost of occupation.1110 On 1 July, the final government o f the Third Republic took up 
residence in the Unoccupied Zone at Vichy. In reality Petain sought to consolidate his position. 
Pierre Laval, at the time deputy premier, formulated a plan that would see parliament grant 
Petain the powers to revise the constitution. Already approved by the cabinet, parliament met in 
Vichy to discuss the plan on 9 July. The next day, Petain, empowered by parliament, put an end 
to the Third Republic and became head of state.1111
Ultimately, there was no veterans’ revolution. On 17 June 1940, in his first address to the 
nation, Marshal Petain mentioned the support o f the anciens combattants.1112 Would the new 
regime finally take heed of the veterans and grant them their long-pursued role in the leadership 
of the nation? On 28 August 1940, Vichy’s council of ministers adopted a law that merged all 
veterans’ associations into the Legion fran9 aise des combattants. Intended to be ‘the eyes and 
the ears’ of the Marshal, according to Vallat, the Legion would help to spread the principles of 
the National Revolution in collaboration with the public powers.1113 Members of the defunct 
UNC joined the leadership o f the movement. Pericard became vice-president representing the 
army. Lebecq was chosen as president of the occupied zone, although the Legion was prohibited 
in the north.1114 The directoire o f the Legion contained 15 members, of which Aze, du Plessis de
1109 Jackson, Dark Years, pp. 113-118.
1110 Ibid., p. 127.
1111 Ibid., pp. 112-133.
1112 Cointet, La Legion frangaise des combattants, p. 17.
1113 Ibid., pp. 57-59.
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Grenedan, Emile Goudaert and Vimal de Flechac were former UNC members. From the UF, 
Blanchard, Lhospied, Maupoil and Mercier had all been members o f their association’s executive 
committee in 1940.1115 In the choice of departmental presidents, where the selected candidate 
had belonged to an association before the war former UNC members held the lion’s share (13/45 
compared to the UF’s 7).1116
The veterans supported the foundation o f the Vichy regime because, in their opinion, it 
was moral and national. In Petain they found a leader who they believed could represent their 
views and address their concerns. As evidenced in their campaigns for state reform, both the 
UNC and the UF had desired to see a personality such as the Marshal take over the government 
of France. The new regime would satisfy the veterans’ long standing demands for authority after 
years of alleged parliamentary decadence. The veterans supported Vichy’s removal of elected 
mayors and the imprisonment o f political figures and suspect individuals.
Though the veterans supported Vichy, Prost writes that this fact does not undermine their 
legalistic inclination. The veterans endorsed the removal of enemies of the national interest by a 
legal regime. During the thirties, they did not eliminate these enemies in the course o f a political 
struggle as Italian Fascists and German Nazis did. However, given that the veterans were neither 
fascist in programme, associational structure nor political tactics, it is problematic to prove their 
legalism in comparison with fascism. The UNC did not partake in violent physical confrontation 
but as we have seen in their opposition to the left that did not mean that they rejected 
confrontation tout court. Should one discount the UNC’s often violent discourse because it did 
not transmute into physical violence? The UNC desired an authoritarian regime be implemented 
through legal reform. It never intended to take power by violent means. One should not 
therefore judge its failure to do so as indicative of the movement’s moderation.
With the benefit o f hindsight, one can dismiss veteran discourse as ‘situated in an unreal 
universe, where action had an incantatory function’.1 The incantatory function of veteran
1115 Ibid., p. 74.
1116 Ibid., pp. 314-316. There were 45 departmental presidents o f which 15 had no previous affiliation to a veterans’ 
association. The 13 former UNC members were from: the Ardeche (former group president), the Correze (former 
member of the national council and the policy-making committee), the Dordogne (former group president), the 
Drome (former group president), the Herault, the Haute Loire, the Basses-Pyrenees (former departmental president), 
the Hautes-Pyrenees (former departmental president), the Rhone (former section president), the Vienne and the 
Haute Vienne. The number o f departmental presidents drawn from other associations were as follows: UF, 7; UNP, 
1; Federation. Bourbonnaise des AC, 1; the SDC, 1; the Federation Maginot, 3; the AGMG, 1; the UMAC, 1; the 
Federation des Poilus de la Loire, 1; the Gueules Cassees, 1.
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discourse is proved by the fact that the veterans did not act upon it. Yet once again this depends 
upon using an outcome to dismiss veteran discourse as lacking seriousness. If one accepts the 
incantatory function o f their discourse one must also accept that contemporaries understood it as 
such too, a point that is difficult to prove.
One can argue that UNC discourse had some grounding in political reality. Articles in La 
Voix du combattant dealt with contemporary political issues. Though verbal attacks often 
targeted the nameless and undefined politicien, this did not mean that specific politicians were 
not named. Particularly after May 1936, when the left came in for venomous criticism, the UNC 
was not afraid to single out politicians and parties in its bitter campaign against 
parliamentarianism. UNC discourse drew on the influence of the culture o f war to target 
violently communists and socialists. The left, depicted as an anti-national force, replaced the 
German wartime enemy. The association relied on wartime language and ideas to portray their 
political enemies as incompatible with French and Western civilisation. Through the accusation 
that the left had won power only to then install a soviet dictatorship the UNC cast doubt on the 
legitimacy of the Republic at this time.
A proportion o f veterans heeded the UNC’s supplications to action. On 6 February 1934, 
several thousand members answered the call to march. The UNC took part in the violence that 
brought down an elected government. Some veterans were involved in the incidents on the Place 
de la Concorde early in the riot. Moreover one should not ignore the fact that the UNC clashed 
with police in their march to the Elysee. Veterans returned to the Concorde late in the evening 
and took part in renewed violence. Certainly, not all UNC veterans agreed with the GRP’s 
march. The association lost members yet it gained the approval of some provincial sections. It 
also attracted new recruits.
Though the UNC did not explicitly state its aim was to bring down the government, it 
claimed credit for the fall o f Daladier and the arrival of Doumergue in power, an action that 
reversed the parliamentary mandate of 1932. Aubert claimed that without the UNC’s presence
1117on the night, the Republic ‘would have had its day’ (aurait vecu), a view shared by Isaac. 
What this meant is open to interpretation. Perhaps the event marked a coup d ’arret in the decline 
of the regime, after which the Doumergue administration could begin the process of recovery.1118
1117 H. Aubert, ‘Le Bilan d ’un soir tragique’, La Vdc, 17 February 1934; Prost, I, p. 164.
1,18 Ibid., p. 164.
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Yet the UNC and sections o f the right placed great hope in the new government for another 
reason. They believed that reform of the regime would not be long in coming. This reform 
would satisfy their more or less authoritarian demands, especially given the appointment of 
Tardieu, Louis Marin and Petain to governmental posts. Whatever Aubert and Isaac meant, one 
can argue that the association supported an illegal action that toppled a democratically elected 
government. By associating its action with the ‘people’ and laying claim to a ‘Republican’ 
action against a government that was not, the UNC posed its own popular sovereignty against the 
democratic sovereignty o f the Chamber. In this way it challenged the right of parliament to 
govern France.
Discourse on youth in the UNC was a component of its authoritarianism. The 
associations used the perceived youthfulness of veteran ideas to reinforce its claim to the 
government of France and further undermine the claim of ‘aged’ politicians to power. The 
JUNC pursued an openly political action. Its programme drew on the themes of the 
contemporary young intellectual milieu, especially in its call for spiritual revolution and a 
palingenetic vision o f French society. The JUNC’s plans for reform took two forms. Initially, 
the jeunes called for a revolution both in the national esprit and the French state, which would 
entail the destruction o f its institutions. As the thirties progressed, the jeunes came to value 
authority, evidenced in its support for the UNC and UF’s plan in March 1938 and its statements 
on returning authority to France. Either way, the Third Republic as it stood, that is, as a 
parliamentary democracy, would not have survived.
If one defines the veterans’ movement as a pillar of a French democratic political culture 
it appears that co-operation with anti-democratic organisations was out of character. It follows 
from this that such co-operation was anomalous and limited to a minority of the movement or 
perhaps the extreme right ‘seduced’ the anciens combattants. However, one should not seek to 
define the essence or nature o f the UNC or the combatants’ movement. To do so leads one to 
classify examples of discourse and action as either ‘real’ (and therefore revelatory of the true 
identity of the group) or ‘unreal’ (and so against the group’s nature). If one examines the UNC 
from a relational perspective based on its programme and tactics then co-operation with the 
extreme right becomes less mysterious. This political involvement shows that some UNC
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veterans went beyond ‘cathartic’ expressions of frustration, bitterness and spite against 
politicians.1119
As the thirties progressed, the UNC adapted its political tactics and discourse to the 
demands of the time. Astute enough to observe the structure and tactics of the thriving leagues, 
the UNC adopted a league-style action precisely because it had proved successful for other 
groups. Action combattante not only represented the veterans’ desire to enter into politics but 
also their willingness to adjust their tactics in relation to others, especially the Croix de Feu. The 
association’s later political initiative, the Rassemblement fran9ais, saw the UNC once again alter 
its political tactics to suit a new situation. For the first time, the association explicitly 
encouraged national and local co-operation with political groups that were violently opposed to 
the Third Republic.
The veterans shared common ideas with extreme right-wing groups and this facilitated 
co-operation. It allowed members to lend their support to several organisations at once. The 
Croix de Feu and the UNC competed for the same clientele, laid claim to a common heritage and 
espoused largely similar ideas. Moreover, Goy and Lebecq endorsed the leagues and encouraged 
informal and formal collaboration among members. It is unsurprising that members had few 
qualms over relegating loyalty to a single group to the practice of multiple memberships. This 
collaboration showed the desire o f some veterans to engage in action with groups that could not 
be described as Republican, even if  there is still disagreement among historians over their fascist 
characteristics. The UNC was not a fascist threat to the Republic yet it was not a major obstacle 
to the development of a French fascism. It did not inculcate in its members an attitude opposed 
to fascism. Prost is wrong to assert that all veterans rejected the Croix de Feu. The veterans, like 
French society, were not immune to fascism. In the end, common political discourse, ideas and 
actions meant that extreme right-wing groups did not find it difficult to recruit from the UNC.
The veterans’ plans for state reform did not allow for the continuation of the Republic in 
the democratic and parliamentary sense o f the word. A leading ‘national’ personality, probably 
from the armed forces, would lead the government. Around him, a group of honest, competent 
and unelected men (such as the veterans) would form the government. The veterans’ movement 
though not in power would become part of the state apparatus perhaps as a surveillance force.
1119 Prost, III, p. 213.
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Parliament, reduced in size and disarmed of its obstructive powers, would ratify the decisions of 
the executive. Replacing the Senate as an institution of the state, a new chamber made up of 
economists and fathers (who would naturally work in the ‘national interest’) would direct the 
economy and manage the professions through corporations. With political pluralism severely 
restricted, the parties o f the left would most likely be outlawed. Enemies of the state, that is to 
say those deemed to be in opposition to the single national interest, would be punished. If 
measured by the standard o f the Fourth and Fifth Republics, one may judge the veteran’s plans 
as objective modifications intended to make the regime more efficient. However, one should not 
consider these ‘modem’ regimes as an historical norm and the goal to which all French were 
striving. The UNC’s plans would make the regime more ‘efficient’ but only according to its own 
definition of efficient government: a permanent authoritarian right-wing government of veterans, 
under a military personality, which would restore order and reduce the role of parliamentary 
democracy. Close to the plans o f the right and extreme right, the UNC’s programme for state 
reform was not of the Republican centre.
Was the veterans’ movement integral to a French democratic political culture? Given the 
social, cultural and political heterogeneity of France during the interwar period it is problematic 
to assert that this democratic culture existed at all. One cannot say how French citizens 
internalised a certain set o f values, whether democratic or not.1120 The same is true for the 
mouvement ancien combattant. With a membership of 3 million veterans, heterogeneity 
characterised the associations. Within the UNC itself, activists, extremists and those who 
favoured relative moderation disagreed over the meaning of civic action, the veterans’ role in 
society and over the meaning o f the UNC itself. What one can say is that the discourse and 
actions of not a few UNC veterans were not compatible with democracy. The association was 
close to the right and extreme right in its plans for state reform, its discourse and its programme. 
It readily co-operated on a national and provincial level with groups of this political persuasion.
The UNC was not part o f a French democratic political culture. In casting doubt on the 
capability of Republican institutions and parliamentarians to represent the national interest and in 
posing themselves as the true representatives o f these, the veterans undermined the regime. They 
did this in a variety o f ways. Parliament was branded as incompetent, corrupt, selfish and was 
regarded with suspicion. Governments and deputies worked for their own career interests and
1120 Passmore, ‘The construction o f crisis’, p. 164; Dobry, ‘February 1934’, pp. 145-146.
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not those of the nation. As an institution then parliament acted contrary to the will of the nation. 
As it stood, parliamentary democracy in the Third Republic was unsuitable. In contrast, the 
veterans of the UNC represented the true will of the people. Gifted with the necessary 
competence for leadership, they were better able to express this than parliamentarians. 
Furthermore, the veterans’ claim to power was not based on the elective principal, the usual 
route to power in the Third Republic. It was based on the historical legitimacy of the trench 
experience. Consequently, veteran discourse was not suited to electoral politics. When the UNC 
spoke of evicting parliamentarians from the Chamber this would not come after a successful 
electoral campaign, which the veterans rejected. It implied an extra-parliamentary route to 
government.
Authoritarian in its objectives and willing to co-operate with anti-Republican and anti­
democratic organisations, the UNC provided recruits for and shared ideas with extreme right- 
wing groups in France. The UNC’s general assemblies, propaganda tours, and its national and 
local congresses exposed members to ideas and initiatives that were not democratic. Would the 
veterans have installed an authoritarian regime if  the Second World War had not broken? 
However much one speculates, war did  break out. In spite of all their plans, the veterans did not
install an authoritarian regime. This outcome (or indeed this lack of an outcome) should not lead
1121one to dismiss all that the veterans did and said as ‘boasting, sabre-rattling and bluster’. One 
should not remove all serious intent from their ‘thundering’ rhetoric and claim to see it for what 
it was: ‘an empty discourse’ and ‘an admittance of impotence’.1122 It is not surprising that the 
veterans’ associations supported Petain in 1940. They were, after all, part of the historical 
hinterland of the Vichy regime.
1121 Prost, III, p. 163.
1122 Ibid., p. 163.
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